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 ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis includes three empirical studies detecting the determinants of crime in 
England and Wales. We firstly apply time series analyses to look for cointegrating 
relationships between property crimes and unemployment as well as law enforcement 
instruments. We extend our study by employing panel data and corresponding 
techniques to control for area-specific fixed effects as well as the endogeneity of law 
enforcement variables. In our third study, we allow crime rate to have spatial spillover 
effect, in other words, the crime rate in one area is affected by, in addition to its local 
crime-influential factors, the crime rates and crime-related factors in its neighbouring 
areas. We demonstrate this result by constructing a theoretical model and testing it by 
applying spatial analysis regressions. Our main findings can be summarized as 
follows: First, property crimes are better explained by economic models of crime than 
violent crimes. Second, law enforcement instruments always have negative effects on 
both property and violent crimes, indicating their deterrence and incapacitation effects 
as predicted. Third, social-economic factors, such as unemployment and income level, 
have two effects on property crimes: opportunity and motivation. Their net effects on 
property crime rates depend on the type of crime as well as the time period being 
examined. And finally, there is indeed spillover effect existing in crime rate. For 
burglary, theft and handling, and robbery, the crime rate in one area is positively and 
significantly correlated with the crime rates from its neighbouring areas. Furthermore, 
the crime rate of sexual offences of one area is negatively related to such crime rates 
in neighbouring areas.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND AIMS 
 
The aim of this thesis is to understand the determinants of crime rates in England and 
Wales by applying various empirical analyses. Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) 
provided a framework for the economic analysis of crime by assuming potential 
offenders are economically rational and utility maximizing. Becker and Ehrlich 
predicted that crime should be deterred by tougher law enforcement policies because 
higher “price” for committing crimes should discourage the incentives to participate 
in illegal activities of rational offenders. Further, worse labour market opportunities 
for potential offenders will encourage their criminal activities by reducing their 
opportunity cost of doing so. Following the theories of Becker and Ehrlich, many 
scholars were interested in empirically testing the predicted relationships between 
crime and variables which influence the potential criminal’s rational decision by 
affecting the costs and benefits of committing crime. However, there are various 
econometric issues (for example endogeneity) in most of these papers and often 
significant crime influencing variables are not included in the estimation leading to an 
omitted variable bias. 
 
I use a broad range of crime types, both property and violent, and adopt multiple 
techniques to analyse this issue in England and Wales. In this thesis, I aim to provide 
a relatively comprehensive understanding on the intriguing but complex relations 
between different crimes and various social factors through multiple types of 
empirical analysis.  
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Such analysis has distinct implications for policy analysis. The effective response to 
crime is one of the essential priorities faced by any government. However, in order to 
provide effective crime control, it is crucial to clearly understand the interaction 
between crime and various factors. Therefore, the empirical analyses in this thesis 
could supplement to the existing literature of crime in England and Wales to analyze 
the determinants of criminal activities. Furthermore, as implied in Becker (1968), 
combating crimes through law enforcement and justice system is costly to social 
welfare. If, by empirical analysis, it could be demonstrated that crime is also heavily 
affected by certain social-economic factors, there could be an additional method to 
control crime which is less costly and provide other long term benefits to society. For 
example, higher legal income level is predicted to reduce crime through increasing 
offenders’ opportunity cost of committing crimes; similarly, a decrease in 
unemployment rate could also reduce crime by improving the labour market 
opportunities for potential criminals (Ehrlich 1973). If various empirical tests in 
England and Wales can constantly confirm the validation of such predictions, it might 
be able to draw the implication that economic growth could be an effective way to 
ease the issue of crime. Comparing to law enforcement effort, combating crime 
through economic growth could be less costly because economic prosperity itself is 
the target of both government and population. Reduced crime rate becomes a positive 
“side-effect” of better economic conditions. Moreover, different types of crimes differ 
in their nature and thus their reactions to the crime influential factors. Empirical 
testing could reveal such diversity and, as a result, a better understanding of the nature 
of each individual type of crime may be achieved. We may realize that different 
policies may be better suited for combating different kinds of crime. 
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1.2 THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
The thesis is divided as follows: 
 
In Chapter Two, we provide a background by surveying the economic literature on 
crime starting with Becker (1968) who first formalized how crime could be looked 
upon as any other economic activity. A lot of theoretical and empirical work has tried 
to extend Becker’s theory and have used empirical analogues to Becker’s model in 
trying to determine the effects that different factors have on crime rates. I survey 
some of the important works in that areas; most of which are based on the cases in the 
U.S.  
 
In Chapter Three, we start our empirical analysis by applying time series data and 
techniques to look at both long-run and short-run relationships between crime rates 
and a limited number of variables. We use national level time series data over the 
period 1971-2000 (for the overall crime and fraud and forgery, the examined period is 
1971-1997) to study the correlations between property crimes and their related factors 
of law enforcement instruments and unemployment rate. The aim of this chapter is to 
identify the unemployment – crime relationship, which is famous for being 
ambiguous in sign, by examining their temporal variations. In addition, we also test 
the predicted negative correlations between property crimes and law enforcement 
variables from the angle of time series analysis. The modern econometric techniques 
enable us to test the stationarity of different variables as well as long-term 
cointegration and short-term error correction models. Our results mainly suggest that, 
in long-run, the overall and property crime rates are cointegrated with unemployment 
and law enforcement instruments. While unemployment has positive cointegration 
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with overall crime, burglary, and theft and handling, it has negative cointegration with 
fraud and forgery. The custody rate, as one of the law enforcement variables, is 
negatively cointegrated with both overall and property crimes. Detection rate, the 
other law enforcement variable, has negative cointegration with overall crime and 
positive cointegration with each individual property crimes. In short-run, on the other 
hand, the change in custody rate constantly and negatively affects each crime rate 
being examined, the change in unemployment is positively correlated with the overall 
crime, burglary, as well as theft and handling.  
 
We extend our analyses in Chapter Four by adding violent crimes into our analyses. 
More importantly, we introduce a relatively complete set of crime-related explanatory 
variables in our empirical model, such as law enforcement, social-economic 
conditions, demographic composition, as well as once-lagged crime rate reflecting a 
dynamic pattern in crime rate. Our panel data disaggregated by 43 police force areas 
in England and Wales over the period 1992-2005 enables us to study the relationships 
between different crime rates and their influential variables based on the information 
that varies by both areas and years. In addition, such a data structure also provides the 
capacity to control for area-specific fixed effects that would be otherwise correlated 
with the independent variables. We adopt generalized method of moments (GMM) 
technique, in addition to OLS and fixed effects models, to eliminate the area-specific 
fixed effects and to apply instrumental variables for endogenous law enforcement 
variables as well as once-lagged crime rate. Our main findings are: firstly, property 
crimes are better explained by our empirical model than violent crimes. Individual 
crime types could have different response to the explanatory variables. Secondly, the 
law enforcement variables broadly show negative correlations with different crime 
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rates confirming their deterrence (and probably also incapacitation) effects on crime 
as predicted by theories. Thirdly, the social-economic factors, such as unemployment 
and real earnings, mainly pick up their opportunity (i.e. the opportunities for such 
crime) effects on property crimes indicating worse social-economic conditions will 
reduce property crimes due to fewer opportunities available. And finally, each crime 
rate being analysed shows significant and positive correlation with its once-lagged 
value. This result suggests strong persistence in crimes and we will give detailed 
explanations in this chapter.  
 
In Chapter Five, we examine whether there are spatial spillover effects in crime rates. 
We relax the assumption adopted by most works in this area (including our previous 
analyses) that crime rate in one area is only affected by its local related factors. 
Instead, we allow the crime rate of each area to depend on, in addition to local factors, 
the crime rates and explanatory variables in neighbouring areas. The idea stems from 
the fact that, if criminals are mobile, policy in one area could affect the crime rate in 
neighbouring areas as well. For example, toughened law enforcement in one area 
could drive criminals to spillover into neighbouring areas causing a negative 
externality. Alternatively, relatively affluent crime opportunities in one area could 
attract the potential criminals spillover from neighbouring areas and leaving their 
“home” areas with lower crime rates. Based on the assumption of spill-over effect, we 
firstly construct a simple theoretical model containing two regions contiguous to each 
other. By showing that the number of crimes spilling over from one area to the other 
is affected by the relative cost and opportunities between the two regions, we derive 
several predictions for later tests. Accordingly, we constructed two empirical models: 
in the first one, we allow the crime rate in one area to be affected by a set of local 
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explanatory variables as well as the crime rates from its neighbouring areas; in the 
second model, we assume the crime rate in one area is predicted by not only its local 
related factors, but also those factors from neighbouring areas. Our empirical models 
are tested by applying spatial lag and spatial error models, as well as a spatial 
contiguous matrix, on panel data disaggregated by police force areas over the period 
1998-2001. Our application of panel data in spatial analysis models is a major 
improvement comparing to other spatial analysis papers because, in this way, we are 
able to explicitly include both area-specific and year-specific fixed effects that would 
be otherwise correlated with the independent variables. Our results suggest that there 
is indeed spatial spillover effect between the crime rates of neighbouring areas 
specifically for burglary, theft and handling, robbery and sexual offences. In addition, 
among the explanatory variables we included, the strongest predictors for the crime 
rate in one area are its local detection rate and real earnings. While detection rate 
mostly has negative effect on crime, real earnings are positively correlated with 
property crimes reflecting its opportunity effect.  
 
Finally, we conclude our main findings in Chapter Six where we also discuss the 
limitations in this work as well as provide prospects of future research in this field.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, we survey some important literature in the field of economic analysis 
of crime. Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) start analysing the phenomenon of crime 
in economic frameworks and most of later works construct their models accordingly. 
By assuming potential criminals are economically rational and utility maximizing, 
Becker and Ehrlich theoretically relate crime rate to various factors such as law 
enforcement effort and social-economic status. Furthermore, they predict that an 
increase in either the probability of apprehension or severity of punishment will 
reduce people’s incentives to commit crimes; either higher illegal payoffs or lower 
legal returns will increase one’s participation in criminal activities. Moreover, 
unemployment rate, measuring the risk of legal labour market, has ambiguous effect 
on crime. Many later papers are particularly interested in empirically testing these 
predictions made by Becker and Ehrlich.  
 
We construct this literature review by putting papers with the same aim together and 
hope to provide a general background for the literature analysing crime with 
economic theories. The papers most related to our empirical studies will be introduced 
and discussed in each individual chapter. In this chapter, section two introduces 
classic economic frameworks applied on crime, while section three discusses the 
papers aiming to detect the deterrence effect of law enforcement. We talk about 
literature identifying the well-known unemployment – crime relationship in section 
four and examine the papers testing the effects of the overall labour market conditions 
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in section five. And finally, section six focuses on detecting the effect of the 
proportion of young people.  
 
2.2 ECONOMIC THEORIES OF CRIME 
 
Becker (1968) can be seen as the first work which formally analyses the phenomenon 
of crime in an economic model and its special contribution is undeniable. Almost 
every paper later on has cited Becker (1968) in a significant position as the original 
inspiration. This paper is no exception.  
 
Becker (1968) looks at the issue of crime control from the angle of social welfare. As 
increasing the probability of apprehension and the severity of punishment are both 
costly, it targets to identify the optimal levels of punishment by minimising the social 
loss induced by both crime combat and crimes themselves. 
 
As a part of the model, the damage from offences (D) has been related to the number 
of offences (O) and can be written as the following equation: 
, 
where H denotes the harm to the victims and the society and G denotes the gain to 
offenders. Therefore, the net damage to the society is simply the difference between 
the two. It is reasonable to assume that both H and G are increasing with the number 
of offences O as long as each additional crime will cause positive harm to the victim 
or/and the society and positive gain for the criminal himself. In mathematical term, 
that is and . Therefore, the sign of depends on the relative 
magnitudes of and . 
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The costs of apprehension and punishment should both be a positive function of the 
level of offences O. The cost of apprehension can be written as: 
, 
where p represents the probability of apprehension and O represents the level of 
offences. Both p and O should be positively related to the cost of apprehension C: 
and . The social cost of punishment depends on the exact form of the 
punishment. This problem can be simplified by imposing a coefficient b: 
 
where b takes the value of 0 for fines and greater then unity for torture, probation, 
parole, imprisonment and most other punishment. In this way, the punishment f 
imposed on the criminal can be transferred to the social cost . For punishment 
taking the form of fines, the coefficient b can be quite close to 0 if the money transfer 
can be regarded as costless. On the other hand, punishments of other forms are costly 
not only to the criminals but also to the society. Therefore, the induced social cost 
should be greater than the cost on the offender and the coefficient b is greater than 1.  
 
Then, Becker derives a function relating the number of offences one would commit 
his probability of apprehension, his severity of punishment and other relevant 
variables such as his income level in both legal and illegal activities, his frequency of 
nuisance arrests and his willingness to commit offences etc. This function can be 
expressed as: 
, 
where is the number of offences person i would commit; and represent his 
probability of apprehension and severity of punishment respectively;  represents all 
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other relevant variables. An increase in either or would reduce one’s expected 
utility from an offence and thus would tend to reduce the number of offences he 
would commit. This point can be easily proved by the expected utility function of a 
potential offender 
, 
where represents his income from an offence; represents his utility function; 
represents his monetary equivalent of the punishment. The change in the expected 
utility with respect to the probability of apprehension and the severity of punishment 
can then be derived by taking first order conditions: 
 
and 
. 
Both first order conditions would be negative as long as the marginal utility of income 
is positive. This is saying that the expected utility from an offence would be 
decreasing as the probability of apprehension and severity of punishment increase. 
Thus, the number of offences one would commit, , should have the following 
properties:  
 
and 
. 
Literally, the number of offences one would commit would be negatively related to 
both the probability of apprehension and the severity of punishment.  
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As the concern is normally the aggregated level of offences, it can be derived by 
summing all the . Its determinants, though, need some minor corrections. The 
aggregated number of offences, O, would still be affected by the probability of 
apprehension, the severity of punishment and other relevant factors. However, such 
determinants are likely to differ from one person to another. To tackle this issue, 
Becker takes the average values for p, f, and u, for simplicity. The aggregated number 
of offences can then be expressed as: 
, 
where p, f and u are denoting the average values of , and . This function is 
expected to have the same properties as the individual function: the aggregated 
number of offences would be negatively correlated with both p and f. Furthermore, it 
would be more responsive to the change in p than to the same change in f if, and only 
if, most offenders are risk-lover.  
 
The aggregated supply of offences function in Becker (1968) contains the probability 
of apprehension, the severity of punishment and a third factor u. Although, Becker 
mentions that u represents a set of relevant variables such as one’s incomes in legal 
and illegal activities, family background, education, preference for risk etc, he does 
not explicitly analyse the effect of any of these relevant factors. This gap is filled by 
Ehrlich (1972; 1973). In both works, one is assumed to be able to spend his time on 
either legal or illegal activities or both. His time allocation depends on the relative 
expected utility from each activity. While Ehrlich (1972) only provides a verbally 
analytical model, Ehrlich (1973) has formally developed a mathematical framework 
analysing the participation in illegal activities with a choice under uncertainty theory. 
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An essential assumption in Ehrlich (1973) is that one is free to combine a number of 
legitimate and illegitimate activities or switch occasionally from one to another during 
any period throughout their lifetime. His object is to maximize his expected utility by 
optimally allocate his time and other resources between legal and illegal activities. 
For simplicity, the optimal participation in illegal activities is analysed in a one-period 
uncertainty model. It is assumed that there is no training or other entry costs required 
in either legal and illegal activities and neither are there costs of movement between 
the two. Since activity l (legal activity) is safe, its net returns are given with certainty 
by the function , where t denotes the time input. On the other hand, activity i 
(illegal activity) is risky in the sense that its net returns are conditional upon two 
states of the world: a, apprehension and punishment with probability , and b, 
getting escaped with probability of . If successful, the offender obtains a payoff 
 which is his gain from the illegal activity net his costs of inputs. If apprehended 
and punished, his payoff will be reduced by an amount of . Therefore, one would 
obtain either  
 
With probability , or 
 
With probability , where denotes the market value of the individual’s assets. 
Accordingly, his expected utility is given by 
. 
 
The problem has now become maximizing the above equation with respect to the 
choice variables , and subject to a time constraint 
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. 
The solutions require that 
,  and  
It is not difficult to show that, given the amount of time allocated to consumption , 
the optimal allocation of working time between activity i and l must satisfy the first 
order condition 
, 
where , and . Apparently, a necessary prerequisite is that 
the potential marginal penalty, , should exceed the differential marginal return from 
illegal activity, , because otherwise the marginal opportunities in i would 
always dominate those in l.  
 
As the two-state-of-the-world assumption seems less realistic, the model can be 
expanded by incorporating more variables which implies more states of the world. For 
example, unemployment rate, as an important indicator of the legal labour market, can 
be included to measure the risk in legal activities while still measures the risk in 
illegal activities. The preceding analysis can still be applied in this four-state-of-the-
world condition. In order to obtain an interior solution, the following first-order 
condition should be satisfied: 
, 
where represents the probability of unemployment in legal activities l; a, b, c and d 
are the four relevant states of the world.  
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Both equations of first-order conditions have identified the basic factors determining 
entry into and optimal participation in illegal activities. Furthermore, they have some 
implications on the effects of relevant factors on the participation in illegal activities. 
Firstly, an increase in either or , with other variables being constant, would 
reduce one’s incentive to enter and participate in illegal activities because it increases 
the expected marginal cost of punishment . Secondly, an increase in the marginal 
or average differential return from illegal activity , resulting from either an 
increase in illegal payoffs or a decrease in legal incomes or both, would increase 
one’s incentive to enter into or allocate more time to illegal activities. Thirdly, an 
increase in the probability of unemployment, , has a more ambiguous effect on the 
incentive to participate in illegal activities. This is because an increase in the 
probability of the least desirable state of the world (unemployed in legal activities and 
failed in illegal activities) would increase one’s demand for wealth in this state and 
might decrease his incentive to participate in illegal activities. However, the partial 
effect of an increase in would unambiguously be positive on his incentive to 
participate in illegal activities. And finally, a decrease in the amount of time allocated 
to nonmarket activities  would not affect one’s relative preference between different 
states of the world and therefore lead to a positive scale effect on participation in 
activities i and l: more time would be spent in both legal and illegal activities.  
 
Given the validity of the preceding analyses, an individual supply-of-offenses 
function can be specified 
, 
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where i and l still denote illegal and legal activities; j denotes individual j; denotes 
the number of offenses committed by individual j; and denotes a set of other 
variables that might affect the number of offenses committed by individual j.  
 
If all individuals are identical, the aggregated supply-of-offenses functions can be 
easily derived given the individual function. As mentioned in Becker (1968), the 
relevant variables are likely to differ from person to person due to personal 
heterogeneity.  Ehrlich takes the average values of these variables to incorporate in 
the aggregated supply of offenses function 
, 
where represents the aggregated supply of offenses; ,  etc. represent the 
average values of , etc.; and includes, in addition to those environmental 
variables, all the moments of the distributions of p, f etc. other than their means.  
 
Based on early theoretical frameworks, Ehrlich (1996) has described a “market 
model” which is also based on the assumption that offenders, like other members of a 
society, respond to incentives. Such incentives, both negative and positive, do not 
largely differ from those introduced in Ehrlich (1973): negative incentives are 
referring to the factors deterring potential offenders to commit crimes such as 
detection and punishment; positive incentives are the factors that encourage legal 
activities as an alternative to committing offenses, such as the employment and 
earning opportunities, rehabilitation programs and lower disparity in the income 
distribution.  
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The most important difference between this model and previous ones is probably that 
the equilibrium is achieved through the interactions between three parties instead of 
two: in addition to offenders and the law enforcement authorities, the potential 
victims also affect the equilibrium. The potential offenders are still behaving to 
maximize their expected returns from both legal and illegal activities given the 
incentives they are facing. Potential victims are expected to desire protection from 
offenses, such as insurance against crime, burglar alarm systems, safety deposit boxes 
etc. However, such protections come at a cost. The optimal level of protection, 
therefore, depends on a position where the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit 
of the protection. In this way, the level of private protection, measured by the 
expenditure, can be related to crime rate which is the proxy for the probability of 
becoming a victim. In addition, the expenditure on private protection can also affect 
the cost of offenses for potential offenders. For law enforcement authorities, their 
targets will still be maximizing the social welfare by minimizing the loss from 
offenses. The optimal level of public expenditure on law enforcement can be found by 
balancing the marginal cost and the marginal benefit by imposing the law 
enforcement instruments. The expenditure on law enforcement would not only affect 
the potential offenders by changing their expected punishment, but also affect the 
demand for private protection against offenses. The supply of offenses, together with 
the demand for private and public protections against offenses, forms the basic 
components of the “market model”. The equilibrium is reached when the level of 
offenses is such that neither offenders, potential victims, nor the government feel the 
need to adjust their behaviours.  
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This “market model” has derived some implications concerning the behaviours of 
different parties. Firstly, crime is a persistent and “normal” social issue which has 
survived through history regardless of the prevailing economic, political or social 
system. This is because both private and public protections against offenses are costly 
and certain level of offenses would lead to socially optimal equilibrium. Secondly, 
some social, political or demographic conditions affect the level of offenses. For 
example, an economic growth and real asset accumulation could raise the potential 
payoffs to offenders in many illegal activities. Thirdly, changes in the court decisions 
or sentencing guidelines over time would shift the “tax” paid by offenders if 
convicted and thus their net returns.  
 
2.3 DETECTING THE EFFECT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
 
The preceding part has introduced the theoretical models analysing the relationship 
between the level of offenses and its influential factors. The validity of these 
theoretical frameworks, however, rests on the assumed deterrent effect of law 
enforcement. The idea is that law enforcement—apprehension and punishment of 
offenders—serves partly to deter future offenses by increasing the expected cost of 
breaking the law for both actual and potential offenders. Given the increased expected 
cost of committing offenses, both actual and potential offenders would have lower 
incentives to participate in illegal activities. Such assumptions, however, have been 
seriously questioned in the criminological literature of the past hundred years or so. 
As stated in Ehrlich (1972), “an extreme view is that law enforcement has no 
deterrent effect on offenders (at least those who commit serious crimes), essentially 
because offenders are very different from other human beings.” In fact, criminological 
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literatures usually claim that the criminal behaviours should mainly be attributed to 
the offenders’ unique motivations which, in turn, have been linked to his unique 
“inner structure” or the impact of exceptional social and family circumstances. 
Therefore, demonstrating the existence of the deterrent effect of law enforcement is 
not only important for the theoretical frameworks, but also meaningful for the later 
literature which are developed upon these theories. Ehrlich (1972) is such a work that 
presents empirical evidence to support the deterrent effect of law enforcement.  
 
In the theoretical model developed in Ehrlich (1973), the factors affecting one’s 
participation in illegal activities include his legal and illegal returns, the probability 
and severity of punishment, and the probability of being unemployed in legal labour 
market. A negative relationship between the law enforcement and the level of 
offenses is predicted accordingly. However, the probability and severity of 
punishment may affect crime rate through a different channel other than deterrence 
when the punishment takes the form of imprisonment. This is called the preventive 
effect, also known as the incapacitation effect. The preventive effect takes place when 
the convicted offenders are punished by sentencing into prison: as they are separated 
from the potential victims, they can be prevented, at least temporarily, from 
committing further crimes.  
 
Although both deterrent and preventive effects of law enforcement are expected to 
reduce the level of offenses, it is still essential to establish an independent deterrent 
effect of law enforcement. This is because, firstly, preventive effect only exists for the 
offenders who are punished imprisonment. Furthermore, the preventive effect only 
works temporarily up to the release of the prisoner. The deterrent effect, on the other 
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hand, should influence both actual and potential offenders and does not depend on the 
form of punishment. Secondly, reducing the level of offences through preventive 
effect induces extra cost. Sentencing offenders into prison requires expenditure on 
relevant facilities and supervision personnel. In addition, imprisonment restricts the 
prisoners to contribute to national production.  
 
Theoretically, the deterrent effect of law enforcement is distinguishable from the 
preventive effect when the punishment takes the form of imprisonment. It can be 
shown that the preventive effects of one percent increase in the probability of 
apprehension P or the number of periods offenders actually serve in prison T are 
approximately the same after a period of adjustment to the dynamic processes 
generated by the changes in P and T. The preventive effect, caused by the change in 
either P or T, is equal to the ratio 
. 
Since is positively related to PT, the expected length of imprisonment, the 
preventive effect of law enforcement might be relatively small for less serious 
offenses. The derived preventive effect of law enforcement implies a feasible method 
to distinguish between the preventive and deterrent effects: as the preventive effects 
of P and T are expected to be equal in magnitudes, significant difference between the 
estimated elasticity of crime rate to the changes in these variables would suggest the 
existence of an independent deterrent effect of law enforcement. Furthermore, the 
ratio  is supposed to be lower than unity even if P is close to unity. The existence of 
deterrent effect might also be detected if the empirical coefficients of P and T are 
close to, or even greater than, unity.  
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Ehrlich (1972) carries out empirical analysis to test his theory introduced above. The 
analysis is based on cross-state analysis of seven “index crimes” punishable by 
imprisonment. The years being covered are 1940, 1950 and 1960. The empirical 
model takes the number of offenses per capita as dependent variable and the 
independent variables include the ratio of the number of commitments into prison to 
the number of offenses, the average time served in prison, the median family income, 
the percentage of families below one half of the median family income, and the 
percentage of non-while population. The estimated results have exhibit a remarkable 
consistency with the theoretical predictions. Specifically, while relevant variables are 
controlled, the coefficients of the probability and length of imprisonment are 
consistent with the hypothesis that law-enforcement instruments have deterrent effects 
on offenders. Such deterrent effect is independent from the preventive effect of 
imprisonment.  
 
Levitt (1996) focuses on the relationship between the prison population size, 
measuring the severity of punishment, and different crime rates. This paper is 
motivated by the phenomenon that the incarceration rate in the United States has more 
than tripled over two decades: from 1970s to 1990s. Meanwhile, the rate of 
imprisonment in the United States is three to four times greater than most European 
countries. Such high level of incarceration, however, does not seem to be 
accompanied by obvious declines in crime rate. Therefore, this papers aims to identify 
the effect of prison population on crime rates when other relevant variables are being 
controlled.  
 
  21 
Given the trends of both prison population and crime rates, one cannot simply 
conclude that increased incarceration rate has been ineffective as a law enforcement 
instruments. Crime rates are also affected by other determinants such as the labour 
market opportunities, potential offenders’ family and educational backgrounds, gang 
involvement etc. In order to generate relatively precise estimate for prison population, 
other relevant variables should be controlled as completely as possible. Furthermore, 
simultaneous bias could also affect the estimation. Increased incarceration is likely to 
reduce crime due to both deterrent and incapacitation effects. However, increased 
crime rate could lead to larger prison population through either higher probability of 
apprehension or more severe punishment or both. Consequently, the OLS estimation 
will be biased by such reverse causality. Thus, Levitt chooses to employ instrument 
variables which should be correlated with the endogenous variable, prison population, 
and uncorrelated with crime rates. The instrument variable employed in this paper is 
the status of state prison overcrowding litigation. Unsurprisingly, the existence of 
overcrowding litigation reduces the growth rates of prison population.  
 
The data used in this paper is state-level panel data over the years 1971-1993. The 
model under estimation is given by the equation 
, 
where the subscript s and t represent the states and years respectively; , as the 
dependent variable, represents the per capita crime; , as the main concern of 
this paper, represents the once-lagged per capita prison population; is a set of 
covariates including the per capita income, unemployment rate, the percentage of 
population who are black, the percentage population who live in metropolitan areas 
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and a set of age distribution variables; year-specific effect is captured by the 
parameter . 
 
When treating prison population as exogenous, its coefficient is -0.099 for violent 
crime and -0.071 for property crime. After applying instrument variables for prison 
population, its effect on violent crime is almost four times greater than before. 
Similarly, the effect of prison population on property crime, when being intrumented, 
is four times higher than before. Such results strongly support the effectiveness of 
imprisonment, as law enforcement instrument, on crime. Furthermore, the same 
estimation is applied on seven individual crime categories and has generated 
consistent results: in all seven cases, applying instruments lead to more negative 
coefficient for prison population. In addition, assault, robbery and burglary are more 
responsive to the change in imprisonment.  
 
According to the classic models developed in both Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), 
an increase in either the probability of apprehension or the severity of punishment 
would tend to reduce the expected returns from illegal activities and hence the crime 
rate. Levitt (1996) has confirmed the negative effect of prison population size, 
measuring the severity of punishment, on crime rate. In Levitt (1998), effort has been 
devoted to identifying the effect of increased arrest rate on crime while the arrest rate 
is assumed to measure the probability of apprehension. Furthermore, this paper also 
designs a strategy trying to distinguish the deterrence and incapacitation effects of 
increased arrest rate.  
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The approach distinguishing between the deterrence and incapacitation effects lies on 
specific assumptions: firstly, criminals commit multiple offenses and do not specialize 
in one particular type of crime; secondly, certain types of crime are substitutes for 
each other while other types of crime are not. As long as these two assumptions are 
satisfied, the deterrence and incapacitation effects of arrest rate could be separately 
identified. This is because an increase in the arrest rate for any crime would lead to a 
reduction in all crimes due to the incapacitation effect. In contrast, if criminals are 
rational and different crimes are substitutes for one another, the deterrent effect 
implies that increasing the arrest rate for one crime would lead to a decrease in own 
crime, but an increase in other crimes as criminals would substitute away from the 
own crime. Therefore, the expected sign of deterrence effect depends on the 
relationship between different types of crimes: deterrence is negative for the own-
crime rate and positive for the substituting crime rates. For the non-substituting 
crimes, the deterrence is not expected to have significant effect. If the incapacitation 
effect exists, on the other hand, an increase in the arrest rate for one crime would not 
only reduce own-crime rate, but also reduce the substituting-crime rates since more 
criminals have been locked behind bars.  
 
In order to support the assumption that criminals commit multiple crimes which 
belong to different types, strong evidence has been found: surveys of prisoners in the 
United States reveal that the median number of non-drug crimes committed in the 
year preceding their most recent arrest is twelve to fifteen. Furthermore, there is 
evidence suggesting that the majority of criminals are in fact generalists. Only one in 
twenty released murderers who recidivate will have his next arrest to be for murder. 
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The corresponding number for released robbers and auto thieves is less than one in 
three. For burglars and larcenists, the number is slightly less than one in two.  
 
For the purposes of empirical analysis, it is assumed that violent crimes are substitutes 
for each other, and property crimes are substitutes for each other. However, there is 
assumed to be no substituting relationship between violent and property crimes. The 
empirical analysis has been carried out based upon the annual-level panel data which 
covers 59 of the largest U.S. cities over the period 1970 to 1992. The estimated 
equation is given by  
, 
where the subscripts i and t denote cities and time periods respectively; the subscript o 
denotes own-crimes, s and n refer to the crimes that are substitutes and non-substitutes 
for crime o; variables c and a represent the number of reported crimes and the arrests 
respectively and the ratio between them represents the arrest rate. The estimated 
equation is describing a model in which the crime rate is assumed to be determined 
not only by the contemporary and once-lagged arrest rates of its own crime type, but 
also by the contemporary and once-lagged arrest rates of both substituting and non-
substituting types of crimes. Furthermore, a set of covariates is also expected to 
influence the crime rate. Such covariates include city population size, the percentage 
of black population, the percentage of population residing in female-headed 
households, the percentage of population between the age 15 and 24, the 
unemployment rate, the combined local spending on education and public welfare etc.  
The estimated results can be summarized by the following four points. Firstly, a 
negative relationship between crime rate and own arrest rate has been found for six 
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out of seven types of crime, murder is the only exception. Secondly, the arrest rates of 
presumably non-substituting crimes should only affect the own crime rate through the 
incapacitation effect. More specifically, the coefficients of the non-substituting arrest 
rates are expected to be negative. The estimation has shown that, for all seven 
categories, the estimated coefficients are indeed negative, although the coefficients 
are significant only in the cases of robbery and rape. Thirdly, the arrest rates of 
substituting crimes are expected to generate ambiguous coefficients: the 
incapacitation effect would negatively influent the crime rate under study while the 
deterrence effect would have positive influence. The net effect, therefore, would be 
ambiguous. In practice, the estimated coefficients of substituting arrest rates are 
mixed: negative and significant in three cases, positive and significant in two cases 
and insignificant in two cases. Given the obtained results, one important implication 
for crime control policies is that both deterrence and incapacitation effects are indeed 
existing and distinguishable. The optimal level of crime control, therefore, should be 
decided while incorporating this factor.  
 
As demonstrated by the papers introduced previously, the probability of apprehension 
and the severity of punishment have both been confirmed for their deterrent effects on 
crime rate. One practical problem that usually rises during the empirical analysis is 
that both factors, the probability of apprehension and the severity of punishment, can 
have different proxies as their counterparts in the empirical analysis. For example, the 
probability of apprehension is traditionally measured by either detection rate or 
conviction rate. The counterpart of severity of punishment, on the other hand, has 
more choices. Given the relevant literatures, the most commonly used variables 
measuring the severity of punishment are the prison population size and the average 
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length of imprisonment. One would be reasonable to suspect that death penalty, as an 
extreme form of punishment, would have some deterrent effect on crime. As more 
convicted criminals get sentenced to death penalty, the potential criminals would 
rationally expect tougher punishment once convicted and hence become more 
cautious when making the decision on whether or not commit crimes. However, the 
paper Levitt (2003) has cast some doubts on the deterrent effect that death penalty is 
expected to have. As stated in this paper, “a number of studies have found evidence 
supporting a deterrent effect of the death penalty (Cloninger, 1977; Deadman and 
Pyle, 1989; Ehrlich, 1977; Ehrlich and Liu, 1999; Layson, 1985; Mocan and Gittings, 
2001). A far larger set of studies have failed to find deterrent effects of capital 
punishment (e.g., Avio, 1979, 1988; Bailey, 1982; Cheatwood, 1993; Forst, Filatov, 
and Klein, 1978; Grogger, 1990; Leamer, 1983; Passell and Taylor, 1977).” Aside 
from these mentioned literatures, Levitt has found some statistical records which may 
support the claim that the deterrent effect of death penalty is far too limited than 
expectation. In 1997, totally 74 prisoners were executed in the United States and it has 
been the highest amount in thirty years. However, the executed prisoners only take 
approximately 2 percent of the total inmates under death sentence up till the end of 
1997. Even among those who have eventually put to death, there is a long lag between 
sentencing and execution. Therefore, as claimed in this paper, given the high discount 
rates of many criminals and the fact that many homicides are committed by 
individuals under the influence of alcohol or drugs, it is hard to believe that 
punishment with such a long delay would be effective.  
 
Instead, the paper argues that the quality of life in prison is likely to have a greater 
impact on criminal behaviour than the death penalty. More specifically, the lower the 
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quality of life in prison, the greater the punishment for a fixed amount of time served. 
Furthermore, poor prison conditions, unlike death penalty, would affect all inmates 
regardless of the crimes committed. Levitt (2003), therefore, aims to test the deterrent 
effect of prison conditions on crime using panel data from the United States.  
 
The data is a panel of annual, state-level observations covering the continental United 
States for the time period 1950-1990. The dependent variables being analysed are 
three types of crimes: murder, violent crime (excluding rape) and property crime 
(excluding larceny)1. The explanatory variables of primary interest are the execution 
rate and the death rate among the prisoners from all sources other than execution. The 
death rate is incorporated in the analysis as a proxy of the prison conditions. In 
addition to the prisoner death and execution rates, a range of criminal justice, 
economic and demographic variables are also included. More specifically, the 
certainty of severity of a state’s criminal justice system is proxied by the number of 
prisoners per violent crime and the ratio of prisoners to state population. Given that 
the contemporary values of these two variables would probably cause endogenous 
biases to the estimation, their once-lagged values have entered the estimated equation 
instead. The economic statuses are measured by the real state per capita income and 
the insured unemployment rate. The demographic controls include the percentage of 
black population, the percentage of metropolitan population, age distribution variables 
and infant mortality rate.  
 
The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows. Firstly, in all 
estimations with homicide as the dependent variable, prison death rate is negative and 
                                                
1 Rape is excluded because the data was not collected until 1957. Larceny is omitted because the 
important changes in its definition over the time period examined.  
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precisely estimated. The decline in homicides associated with one additional prison 
death varies from -0.1 to -0.8 across specifications. In contrast, the coefficient of 
execution rate is extremely sensitive to the choice of specification and has much 
larger estimated standard errors. The proxies of criminal justice system have 
generated different results: the prisoner-per-crime variable significantly loses its 
impact on homicide as the specification includes the full set of independent variables; 
the prisoner-per-capita variable, on the other hand, becomes increasingly negative as 
more independent variables come on board. Higher income is consistently associated 
with higher homicide rate while higher unemployment rate has the opposite effect. 
The effect of larger fraction of black population is, as expected, positive on murder 
rate and the effect of more metropolitan residents is surprisingly negative. The age 
distribution and infant mortality variables do not generate significant coefficients 
constantly.  
 
Secondly, the death rate has obtained negative and significant coefficients in all 
estimations with violent crime as the dependent variable. According to the results, the 
elasticity of violent crime with respect to prison death rate varies from -0.05 to -0.17. 
On the other hand, no systematic effect of execution has been found for violent crime. 
The prisoner-per-crime variable, in this case, has shown much more significant effect 
comparing to the prisoner-per-capita variable, and this result is opposite to that 
obtained for homicide. While the economic factors appear to be weakly associated 
with violent crime, both fractions of black and urban residents exhibit positive 
association with violent crime in all specifications. Furthermore, the population under 
the age 25 is positively correlated with violent crime rate only in specifications with a 
limited set of control variables.  
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Thirdly, the prison death rate has lost some significance in explaining property crime: 
its coefficient is significant in only a few specifications. The execution rate, as usual, 
has generated ambiguous coefficient which is quite sensitive to the specification. Both 
the number of prisoners per crime and the number of prisoners per capita are 
negatively correlated with property crime. Higher unemployment rate, as expected, is 
associated with higher property crime and such positive correlation has also been 
found for the fraction of black people and the population under the age of 25.  
 
In addition to the basic empirical model upon which the previously discussed results 
are based, expanded models have also been estimated in order to test the robustness of 
the results. The first extension to the basic model is constructed by allowing for prison 
death and execution rates to have both contemporaneous and lagged effect on crime 
rates. The second method is splitting the data set into two parts using the year 1971 as 
the break point. The last attempt is using logarithm, instead of level, of the 
observations to estimate the basic empirical model. Generally speaking, the extended 
models do not generate significant evidence that is against the deterrent effect of 
prison death rate found by the basic model. Furthermore, the execution rate has again 
obtained coefficient sensitive to the choice of specification.  
 
As most empirical literature have devoted their effort in investigating the 
determinants of crime in the United States, other countries have not been completely 
left out although the amount of their relevant literature is remarkably smaller. Wolpin 
(1978) is one of papers studying the criminal behaviour in England and Wales. As 
stated in the paper, “crime of almost every variety has increased enormously over the 
past 80 years in England, at the same time the risk of capture and severity of 
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punishment have declined.” Hence, this work attempts to understand the 
interrelationship between crime and its determinants during the time period 1894-
1967.  
 
Wolpin derives a supply-of-offenses function based on the theoretical frameworks 
introduced in Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973). In addition to empirical analysis, 
Wolpin has also extended the classic theoretical models by incorporating more factors 
measuring the law enforcement. Traditionally, the law enforcement effort is measured 
by the probability of apprehension and the severity of punishment. The probability of 
apprehension is proxied by either the detection rate or conviction rate. The severity of 
punishment, on the other hand, is usually measured by either prison population or 
average length of imprisonment. This work, however, has incorporated the 
probabilities of detection, conviction and punishment at the same time. Furthermore, 
different forms of punishment have also been included in the expected utility function 
and they are expected to have separate effects on crime. As individuals are assumed to 
maximize their expected utilities, interesting implications can be made regarding the 
elasticity of expected utility with respect to the law enforcement variables. Firstly, the 
elasticity of expected utility with respect to the probability of apprehension, 
conviction and punishment can be ordered. More specifically, the one percentage 
increase in the probability of apprehension would lead to the greatest decrease in the 
expected utility, comparing to the same percentage changes in the probability of 
conviction and punishment. Meanwhile, the change in punishment would have the 
smallest effect on the expected utility. Secondly, when the punishment only takes 
three forms: imprisonment, recognizance and fines, with imprisonment being the most 
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severe punishment, one percent increase in the imprisonment rate would reduce the 
expected utility most, the recognizance rate next, and the fine rate last.  
 
The empirical analysis is carried out for the time period 1894 to 1967 excluding the 
war years, 1914-1919 and 1939-1945. The supply-of-offenses equation is firstly 
estimated under the assumption that the law enforcement variables are not affected by 
the level of crime. In other words, the law enforcement variables are taken as 
exogenous at the first stage. The dependent variables under estimation are 8 types of 
crime rates.2 The explanatory variables can be divided into two groups: group one 
contains a set of law enforcement variables such as the clearance rate, conviction rate, 
imprisonment rate, recognizance rate, fine rate and average length of sentence; groups 
two includes variables that mainly reflect social-economic and demographic status.3  
 
In most cases, the estimated coefficients of law enforcement variables are negative. 
The major exception is the average length of sentence: its estimated coefficient is 
inconsistent with respect to both “sign” and “significant”. This result could possibly 
be due to the weak relationship between the average length of sentence and the actual 
time served. The other law enforcement variables, generally speaking, perform better 
in the estimations for property crimes. The predicted order of elasticities is partially 
verified with only the conviction rate being estimated with quite weak elasticity. For 
violent crimes, the law enforcement instruments perform less well: the estimated 
                                                
2 The dependent variables include larceny, burglary, robbery, auto theft, malicious wounding, felonious 
wounding, all offenses against the person and all offenses.  
3 These controlling variables are the percentage of males aged from 10 to 25, the unemployment rate, 
the real weekly wage in manufacturing for manual workers, the real per capita GDP, the per capita 
number of police, real per capita local government expenditure, the proportion of those arrested for 
indictable offenses given legal aid and a dummy variable with value 0 before WW II and value 1 
thereafter.  
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elasticities are less precise and the coefficient of imprisonment rate is far too large to 
conform to the predicted elasticity-ordering.  
 
With respect to alternative forms of punishment, same percentage increases in the 
probability of imprisonment, recognizance and fine are, in most cases, consistent with 
the prediction: a change in the probability of imprisonment would yield the biggest 
response of crime rate while the same change in the probability of fine would lead to 
the smallest response.  
 
The impacts of other controlling variables can be summarized by several points. 
Firstly, young males have been confirmed to have greater propensity to engage in 
property crimes although they have not been proved to be more likely to commit 
violent crimes. This finding could be attributed to the fact that juveniles would be 
treated with much milder punishment once convicted. Therefore, if they respond to 
the incentives and opportunities the same way as adults, their lower expected cost of 
punishment would increase their offense rate. Secondly, the unemployment rate is 
positively correlated with the overall and property crime rates. This is consistent with 
the implication derived in Ehrlich (1973) that, although the net effect of 
unemployment is ambiguous, its partial positive effect on crime rate is definite 
because higher unemployment rate would reduce the opportunity cost of committing 
crimes from the legal labour market. Thirdly, the proportion of individuals aged 15 
and over attending school is negatively correlated with crime rates of both violence 
and property. The reason could be that increasing educational attainment reduces the 
necessity to solve disputes with violent actions and hence the violent crime rate. More 
directly, school attendance reduces the time available for other activities, including 
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committing crimes. However, the negative correlation between school attendance and 
crime rates could be running from the opposite direction: criminal records could 
reduce future employment opportunities and, therefore, reduce the expected return 
from the schooling investment. Fourthly, the degree of urbanization positively affects 
the aggregate crime rate. For individual type, increasing urbanization raises the levels 
of larceny and burglary but reduces malicious wounding and auto theft. Fifthly, the 
per capita GDP, supposed to measure the average gain from crime, has negative effect 
for property crimes and positive effect for violent crimes. Furthermore, the real 
weekly wage for manual workers, a measure of the alternative legal wage, has 
obtained the same result: negatively correlated with property crimes and positively 
correlated with violent crimes. According to the theoretical models, increasing the 
average gain from crime is predicted to increase the property crimes as the expected 
return from such crimes has gone up. On the other hand, increasing the alternative 
legal wage is expected to reduce property crime by increasing the opportunity cost 
from legal labour market. The estimated results, therefore, imply that the per capita 
GDP has failed to capture the motivating effect of higher expected gain from property 
crimes.  
 
The previously discussed results are based on the assumption that all the law 
enforcement variables are exogenous to the estimation system. Such assumption, 
however, could be easily challenged. On the one hand, crime rate could be reduced by 
increased law enforcement investment through deterrence and incapacitation effects; 
on the other hand, increased crime rate could reduce the productivities of law 
enforcement instruments by sharing the resources. Therefore, the seemingly negative 
relationship between crime rate and law enforcement variables runs in two opposite 
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directions and such simultaneous interaction would cause estimation biases with 
ordinary estimation methods. This paper has adopted a three-equation system to deal 
with the simultaneous issue and generate unbiased estimation. In addition to the 
supply-of-offenses equation, it is assumed that the conviction rate and the per capita 
number of police are endogenous to the system, both of which are functions of crime 
rate and other relevant variables. 4 The estimations of the determinants of conviction 
rate and police demand have yielded encouraging results. However, as the author 
stated, “more detailed data sets and the resolution of several conceptual problems are 
needed in order to gain further insights into crime-prevention decisions and the 
validity of the social-loss framework.” 
 
2.4 DETECTING THE EFFECT OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
Opportunities from legal labour market can be regarded as alternative options to both 
potential and actual offenders. As implied in Ehrlich (1973), an individual is assumed 
to allocate his available time between legal and illegal activities in order to maximize 
his expected utility. The optimal time allocation is thus depending on the expected 
opportunities from both legal and illegal markets. As alternative to criminal activities, 
increased legal opportunities, such as higher probability of employment and expected 
income, are supposed to increase the expected return from legal labour market and, in 
such case, individuals are expected to allocate more time to engage in legal activities. 
As predicted in Ehrlich (1973), an increase in the expected legal income would reduce 
the number of offenses one would commit by increasing the opportunity cost of 
                                                
4 Conviction rate is assumed to be a function of crime rate, per capita number of police, the proportion 
of defendants given legal aid, imprisonment rate, lagged conviction rate, per capita number of 
registered motor vehicles as well as all the environmental variables used in the supple-of-offenses 
equation. The per capita number of police is defined as a function of its lagged value, lagged crime rate, 
the per capita number of registered motor vehicles and local expenditures. 
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spending time on illegal activities. However, the effect of unemployment rate, 
measuring the uncertainty in legal labour market, would be more ambiguous to 
predict. Ehrlich (1973) has pointed out a partial positive effect that unemployment 
rate could have on the number of offenses given that higher unemployment rate would 
reduce the expected opportunities from legal labour market. Meanwhile, however, 
higher unemployment would also increase the probability that one would end up with 
the lease-desired situation: unemployed in legal market and failed in illegal market. In 
order to avoid such situation, an individual is likely to allocate less time on illegal 
activities.  
 
In addition, Cantor and Land (1985) also develop a theoretical model which has 
predicted two distinct and counterbalancing effects of unemployment rate on crime. 
The analysis is based on the argument, proposed in Cohen and Felson (1979b), that 
the production of conventional crimes requires the presence of a. motivated offenders 
and b. suitable targets in c. the absence of effective guardians. Therefore, an increase 
in crime should be caused by an increased convergence of both motivated offenders 
and suitable targets under the situation of ineffective guardian. Following this 
proposition, the motivation effect of unemployment as predicted in Ehrlich (1973) 
only reflects the positive relationship between unemployment rate and the number of 
potential offenders. On the other hand, Cantor and Land (1985) has also predicted an 
opportunity effect of unemployment on crime which reflects a negative correlation 
between unemployment rate and potential victims.  
 
As argued in Cantor and Land (1985), higher unemployment rate would reduce the 
number of suitable targets for property crimes due to two reasons. Firstly, by 
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removing from employment, more people would be staying in or around their residing 
neighbourhoods. Such people and their properties are at reduced risks of becoming 
victims. Secondly, higher unemployment rate could be taken as a signal of declining 
economy. Therefore, producing and consuming activities are also likely to slow down 
as a result for both employed and unemployed. Such reduced property accumulation 
would thus provide fewer opportunities for property crimes. Given the reasons stated 
above, all other things being equal, higher unemployment rate would lower the 
probability of concurrence between motivated offenders and careless targets, and 
hence, lower the property crime rates.  
 
Same logic can be applied on violent crimes because, contrary to the image promoted 
by the media, a substantial fraction of violent crimes involve causal acquaintances or 
strangers. According to the victimization survey in the United States, 60 percent of 
rapes and aggravated assaults reported to the police involve total strangers. In addition, 
76 percent of murders were committed by offenders other than families and friends: 
26.4 percent by non-family member; 13.3 percent by stranger; and 35.8 percent by 
people unknown to the police. Consequently, higher unemployment rate may reduce 
violent crimes through the same channel as property crimes: by reducing the 
availability of potential victims.  
 
This paper, Cantor and Land (1985), has also designed an empirical model to test the 
proposed motivation and opportunity effects of unemployment rate on crime and 
applied such model on the time series data set of the United States covering the time 
period 1946-1982. The equations under estimation are specified as  
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. 
The dependent variables are either the differenced5 levels or differenced logarithms of 
the index crimes: non-negligible homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, robbery, 
motor-vehicle theft, burglary, and larceny theft. The independent variables include 
both contemporary and differenced unemployment rate (in the form of either level or 
logarithm). The contemporary unemployment rate, both logged and unlogged, is 
supposed to capture the opportunity mechanism: once become unemployed, 
individuals would concentrate their activities in their residences and residential 
neighbourhoods and hence reduce their probability of victimization through the 
guardianship effect. Furthermore, as a signal of economic downturn, contemporary 
unemployment rate is assumed to immediately reflect people’s declining consuming 
behaviour and thus reduce the availability of suitable targets. The differenced 
unemployment rate, on the other hand, is incorporated to represent the motivation 
impact which is less likely to be contemporaneous. It is argued in this paper that 
newly unemployed people are usually covered by unemployment benefit from 
government and therefore would not be immediately under the pressure of financial 
crisis. After a while, as benefits and other financial supports decline or even stop, 
unemployed individuals might be more likely to engage in criminal activities as a 
solution to financial crisis.  
 
                                                
5 The first differencing is to eliminate a linear secular trend; the second differencing is to eliminate a 
quadratic trend.  
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The estimated results, in general, have provided mixed support for the theoretical 
expectations: five out of seven index crimes have been detected to have small but 
significant correlation with unemployment rate. Furthermore, while the negative 
contemporaneous effect is indicated for all crimes expect rape and assault, the only 
evidence of a lagged motivational effect is for crimes that have a property component.  
 
The methodology adopted in Cantor and Land (1985) is, with no doubt, an innovation 
in separating the opportunity and motivation effects that unemployment might have 
on crime rate. However, this strategy has been criticised by several following papers. 
For example, Greenberg (2001) has raised various questions concerning different 
aspects of Cantor and Land (1985) and its extension Land et al. (1995). First of all, 
using the differenced unemployment rate to capture the motivation effect is 
inappropriate. It is argued, in Greenberg (2001), that it is unrealistic to assume that 
large fraction of unemployed individuals would have enough savings or benefits to 
cover their finance for a while after becoming unemployed. In fact, many would face 
serious financial difficulties very quickly after losing a job. Therefore, annual lag of 
unemployment rate would be insufficiently fine-grained to detect the change in 
financial status over a much shorter time period. Furthermore, even if the motivation 
effect is indeed lagged, it is should be the once-lagged unemployment rate to enter the 
equation, rather than the differenced unemployment rate.  
 
Secondly, Greenberg (2001) has questioned the approach adopted in Cantor and Land 
(1985) that only the dependent variables have been taken first or second order 
difference in order to remove time trend. It is a standard procedure that time trend 
should be eliminated before further analysis by taking differences. However, as 
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claimed in Greenberg (2001), it is mathematically unacceptable if the differencing 
procedure is only carried out on the crime rates but not the explanatory variables.  
 
The paper Hale and Sabbagh (1991) has also found the approach adopted in Cantor 
and Land (1985) is questionable mainly from the aspect of empirical approach. As 
broadly accepted, the first step of time series analysis is testing the stationarity of 
incorporated variables. Simply speaking, if the relevant variables are of different 
order of integration (i.e. they need different times of differencing to become 
stationary), ordinary estimation techniques would break down and generate unreliable 
inferences. Such problem exists in the strategy suggested in Cantor and Land (1985). 
If both crime rate and unemployment rate are integrated of order 1, they are non-
stationary in levels but becoming stationary once first-differenced. Taking the first 
estimated equation for example 
, 
the model is actually trying to explain a stationary variable (differenced crime rate) 
with a non-stationary variable (unemployment rate) and another stationary variable 
(differenced unemployment rate). This approach is statistically invalid and the model 
is therefore mis-specified. As the same problem exists in every estimated equations 
proposed in Cantor and Land (1985), any conclusion drawn from this paper is 
probably unreliable concerning the relationship between unemployment and crime 
rates.   
 
As Cantor and Land (1985) is trying to separately identify the opportunity and 
motivation effects that unemployment could have on crime, there are other papers 
only interested in estimating the net effect of unemployment rate on crime. For 
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example, Fleisher (1963) employs time series data set trying to indentify the effect of 
unemployment on juvenile crimes. It is argued in the paper that higher unemployment 
rate not only creates difficulties for new entrants in the labour market in the sense of 
satisfying the desire for market goods and maintaining an acceptable living standard, 
it also make it harder for families to provide market goods and services for their 
children. Thus it is expected that unemployment could be positively correlated with 
crimes among young people.  
 
In order to test the prediction discussed above, the paper has employed time series 
data structure which covers the period 1932-1961 (excluding the war time 1942-1945). 
According to the author, the time series data structure has its own merit in analysing 
the relationship between unemployment and crime. First of all, time series data 
reflects more clearly the trends of different variables over time. By covering relatively 
longer time period, it offers the opportunity to study the long-run relationship between 
relevant variables. Secondly, time series analysis could avoid incorporating regional 
differences in income, population characteristics and taste etc. which might produce 
disturbances that are hard to account for.  
 
The dependent variable being estimated is the arrest rate for property crimes and this 
variable is expressed as the number o f arrests divided by the age-specific population. 
The independent variables include the male unemployment rate for ages 14-19 and 
20-24, the total number of personnel in the United States army services, the ratio of 
property crime arrest rate for all ages to the rate of property offenses known to the 
police and a dummy variable splitting the whole time period into two parts with the 
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year 1951. With OLS estimation, the results do support the prediction that the effect 
of unemployment on juvenile crime is positive and significant.  
 
Some papers prefer to employ panel data analysis because such data structure could 
enrich both sample size and information which the analysis is based on. In addition, 
panel data could reflect the variations both over time and cross regions. The paper 
Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) is one of the examples that investigate the 
relationship between unemployment and crime using panel data. More specifically, 
the data is disaggregated on state-level in the United States covering the years 1971-
1997. The model under estimation is specified by the equation 
, 
where i and t index states and years. In addition to the unemployment rate, the model 
also incorporates a set of controlling variables which are represented by the matrix X. 
such controlling variables include alcohol consumption per capita, average income 
per worker, proportions of state residents that are black, living in poverty and residing 
in metropolitan areas, as well as prison population per 100,000 state residents. 
Furthermore, the model also includes state-specific and year-specific effects to 
eliminate the influence of factors that vary by either state or year. The state-specific 
linear and quadratic time trends are included to eliminate the variation in within-state 
crime rates caused by factors that are state-specific over time. 
 
The specified model is firstly estimated with OLS regression as the basic analysis. As 
argued in the paper, however, the causal relationship could run from crime to 
unemployment. This is because higher crime rates could discourage employment 
growth and drive away existing firms and thus contribute to a state’s unemployment 
  42 
rate. Alternatively, former criminals could find it difficult to participate in legal labour 
market given the criminal record and thus have to remain unemployed. In order to 
deal with the potential endogeneity of unemployment rate, two-stage-least-squares 
(2SLS) approach is applied thereafter by employing two instruments: Department of 
Defense annual prime contract awards to each state and state-specific measure of oil 
price shocks. The effects of both the prime contracts and oil price shocks on state 
unemployment rate have been well documented by past research.  
 
The results of OLS regression have shown that the effect of unemployment rate is 
positive and significant at 1 percent level of confidence no matter when the property 
crimes are taken as one category or each property crime is analysed individually. 
When it comes to violent crimes, the results are mixed. In the case of estimating the 
overall violent crimes, the coefficient of unemployment is small and insignificant. As 
the state-specific linear and quadratic time trends are included one by one, the 
coefficient of unemployment becomes significant on the 5 percent level of confidence 
eventually. For the two most serious violent crimes, murder and rape, the effect of 
unemployment is either significant but wrongly signed or is unstable across 
specifications. While there is no significant effect of unemployment on assault, there 
are indeed some evidence for a positive correlation between unemployment and 
robbery.  
 
The 2SLS estimations have generated similar results: unemployment exerts a 
consistent, positive and highly significant effect on total property crime. For each 
individual type, the estimated results are generally supporting a positive correlation 
between unemployment and each type of property crime, although the coefficient of 
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unemployment is not significant in every specification. For violent crimes, on the 
other hand, their correlations with unemployment are not quite strong. The coefficient 
of unemployment is insignificant in each specification for the overall violent crime 
analysis. Furthermore, the negative correlation between unemployment and murder 
becomes even more significant in this stage. A similar pattern is also observed for 
rape. The previously estimated positive correlation between unemployment and 
robbery becomes unstable across specifications once apply instrument variables.  
 
One interesting finding of this paper is the negative relationship between 
unemployment and murder, which is contrary to expectation. One possible 
explanation is that increased unemployment could reduce the interaction between 
potential offenders and victims.  
 
2.5 DETECTING THE EFFECT OF LABOUR MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 
 
The labour market opportunities, such as legal income and unemployment rate, have 
been formally incorporated into one’s decision of optimal time allocation between 
legal and illegal activities, as illustrated in Ehrlich (1973).  How much time would be 
spent on both legal and illegal sectors depends on one’s relative expected returns from 
both activities. As such theory has inspired many researchers, it is very natural that 
plenty of later works have attempted to test their interested part. Given the previous 
parts of this literature review, some papers are interested in demonstrating the 
deterrent effect of law enforcement as it is the fundamental assumption of the theory. 
Meanwhile, other papers have shown their intentions to identify the relationship 
between crime and unemployment because the effect of unemployment is predicted to 
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be ambiguous. Similarly, there are papers trying to examine the effect of labour 
market status which include relatively more complete information of legal labour 
market.  
 
Doyle, et. al. (1999) is one of the examples that aim to test the role of labour market 
on crime. In this paper, the labour market conditions are represented by the average 
income, unemployment rate and income inequality. While the income level and 
unemployment rate are familiar to the theoretical framework, income inequality is not 
incorporated. In order to justify the inclusion of income inequality, Freeman (1996) is 
used as support given that it has predicted a positive relationship between income 
inequality and crime. Furthermore, the effects of income level and unemployment rate 
are far from clear. As analysed previously, unemployment rate could have two 
counterbalancing effects on crime: opportunity and motivation. Likewise, the income 
level could capture more than just the potential payoff from legal labour market: it 
could also measure the potential gain of illegal activities such as property crimes.  
 
In order to test the net effects of labour market components, a set of panel data has 
employed which covers 48 contiguous U.S. states plus the District of Columbia for 
the years 1984-1993. The basic model is specified as  
. 
The dependent variable represents the per capita property crime which is the sum of 
larceny, burglary and automobile-theft divided by the state population. The 
independent variables include real annual wage6, unemployment rate, Gini coefficient, 
                                                
6 The real annual wage of all industries enters the equation first. Then the annual wage is separated by 
industries, such as agricultural services, mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation and public 
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percentage of young male aged between 15 and 29, probability of arrest and per capita 
police officers.  In addition, the model also includes a state-specific effect to count for 
the unobservable factors that differ across states.  
 
As law enforcement instruments, arrest rate and per capita police, are potentially 
endogenous to the system, OLS approach will generate inconsistent estimates. One 
effective solution to correct such biases will be applying instrument variables. 
According to relevant literatures, four instruments have been selected to count for the 
endogeneity of arrest rate and per capita police: arrest rate for violent crime, per 
capita police in neighbouring states, per capita personal tax revenue and the 
percentage of the vote cast for the Republican candidate in the biannual elections for 
U.S. representatives. Given the applying of instrument variables, the methodology of 
General Method of Moments (GMM) has been carried out.  
 
As further investigation, the same procedure of analysis has also been applied on 
violent crime rate which is the sum of per capita murder, rape, assault and robbery. 
The aim of such estimation is to determine whether violent crime is also responsive to 
labour market conditions. The violent crime model has employed the same set of 
explanatory variables except one adjustment: the arrest rate of violent crime is 
instrumented by the arrest rate of property crime along with the other three 
instruments mentioned earlier. The estimation is also carried out with GMM 
technique.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
utilities, wholesale and retail trade, finance, insurance and real estate, services, and government, and re-
enter the model.   
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The estimated results can be summaries by a few points. Firstly, the real annual wage 
has a substantial negative effect on both property and violent crimes. Once the annual 
wage is disaggregated by industries, the wage in low-skilled sector of wholesale and 
retail trade has a negative and significant effect on property crime. This result is 
consistent with the expectation that the wages of low-skilled sectors would mainly 
influence the crime rate through the motivation effect because they are measuring the 
legal income of more crime-prone individuals. Secondly, income inequality is largely 
insignificant in explaining both property and violent crime. Thirdly, the proportion of 
young male aged between 15 and 29 has shown positive and significant effect on 
property crime but negative and significant effect on violent crime.  
 
Gould, et. al. (2002) has focused on the relationship between labour market 
conditions of unskilled men and crime because it argues that unskilled men are most 
likely to commit crimes and their declining wages and employment opportunities are 
expected to increase their involvement in crime.  
 
To test this argument, this paper has employed county-level panel data covering the 
years 1979-1997 for United States. The “core” model takes the index crime rates as 
dependent variables.7 The independent variables of interest are the weekly wages for 
non-college-educated men, unemployment rate of non-college-educated men and per 
capita income. County-specific and year-specific dummy variables are also included 
to count for the county-level and yearly unobservable heterogeneity. In addition, each 
specification also controls for changes in the age, sex and race composition of the 
county. The estimated results indicate that all three economic variables are very 
                                                
7 The index crimes include auto theft, burglary, larceny, aggravated assault, murder, robbery and rape. 
The estimations have also been applied on the aggregated property crime, violent crime and overall 
crime.  
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significant in explaining each index crime except rape. More specifically, each 
economic variable has the expected sign: the weekly wage of less educated men is 
negatively correlated with crime rates and the unemployment rate of them has positive 
effect on crime rates. Furthermore, the per capita income, which is supposed to 
measure the economic prosperity, constantly has positive and significant effect on 
crime rates.  
 
Based on the “core” model just introduced, the analysis has been extended by 
incorporating variables measuring county-level crime deterrence. The newly included 
variables are the county-level arrest rate, state expenditure per capita on police, and 
state police employment per capita. In the extended model, the coefficient of less 
educated wage remains significant for both property and violent crimes, although the 
magnitudes have dropped. The unemployment of less educated, on the other hand, is 
still significantly correlated with property crimes but loses significance for violent 
crimes. However, the sign of unemployment rate is always positive as expected.  
 
Cohen, et. al. (1980) also aims to test the effects of labour market conditions on 
property crimes. In addition, it also predicts a negative relationship between the 
population density in physical locations and the risk of being property crime victims 
with other things being equal. Such prediction is resting on the opportunity theory 
mentioned earlier. It is basically arguing that the occurrence of criminal activities 
requires the simultaneous interaction of three elements: motivated offenders, suitable 
targets and the absence of effective guardians. In this theory, the effective guardians 
are referring to the people able to prevent the violation from occurring either by their 
physical presence or certain forms of actions. The residential population density is 
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hereby calculated and assumed to measure the strength of guardians of primary-group 
locations. An increase in the residential population density is expected to deter the 
occurrence of crimes which mainly take place in or near people’s residences. 
 
The relationships of interest between crime and labour market conditions as well as 
the residential population density are tested by employing time series data for the 
years 1947-1972. The dependent variables are the crime rates of robbery, burglary and 
automobile theft for the United States. The independent variables include once-lagged 
crime rate, 8  residential population density, unemployment rate, percentage of 
population aged between 15 and 24, total consumer expenditures and par capita 
automobiles. All the independent variables are measured on national level.  
 
For robbery, all the variables of interest have obtained reasonable signs. The 
residential population density is negatively correlated with robbery and the estimated 
coefficient is highly significant. This result has confirmed the predicted guardian 
effect that residential population could have on crimes. Unemployment rate has 
obtained a significant and negative relationship with robbery which is not difficult to 
explain. As claimed in the paper, the main contribution of the unemployment variable 
is to take into account the effect of business cycle on levels of exposure to the risk of 
robbery. With higher unemployment rate representing an economic downturn, larger 
fraction of individuals would have lower probability to expose to motivated robbers. 
In addition, the percentage of young people has shown positive and significant 
correlation with robbery as expected.  
 
                                                
8 The coefficient of once-lagged crime rate will tend to be zero if changes in other exogenous variables 
have fairly rapid impacts on the property crime rates and significantly different from zero if the 
changes in exogenous variables still affect crime rates after a year.  
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The estimation for burglary has generated similar results: it has confirmed that 
burglary rate is negatively correlated with residential population density and 
positively correlated with young people proportion. Contrary to the case of robbery, 
unemployment rate has obtained positive and significant coefficient in the estimation 
for burglary. The explanation could be that unemployment rate has picked up the 
motivation effect and higher unemployment rate indicates more motivated burglars. 
The estimation has also found an interesting yet reasonable relationship: the 
consumption of non-automobile durable goods has positive and significant correlation 
with burglary rate.  
 
In the case of automobile theft, the residential population density and young people 
proportion still have the expected signs: negative for residential population density 
and positive for young people proportion. The coefficients are significant in both 
cases. The unemployment rate, on the other hand, has switched back to negative signs. 
This result could indicate that people not working might be less likely to expose their 
automobiles to illegal removal. As the per capita automobile has entered the 
estimation to capture the unique feature of automobile theft, no significant 
relationship has been detected between the two.  
 
2.6 DETECTING THE EFFECT OF YOUNG PEOPLE POPULATION 
 
The percentage of young people has been constantly incorporated in empirical models 
of crime as an explanatory variable, which can be seen in our previously reviewed 
literature. Although demographic variables do not take parts in the classic theories of 
crime, they have been customarily included in empirical estimations helping to 
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explain the variations in crime. The choices of demographic variables depend on the 
specific situation of each country. For example, it seems necessary to include both 
percentage of black people and percentage of young people for the U.S. literatures. 
However, the former would seem excessive for the works in the U.K. given its ethnic 
composition. The percentage of young people, on the other hand, is more universal 
across cases as it has been broadly accepted that there exist a robust relationship 
between age and criminal involvement. As stated in Levitt (1999), “there is a sharp 
rise in criminal involvement with the onset of adolescence followed by a steady 
decline with age. The prime ages for criminal involvement are roughly 15 -24. 
Property crime typically peaks   somewhat earlier than violent crime.” According to 
such statement, one would be reasonable to predict that as the fraction of the 
population most prone to involve in crime rises, aggregate crime is likely to rise.  
 
Searching for the reason, some would attribute the high propensity to engage in crime 
of young people to their labour market situations. Essentially, young people are 
expected to respond to incentives and opportunities the same way as adults do. The 
difference is that young people would expect lower returns from legal labour market 
given their lack of experiences and qualifications. The relatively lower opportunity 
cost from legal activities would therefore lower young people’s desired payoffs from 
illegal activities and increase their propensity to involve in crime. Furthermore, there 
are evidences showing that offenders under the age of 18 would be treated with much 
milder punishment once convicted and, in addition, their criminal records would be 
sealed after the age of 18 so that they would not affect the offenders’ future career 
prospects. All these facts indicate a lower expected cost of criminal involvement for 
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young people who can become more “carefree” when deciding whether or not to 
commit crimes.  
 
Levitt (1999) has designed a simple approach to test the impact of changing age 
distribution on aggregate crime rates. As pointed out in the paper, one plausible 
strategy of testing such impact is to run reduced-form regression with the aggregated 
crime rate being the dependent variable and the age distribution of population and 
other control variables being the regressors. Such approach has been adopted by 
numerous literatures. While some of them have found significant relationship between 
crime rate and young people proportion, such as Cohen and Land (1987), majority of 
relevant works have failed to uncover a significant effect between the two. 
Alternatively, Levitt (1999) has applied another approach which decomposes the 
crime rate by ages. Then by taking the age-specific crime rate in a particular year as 
given, the hypothetical aggregate crime rate can be computed using the age structure 
from a different point in time. For example, between 1960 and 1980, the percentage 
of population aged between 15 and 24 has risen from 13.4 percent to 18.7 percent in 
the United States. The following 15 years, 1980-1995, have almost completely 
undone this rise: it has dropped from 18.7 percent to 13.7 percent. Using the proposed 
approach, it is possible to calculate how much in the changes of crime rate can be 
explained by the changes in age distribution.  
 
The paper has investigated the changes in three types of crime: murder, violent crime, 
and property crime. For the period 1960-1980, the murder rate rose from 5.08 to 10.22 
per 100,000 population indicating an increase of more than 100 percent. Changes in 
the age structure are estimated to count for one-fifth of that total rise. For both violent 
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and property crime, changes in the age distribution contribute to similar rises, 17 and 
22 percent respectively. For the period between 1980 and 1995, the changing age 
distribution has lowered crime rates due to the declined percentage of population aged 
15 to 24. For example, 40 percent of the decrease in murder over the period can be 
explained by the changing age structure. Furthermore, the benefit of aging population 
can count for 12 percent and 18 percent declines in violent and property crime 
respectively.  
 
Aside from the worse labour market prospects of young people, the expected milder 
punishment can partially explain their higher propensity to engage in crime, as 
analysed previously. Levitt (1998) has constructed an empirical model to test this 
proposition. The basic empirical model takes the number of juvenile crimes per 
juvenile aged 15-17 as dependent variable. The variations of dependent variable are 
explained by once-lagged juvenile custody rate9, which measures the severity of 
juvenile punishment, along with other controlling variables. Such variables include 
the percentage of black people, the percentage of metropolitan residents, 
unemployment rate, legal drinking age, and the age distribution of population. As the 
empirical model is applied on state-level panel data over the period 1978-1993 in the 
United States, both state-specific and year-specific dummy variables have been 
included to control for unobservable heterogeneity.  The estimated results have shown 
that juvenile crime is responsive to harsher punishment. As the same empirical 
analysis has also been applied on adult crime rate, there is evidence to claim that the 
estimated decrease in juvenile crime rate caused by increased custody rate is at least 
as large as the corresponding reduction in adult crime rate due to a same rise in 
                                                
9 The juvenile custody rate is measured by the number of juvenile in custody per juvenile aged between 
15 and 17.  
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custody rate. In addition, there are sharp changes in the crime rates associated with the 
transition from the juvenile to adult court. As soon as turning to the age of majority, 
states with harsher adult punishment relative to juvenile punishment see sharper drops 
in crime rates comparing to states with milder relative adult punishment.  
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Chapter Three: Time Series Analyses 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, we aim to identify the relationship between unemployment and crime 
in England and Wales by adopting time series analyses. There are several factors that 
motivate us to do this work.  First of all, the unemployment – crime relationship has 
been one of the focal points in the economic literature of crime. The relationship of 
interest, however, is still far from clear. On the one hand, the effect of unemployment 
and crime is predicted to be ambiguous by Ehrlich (1973) and Cantor and Land 
(1985). Ehrlich argues that, while an increase in unemployment rate will increase 
people’s participation in illegal activities through reducing their opportunity of doing 
so, higher unemployment will also increase one’s demand for wealth due to his higher 
probability of ending up with the least desired situation – unemployed in legal sector 
and failed in illegal activities, and thus reduce his incentives to commit crimes.10 
Cantor and Land claim that increased unemployment could have two offsetting effects 
on crime: reducing criminal opportunities and, meanwhile, motivating potential 
offenders to commit crimes.11  On the other hand, empirical studies testing the 
unemployment – crime relationship have obtained mixed results. For example, Reilly 
and Witt (1996), Witt et al. (1998, 1999), Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) have 
found positive and significant effect of unemployment on crime rate; Greenberg 
(2001), Doyle et al. (1999) and Entorf and Spengler (2000) found negative and even 
insignificant U – C relationship. Their results suggest that unemployment has 
probably picked up both opportunity and motivation effects it could have on crime; 
                                                
10 More details of Ehrlich (1973) can be found in Chapter 2.  
11 For more details of Cantor and Land (1985), please see Chapter 2.  
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and the magnitudes of both effects, and thus the net effect of unemployment, 
dependent on the specific features of the crime being examined as well as the 
empirical model estimated.  
 
Given the above facts, we argue that it could be useful to implement time series 
analysis because, despite of the co-existence of opportunity and motivation effects, 
the unemployment – crime relationship could be stable in long-run. Applying time 
series analysis enables us to explore whether there is an equilibrium correlation 
between unemployment and crime. Furthermore, unlike panel data and cross-sectional 
analyses, time series analysis only depends on the variations in variables over time by 
diminishing the spatial deviations. Therefore, it is possible that applying time series 
data and techniques could generate different results.  
 
The second motivation is that the literature in England and Wales being surveyed in 
this chapter apply their time series analyses by applying different data set as well as 
different variables and, in some cases, reach different conclusion. For example, Hale 
and Sabbagh (1991) investigate the unemployment – crime relationship based on 
national level time series data covering the period 1949-1987. They find no long-term 
cointegration between unemployment and crime. Pyle and Deadman (1994a) examine 
the period 1946-1991 searching for long-term correlation between property crimes 
and business cycle. Their analyses suggest that the changes in property crimes are all 
cointegrated with unemployment in equilibrium. As seen in these two papers, as well 
as those studies in our literature review section, changing the time period examined 
and the variables incorporated could generate different results for the unemployment 
– crime relationship. And this is particularly true for time series analysis because all 
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the information used in the analysis comes from the variations of variables over time. 
Therefore, we examine a different time period, 1971-2000, and employ a different set 
of explanatory variables to test the unemployment – crime relationship in our analyses.  
 
In this chapter, we acknowledge the co-existence of opportunity and motivation 
effects of unemployment and focus our interest on testing both long-term and short-
term relationship between unemployment and crime using co-integration and error 
correction techniques. We employ national time series data covering the years 1971-
2000 in England and Wales and carry out analyses on overall and individual property 
crime rate including burglary, theft and handling, and fraud and forgery. (For overall 
crime and fraud and forgery, we only include the years 1971-1997 to avoid the 
influence of new counting rules adopted in 1998, which will be given detailed 
description later.) We only include three explanatory variables, including crime-
specific detection rate, custody rate and unemployment, to maximally utilize from our 
sample size of 30. In addition to unemployment, which is our main concern, we 
include detection and custody rates in order to eliminate their effects on crime 
because they should most directly affect crime and cannot be omitted from the 
specification.  
 
We have mainly found that each crime rate being tested has cointegration relationship 
with the three explanatory variables. Detection rate is negatively cointegrated with the 
overall crime and positively cointegrated with property crime rates in long-run; 
custody rate constantly has negative long-term correlation with all the crime rates; and 
unemployment has positive cointegration with the overall crime as well as burglary 
and theft, while it has negative cointegration with fraud. In short-run, the change of 
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each crime rate is affected by contemporary changes in explanatory variables, but not 
affected by their lagged changes.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section two reviews relevant literature from both 
theoretical and empirical aspects. In section three, we describe the employed data and 
present summary statistics. Section four explains the empirical models and the 
estimation methodologies, while section five reports the results as well as their 
interpretations. Section six briefly summarizes the main findings of this chapter. It 
will also discuss the limitations of this work as well as potential future improvement.  
 
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Most of the existing empirical studies of crime are based on the theoretical models 
constructed in Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), and the work in this chapter is no 
exception. Therefore, this literature review recalls the essential points made by both 
papers briefly as they have already been introduced in Chapter Two. It then discusses 
the empirical papers that detecting the relationship between unemployment and crime 
using time series analysis.  
3.2.1 Economic Theory of Crime 
 
Becker (1968) constructs its model by assuming the potential offenders are 
economically rational and aiming to maximize their expected utility from committing 
crimes. Therefore, the number of offences one would commit should be affected by 
his probability of apprehension and the severity of punishment. Specifically, an 
increase in either the probability of apprehension or the severity of punishment is 
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expected to reduce one’s incentives to commit crimes because the increased expected 
punishment offsets his expected returns from doing so. The aggregated supply of 
offences can then be derived by assuming all the individuals have the same reaction to 
the tougher law enforcement efforts and is predicted to be reduced by either higher 
probability of apprehension or more severe punishment, or both.   
 
The model in Ehrlich (1973) is developed by allowing each individual to freely 
allocate his time between committing crimes and working in legal sectors. His aim, 
however, is still maximizing the expected utility. Other things being equal, an 
increase in either the probability of arrest or the severity of punishment would reduce 
one’s participation in crimes by reducing the relative returns between illegal and legal 
activities. Similarly, better opportunities from legal labour market will also decrease 
the number of offences one would commit by making the legal sectors more 
profitable comparing to committing crimes. The unemployment rate enters one’s 
expected utility function measuring the risk of legal labour market. On the one hand, 
an increase in the unemployment rate is expected to increase one’s participation in 
crimes due to his lower opportunity cost of doing so. On the other hand, however, 
higher unemployment rate will increase one’s probability to end up with the lease 
desired situation – failed in illegal activities and unemployed in legal sectors. Such 
change will diminish his willingness to take the risk of committing crimes. Therefore, 
as argued in Ehrlich (1973), the net effect of higher unemployment rate on crime is 
ambiguous to predict.  
 
According to the theories introduced above, we carry out time series analysis to test 
the relationships specified as follows: 
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, 
where the aggregated crime rate C is a function of the probability of apprehension P, 
the severity of punishment F, and the unemployment rate U. we use the detection rate 
and the number of people in custody per 1000 population as proxies for probability of 
apprehension and severity of punishment. Thus, we expect both variables to have 
negative correlations with crime rates. Meanwhile, we accept the possibility that the 
effect of unemployment on crime is not necessarily positive and significant and wait 
to see what the analysis can reveal.  
3.2.2 Empirical Studies 
 
The early time series analyses of crime do not benefit from the cointegration and error 
correction techniques and are mainly based on ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions (e.g. Cantor and Land 1985; Britt 1994). These papers are criticized by 
later studies for not considering the stationarity of time series variables. Because, as 
they argue, simply applying the OLS estimation between non-stationary variables will 
lead to spurious and invalid results due to their different trends over time. Therefore, 
with the development of cointegration technique, more recent time series papers have 
been able to avoid the spurious results when analysing non-stationary variables by 
adopting such approach. This section will mainly focus on the literature investigating 
the relationship between unemployment and crime in England and Wales by using 
cointegration and relevant analysis.  
 
Cantor and Land (1985) make significant contribution to uncover the unemployment 
– crime relationship by suggesting that an increase in unemployment could have 
double impacts on crime: opportunity and motivation. While higher unemployment 
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rate could reduce the opportunities for certain types of crime, it will also motivate 
more people to participate in criminal activities by lowering their opportunity cost of 
doing so. In order to test this theory, they have designed an empirical model by 
assuming the change in crime rate is affected by two variables: the contemporary and 
first-differenced unemployment rates. While the former is expected to capture the 
opportunity effect and thus have negative effect on crime, the latter is assumed to 
measure the motivation effect and should have positive effect. By applying time series 
data in the United States covering the period 1946-1982, they have indeed found that 
increased contemporary unemployment rate broadly exhibits negative effect on both 
violent and property crimes, suggesting a significant opportunity effect it is supposed 
to capture. On the other hand, an increase in the first-differenced unemployment rate 
only shows positive correlation with property crimes, indicating that increased 
unemployment rate only motivates the potential offenders looking for financial 
benefit.  
 
Britt (1994) adopts the strategy proposed in Cantor and Land (1985) to test the 
unemployment – crime relationship for young people in the U.S. over the years 1958-
1990.12 By using the crime-specific arrest rates as proxies for different types of crime 
rates, he has obtained very similar results to those of Cantor and Land (1985). For 
both violent and property crimes, an increase in the contemporary youth 
unemployment is negatively associated with the annual changes in the youth arrest 
rates.13 Meanwhile, the first-differenced youth unemployment only positively affects 
                                                
12 The young people are defined as the persons aged 16 to 19 years old and both unemployment rate 
and arrest rates (used as proxies for crime rates) are restricted to this age group.  
13 The violent crimes include homicide, rape and aggravated assault. The property crimes refer to 
robbery, burglary and larceny.  
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the annual changes in youth property arrest rates, but has no significant impact on 
violent offences of young people.  
 
Greenberg (2001) and Hale and Sabbahg (1991) criticize the methodology adopted in 
Cantor and Land (1985) for ignoring the fact that variables could be different in their 
orders of integration. They argue that, when the variables are non-stationary (i.e. 
having an order of integration higher than zero) and integrated at different orders, the 
classic OLS estimation breaks down and special analysing procedures are needed. 
Accordingly, Greenberg (2001) applies cointegration and error correction techniques 
to test the relationship between divorce rate, unemployment rate and the crime rates of 
homicide and robbery. Based on annual time series data in the U.S. over the years 
1946-1997, both homicide and burglary have been found to be positively cointegrated 
with divorce rate. Furthermore, in short-run, the change in homicide rate is positively 
affected by the change of divorce rate, and negatively correlated with one year lagged 
unemployment rate. Meanwhile, the error correction model (testing the short-run 
relationship) has found similar result for robbery: the change in robbery is positively 
correlated with the change in divorce rate and negatively correlated with that of once-
lagged unemployment rate.  
 
Hale and Sabbagh (1991) examines the unemployment – crime relationship in 
England and Wales using annual time series data covering the period 1949-1987. 
Having decided that unemployment and crime rates14 are all I(1) series (the variables 
are non-stationary on their levels but stationary after first differencing), he applies 
Engle-Granger two step procedure to detect for long-term cointegrating relationships 
                                                
14 The crime rates being tested are total theft, theft by an employee, shoplifting, handling stolen goods, 
auto theft, total burglary, robbery, and violent crime.  
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between unemployment and crime. As the results generate no cointegration between 
the concerned variables, however, he specifies an alternative empirical model where 
the change in crime rate is correlated with both contemporary and once-lagged change 
in unemployment. Consequently, the estimation results show that only the crime of 
theft by an employee is negatively affected by the contemporary change in 
unemployment, suggesting an opportunity effect. Meanwhile, the crime rates of theft, 
burglary, and robbery have all shown positive correlation with the current change of 
unemployment, which is against his approach of using first-differenced 
unemployment rate to capture the opportunity effect.  
 
Pyle and Deadman (1994a) is interested in testing the relationship between business 
cycle and property crimes using both annual and quarterly time series data in England 
and Wales. While the crime rates being examined are theft and handling stolen goods, 
burglary and robbery, the explanatory variables include conviction rates, the number 
of police officers, the number of males aged 15-19, unemployment rate, real personal 
consumption, GDP, and a weather index. By finding that the crime rates are I(2) 
series (need to be differenced twice for stationary) while the explanatory variables are 
I(1) series (need to be differenced once to become stationary), they try to look for 
cointegrations between the first-differenced crime rates and the explanatory variables. 
Based on the annual time series data covering 1946-1991, the first-differenced crime 
rates have all been found to be cointegrated with the economic variables. Specifically, 
while an increase in either GDP or personal consumption is negatively associated with 
the changes of all property crimes; higher unemployment rate has positive effect on 
them. Furthermore, the conviction rate is found to have negative cointegration with 
the growth of robbery and theft over the examined period. Further analyses using 
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quarterly data, which is available for 1975(1)-1991(4), have confirmed the previous 
finding: GDP is negatively correlated with the growth of all the property crimes in 
both long-run and short-run models.  
 
Based on the error correction model estimated in Pyle and Deadman (1994a), 
Deanman and Pyle (1997) try to forecast the levels of property crimes for the years 
1992-1996. The aim is to see how well the model estimated in the previous paper 
performs as a forecasting device. As they adopt a strategy that forecasts the one year 
ahead growth in crime rates (i.e. from one year to the next), the predicted values 
suggest that the error correction model in the previous paper works quite satisfactorily 
in forecasting the trends in crime rates. Particularly, the forecasted crime rates have 
picked up the 1992-turning point for theft and the 1993-turning point for burglary. 
However, the model works less accurately in predicting crime levels and it tends to 
“exaggerate” the actual values for the examined period.  
 
Hale (1998) criticizes Pyle and Deadman (1994a; 1997) on the foundation of their 
model specification: all the crime rates being tested are integrated of order 2. By re-
examining the period 1946-1991, Hale shows that the crime rates of theft and 
handling, burglar and robbery are all I(1) series, instead of I(2). This result suggests 
that both cointegration and error correction models specified in Pyle and Deadman 
(1994) are wrong. Furthermore, as Hale re-estimates the cointegrations according to 
the correct specification, burglary and theft are found to be cointegrated with only 
personal consumption while robbery has no cointegrating relationship with any of the 
explanatory variable. These long-term relationships are less strong than what is found 
in Pyle and Deadman (1994a) and such difference should be due to the miss-specified 
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equation, as argued in Hale (1998). In the short-run dynamic models, the changes in 
burglary and theft are all positively affected by the change of unemployment, 
negatively correlated with the change in personal consumption, the number of police 
officer, as well as the conviction rate.  
 
Dhiri et al. (1999) carry out time series analyses based on the period 1951-1998 in 
order to present a projection of property crimes in England and Wales for the 
following three years: 1999-2001. The Engle-Granger two step procedure reveals that 
theft and burglary both have cointegrating correlations with two explanatory variables: 
the stock of crime opportunities (measured by the sum of personal consumption for 
the past 3 years) and the number of young males. Having established cointegrations 
between crime rates and the concerned explanatory variables, they go on to estimate 
the dynamic models using the approach developed in Sims et. al. (1990). The results 
show that, in short-run, the growth in theft and burglary are all positively affected by 
the one year-lagged growth in the number of young males as well as the once-lagged 
change in the stock of crime opportunities.  
 
Most of the literature introduced previously use Engle-Granger two step procedure to 
test for cointegrations between crime rates and explanatory variables. An alternative 
approach to test for cointegration is Johansen technique. Saridakis (2008) adopts such 
methodology trying to establish long-run correlations between violent crimes and the 
chosen control variables. The aim of this work is to examine the hypothesis that 
tougher punishment and better economic opportunities will reduce violent crime in 
equilibrium using time series data in England and Wales during 1960-2000. While the 
dependent variables being tested are the overall violent crime, rape, indecent assault 
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on a female and aggravated assault, the independent variables include conviction rate, 
imprisonment rate, male unemployment rate, poverty rate, and beer consumption. The 
results from applying Johansen technique suggest that cointegration relationship does 
exist for aggravated assault. Furthermore, the estimated cointegrating vector strongly 
supports the expected effect of law enforcement instruments: both conviction and 
imprisonment rates are negatively correlated with aggravated assault. They also find 
that the crime rate of aggravated assault is, in long-run, positively affected by male 
unemployment rate, poverty rate, as well as beer consumption. Meanwhile, for the 
more serious violent crimes such as rape and indecent assault on female, there is no 
long-run correlation detected between them and the concerned explanatory variables.   
 
Time series data is one of the most important and commonly used data structures to 
investigate the determinants of crime, with the other structures being cross-sectional 
and panel data.15 However, Levitt (2001) argues that “national-level time series data 
are an extremely crude tool for answering criminological questions” for several 
reasons. Firstly, although time series data is an ideal tool for analysing macro 
variables such as economic growth and inflation etc., crime rates and their influential 
variables usually exhibit significant local variations. Thus, applying time series data 
on crime modelling is not able to pick up the extra information that is varying by 
locations. Secondly, time series data usually provide limited sample size comparing to 
panel and individual data. Hence, it is difficult to include a wide range of explanatory 
variables into the equation. Thus, the estimated parameters only reflect the 
correlations between explained and explanatory variables, instead of causal links. This 
is because, in order to interpret the coefficients as causal, it is necessary to include all 
                                                
15 Individual-level data are less broadly employed due to the unavailability. 
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the potential crime-influential factors into the equation. With the limited degree of 
freedom given by time series data, it is apparently not rational to do so. Thirdly, some 
papers are particularly interested in separately estimating the two channels through 
which unemployment affects crime: opportunity and motivation, as predicted in 
Cantor and Land (1985). Using national-level time series data, however, has limited 
power for such job.  
 
Given the potential shortcomings of time series data as mentioned above, we argue 
that applying time series data and techniques is still meaningful for investigating the 
correlation between crime and its relevant factors. In this chapter, we are particularly 
interested in using national-level time series data in England and Wales to test the 
unemployment – crime relationship, as well as the deterrent effect of law enforcement. 
Our reasons are as follows. Firstly, given the co-existence of opportunity and 
motivation effects of unemployment on crime, the net effect of unemployment could 
be stable over time. Therefore, by carrying out cointegration analysis, we can reveal 
that, in long-run, whether the net effect of unemployment is positive, negative or 
insignificant. Secondly, we have applied both panel and spatial analyses in England 
and Wales to identify the relationships between crime rates and unemployment, as 
well as other relevant variables. Using time series data and techniques could provide a 
different angle to investigate this issue and perhaps generate interesting results. 
Therefore, in this chapter, we examine the correlation between crime rates and 
unemployment rate, along with law enforcement instruments by employing national 
level time series data in England and Wales. 
 
  67 
3.3 DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
In this section, we introduce the basic properties of both dependent and independent 
variables over the examined period 1971-2000. The explained variables are the 
overall crime rate as well as individual property crime rates: burglary, theft and 
handling, and fraud and forgery. We mainly choose property crimes to analyse for the 
following reasons. First, from the theoretical aspect, we expect the property crimes to 
be more responsive to the included explanatory variables than violent crimes. The 
economic models of crime in Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) suggest that relevant 
variables affect crime rates through changing the expected costs and payoffs from 
committing crimes. Therefore, an increase in the expected punishment will deter 
property crimes by increasing the expected costs of illegal activities, while higher 
unemployment rate could encourage the involvement in property crimes through 
reducing the opportunity cost of doing so. The violent crimes, on the other hand, show 
less direct correlations with these factors because the targets of such crimes are not 
financial benefits. Second, the previous empirical analyses tell us that property crimes 
are much better explained by the economic models than violent crimes. In both 
chapters of panel data and spatial analysis, the law enforcement instruments 
constantly have negative and significant effects on property crimes, while they show 
less consistent correlations with violent crimes. Meanwhile, the social-economic 
factors exhibit significant (or insignificant but explainable) effects on property crimes 
while they have, in general, shown no systematic correlation with violent crimes. 
Furthermore, Saridakis (2008) has demonstrated that only minor violent crime, such 
as aggravated assault, is correlated with law enforcement variables as well as social-
economic factors. More severe crimes, such as rape, indecent assault on female, are 
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not affected by these variables in long-run. Based on the reasons mentioned above, we 
only conduct our analysis on the overall and individual property crimes.  
 
The crime rates are measured by the number of offences recorded by police per 1000 
population. The data covering the period 1971-2000 are obtained from the Home 
Office publication Criminal Statistics. The following graph shows the time trends of 
the four crime rates over the examined period.  
 
As seen in the chart above, burglary and theft have quite similar shapes over time. 
They both keep increasing since the year 1971 and peak around the years 1992-1993. 
After that, they both experience mild and stable reduction until the year 2000. The 
line at the bottom of the chart indicates the time trend for fraud and forgery. It has 
much lower crime rate, which is less than 10 offences per 1000 population during 
1971-2000, comparing to burglary and theft. Its trend is slightly increasing until a 
sharp jump in 1998, which is due to the introduction of new counting rules discussed 
in previous chapters. The overall crime rate is lying on the top of the chart and has 
clearly picked up the trends of burglary and theft before the year 1998. The reason is 
obvious: while theft and handling takes more than 50 percent of the total crime, 
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burglary takes around 30 percent. Thus, the shape of total crime rate is unsurprisingly 
dominated by the movements of theft and burglary.  However, during 1998-2000, 
while both theft and burglary keep decreasing, the overall crime rate has an obvious 
upward jump because of the new counting rules. Therefore, in order to avoid the 
structure breaks, we have deleted the years 1998-2000 from the sample when 
empirically analysing the overall crime rate as well as fraud and forgery.  
 
Table 3-1 below reports the summary statistics for each crime rate being tested. The 
number of observation shows that, if no value is missing, the sample size is 30 in later 
analyses.  
Table 3-1 
Overall and property crime rates 
 Property crimes 
 Overall crime Burglary 
Theft and 
handling 
Fraud and 
forgery 
Mean 71.98 16.53 37.14 2.85 
Median 73.04 16.38 38.11 2.60 
Maximum 109.64 26.86 56.05 6.20 
Minimum 33.69 7.81 20.31 2.04 
Std. Dev. 24.24 5.49 10.25 0.97 
Observations  30 30 30 30 
 
The crime-specific detection rate is used as a proxy for the probability of 
apprehension and expected to be negatively correlated with crime rate. As explained 
in previous chapters, the detection rate measures the percentage of recorded offences 
that have been solved by the police through giving caution, fine or charge. The data is 
collected from Criminal Statistics. Meanwhile, we use the number of offenders 
sentenced into custody per 1000 population as a proxy of severity of punishment. 
According to the theories of crime, this variable is expected to be negatively 
correlated with crime rates due to its deterrence and incapacitation effects. The data 
source is the website of National Statistics. We use the unemployment rate defined by 
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the International Labour Organisation (ILO), instead of the claimant count rate16, in 
the time series analysis and the data is also from the website of National Statistics. 
The ILO unemployment rate is referring to the number of people who are looking for 
and available for work as a proportion of the resident economically active population. 
The correlation between this variable and crime rates are ambiguous to predict 
because of the opportunity and motivation effects it has.  
 
Table 3-2 and 3-3 below summarize the basic statistics for the explanatory variables.  
Table 3-2 
Overall and property detection rates 
 Property crimes 
 Overall crime Burglary 
Theft and 
handling 
Fraud and 
forgery 
Mean 34.83 27.07 32.60 64.93 
Median 35.00 28.00 34.50 68.50 
Maximum 47.00 37.00 43.00 84.00 
Minimum 24.00 12.00 17.00 29.00 
Std. Dev. 7.29 6.58 8.18 16.36 
Observations  30 30 30 30 
 
Table 3-3 
Other independent variables 
 
People in custody 
per 1000 population 
ILO 
unemployment rate 
Mean 0.93 7.73 
Median 0.88 7.35 
Maximum 1.26 12.1 
Minimum 0.75 3.60 
Std. Dev. 0.14 2.68 
Observations 30 30 
 
3.4 EMPIRICAL MODELS AND METHODOLOGIES  
 
One of the advantages of using time series data and technique is that we are able to 
model both long-run and short-run relationships among variables. In the presence of 
cointegration, we can specify an error correction dynamic model (ECM) accordingly 
                                                
16 The claimant count rate is used in the panel data and spatial analysis chapters because it is available 
on local authority level.  
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and estimate the short-term relationship between the differenced variables. Following 
this procedure, we firstly define our long-term cointegration model as 
          ,  (3.1) 
where the crime rate in period t is assumed to have equilibrium relationship with 
contemporary detection rate, number of people in custody, ILO unemployment rate as 
well as a constant and linear time trend. As analysed previously, while the coefficient 
of unemployment is difficult to predict, both detection rate and people in custody are 
supposed to have negative correlation with crime rate.  
 
To test the cointegration given by equation (3.1), we follow the Engle-Granger two 
step procedure developed in Engle and Granger (1987). However, in performing such 
examination, the first step is to determine the order of integration for each variable 
because, by definition, cointegration necessitates that the variables included in the 
equilibrium function should be integrated of the same order. Therefore, we start by 
applying both augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests on the 
level of each variable to test for unit root.17 For instance, the level of crime rate is 
tested by equations (3.2) and (3.3) which respectively indicate ADF and PP tests: 
                                                                     (3.2) 
and  
                                        .                                              (3.3) 
 
In both tests as shown in equations (3.2) and (3.3), our primary concern is the 
coefficient of once-lagged crime rate, . In the case of , the crime rate C 
                                                
17 See Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Phillips-Perron (1988). 
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follows a random-walk process indicating crime rate on level is non-stationary. On 
the other hand, if  , the crime rate C cannot be written in the form  . 
In such case, we can conclude that there is no unit root in the crime rate and thus it is 
stationary. As seen in equation (3.2) and (3.3), the ADF test includes certain number 
of lagged dependent variable to eliminate the serial correlation in the residuals 
because the distribution theory supporting the ADF test is based on the assumption 
that the residuals are uncorrelated and have a constant variance. The PP test, on the 
other hand, is a generalised ADF test and requires milder assumptions on the residuals. 
Instead of incorporating lagged dependent variables to the right-hand side of the test 
equation, it avoids the bias of correlated residuals by calculating the correct t statistic 
for the unit root coefficient. Furthermore, we use the critical values derived according 
to MacKinnon (1996) for both ADF and PP tests to decide whether we should reject 
the null hypothesis that a unit root exists (the variable being tested is non-stationary). 
 
In both unit root tests, a constant is always included when testing the level of crime 
rate. However, whether a time trend is incorporated depends on its movement: the 
time trend is included when the crime rate has either increasing or decreasing 
tendency. If a unit root is found (i.e. ) based on these tests, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the crime rate is non-stationary and, in such case, we take the 
first-difference and apply the unit root tests again.18 We repeat this process until the 
differenced crime rate becomes stationary (i.e. ) and the times crime rates has 
been differenced is his order of integration. Furthermore, we apply the same 
procedure of unit root test on all the explanatory variables as well. 19 
 
                                                
18 We include neither a constant nor a time trend when testing the unit root for a differenced variable.  
19 The results of unit root tests are reported in the next section.  
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Under the condition of all the variables have the same order of integration, we keep 
on our analyses by performing the Engle-Granger two step procedure to test for 
cointegration. With OLS regression, we first of all estimate the long-run equilibrium 
function given by equation (1) and obtain the estimated residuals. The next step is to 
check the residuals for the order of integration. If they are stationary, we can conclude 
that there is cointegration among the included variables and the OLS regression yields 
“super-consistent” cointegrating parameters. On the other hand, in the case of the 
residuals are non-stationary, we have to reject the null hypothesis that the variables 
are cointegrated in equilibrium and the OLS estimation generates spurious results.20  
 
Based on cointegration relationship, we hereby specify an error correction mechanism 
(ECM) to model the short-term dynamic correlations between the changes in the 
variables. Formally, we estimate our ECM model represented below using OLS 
regression for each crime rate: 
                ,              (3.4) 
where the term is the one-year-lagged residuals from estimating the 
equilibrium equation and calculated as  
               .         (3.5) 
 
While estimating the dynamic model defined by equation (3.4), there are a few things 
need to point out. Firstly, the error correction model has the advantage of being able 
                                                
20 While applying ADF and PP tests to decide the order of integration of the residuals, we do not 
include either a constant or a time trend in the specification.  
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to incorporate equilibrium information into a short-run model. The coefficients of 
first-differenced variables on the right-hand side of equation (3.4) measure the 
immediate impacts that the changes in detection rate, people in custody and 
unemployment rate will have on the change of crime rate. Hence, they reflect short-
term correlations. On the other hand, the coefficient of is the error correction 
mechanism and shows how much a drift from equilibrium will be corrected. This 
coefficient should be negative so that a crime rate above equilibrium level will be 
pulled back in the next time period to the equilibrium. In this way, the crime rate will 
maintain a stable long-run relationship with its explanatory variables.  
 
Secondly, we have chosen a maximum lag length of two for the dynamic model. 
Theoretically, the appropriate lag length should be able to generate the desired 
properties for the residuals from equation (3.4) such as normal distribution, no serial 
correlation and no heteroskedasticity. However, we choose to include a maximum of 
two lags for two reasons: 1) our sample size of 30 does not provide the potential to 
include a large number of lagged variables. Therefore, we are quite restricted when 
choosing the explanatory variables as well as the lag length; and 2) as we are using 
annual data, including two lags is normally adequate to incorporate the dynamic 
impacts of lagged changes in explanatory variables. In addition, as we have tried to 
include more lags, the results suggest that including two lags in the dynamic model is 
long enough to produce the desired properties for the residuals.  
3.5 RESULTS 
 
In this part, we will present and discuss our estimation results including those from 
unit root tests, cointegration tests, as well as dynamic ECM regressions.  
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3.5.1 Unit Root Test 
To determine the order of integration, we apply both ADF and PP tests on each 
variable. While testing the variables on their levels, we always include a constant. 
Meanwhile, we decide to include a time trend if the variable constantly rising or 
falling over the examined period. Our results in table 3-4, 3-5, and 3-6 show that, 
using both ADF and PP tests, all the variables (excluding the overall detection rate) 
have obtained insignificant t statistics suggesting that we cannot reject the existence 
of a unit root and they are non-stationary on levels. Therefore, we take the first-
differences for the variables (except the overall detection rate) and test for unit root 
again without including either constant or time trend. Our results indicate that all the 
first-differenced variables (except the overall detection rate) are stationary and, 
furthermore, the associated t statistics in both ADF and PP tests are significant at 1% 
level (i.e. the null hypothesis that there is a unit root can be rejected).  
 
Now we move onto discussing the overall detection rate. This variable is stationary on 
its level according to the ADF test, as shown in table 3-5. However, the PP test shows 
a unit root for its level according to the insignificant t statistic. Given that the ADF 
test is known as being easier to reject the hypothesized existence of unit root, we 
decide to take the level of overall detection rate as non-stationary and compute the 
first-difference for it. As seen in table 3-5, both ADF and PP tests show that the 
differenced detection rate is stationary based on highly significant (at 1% level) t 
statistics. 
Table 3-4 
Unit root tests for crime rates 
ADF PP 
Variable Level 
First  
Difference Level 
First 
Difference 
Overall -0.64 -3.26*** -0.85 -3.26*** 
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Burglary -0.94 -3.64*** -0.20 -3.63*** 
Theft and handling -1.29 -3.50*** -0.69 -3.53*** 
Fraud and forgery -2.60 -3.86*** -2.05 -3.78*** 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; and * significant at 10% level. 
Table 3-5 
Unit root tests for detection rates 
ADF PP 
Variable Level 
First  
Difference Level 
First 
Difference 
Overall -3.74** -3.25*** -2.57 -3.25*** 
Burglary -2.96 -4.45*** -1.76 -4.45*** 
Theft and handling -0.80 -3.67*** -1.38 -3.68*** 
Fraud and forgery -2.66 -2.91*** -2.14 -2.91*** 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; and * significant at 10% level. 
Table 3-6 
Unit root tests for other variables 
ADF PP 
Variable Level 
First  
Difference Level 
First 
Difference 
People in custody -2.68 -2.97*** -1.83 -2.98*** 
ILO 
unemployment rate -1.42 -3.06*** -0.70 -2.85*** 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; and * significant at 10% level. 
 
3.5.2 Cointegration Test 
In last section, we have confirmed that all the variables, both dependent and 
independent, are integrated of the same order, I(1). Therefore, we are reasonable to 
perform the cointegration tests among these variables following Engle-Granger two-
step procedure. For each crime rate, we firstly estimate the equilibrium equation 
defined by equation (3.1) using the OLS regression and acquire the residuals. 
Afterwards, we test the residuals with ADF and PP tests to decide whether they are 
stationary, because if they are, we can accept the variables in equation (3.1) as 
cointegrated. It is worth noting that neither a constant nor a time trend is incorporated 
in the unit root tests because the residuals are assumed to have zero mean and 
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constant variances. (Furthermore, we do not find either constant or trend existing in 
the estimated residuals when checking their scatter plots.)  As reported in table 3-7, 
the residuals from the estimation of each crime rate is stationary on the levels 
according to both ADF and PP tests with highly significant (at 1% level) t statistics. 
Consequently, we are able to conclude that, although the variables are individually 
non-stationary over time, their linear combination specified by equation (3.1) is stable 
over time, i.e. these variables are cointegrated.  
 
The cointegrating correlations are reported in table 3-8 and we summarise the results 
as following. Firstly, the overall detection rate is negatively cointegrated with the 
overall crime rate suggesting that, in long-run, higher detection rate comes along with 
decreased crime rate. However, as we mentioned before, we can not tell causal 
relationships from the cointegration between variables; rather, we can only know the 
long-run correlations between them. Therefore, the negative correlation between 
overall crime rate and detection rate could be caused by two effects: 1) higher 
detection rate could reduce crime rate through deterrence and incapacitation effects; 
and 2) increased crime rate could disperse the limited law enforcement resource and 
thus reduce the probability of detection. Meanwhile, the crime-specific detection rates 
are positively cointegrated with the property crimes, namely burglary, theft and 
handling, and fraud and forgery. Such positive cointegrations are probably running 
through the crime rates to the detection rates: more crimes would require tougher 
crime combat policies, because it is unlikely that increased probability of detection 
would induce higher crime rates.  
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The detection rate is negatively cointegrated with the overall crime rate and positively 
cointegrated with individual property crimes as shown in table 3-8. Such long-term 
cointegrations can be explained as follows: increased property crimes require higher 
detections rates to combat and, therefore, part of police officers who used to work on 
other types of crimes could be re-allocated to solve property crimes. Such re-
allocation of police personnel could lead to increases in the detection rates of property 
crimes and reductions in those of other crime types. As the overall detection rate is the 
proportion of overall crimes, including property and other types of crimes, which have 
been solved, higher detection rates for property crimes could lead to lower overall 
detection rate. Hence, while the crime-specific detection rates are positively 
cointegrated with individual property crime rates, the overall detection rate is, in the 
meantime, negatively correlated with the overall crime rate.  
 
Secondly, the variable of people in custody shows negative cointegration with each 
type of crime rate and we argue that the causality could also be running either way. 
On the one hand, more people kept in custody could deter crimes through a signal of 
tougher punishment, and meanwhile, eliminate the possibility for prisoners to commit 
further crimes. On the other hand, higher crime rate could reduce the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the justice system. While the police could be less accurate in finding 
evidence when facing more reported cases, the court system could delay their 
sentences with more charged offenders. Therefore, the negative cointegration could 
also be caused by the negative effect of crime on custody rate.  
 
Thirdly, the unemployment rate has positive integration with the overall crime rate, 
burglary as well as theft in equilibrium. This result implies that the motivation effect 
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of unemployment has more significant impact on crime than the opportunity effect in 
long-run. Therefore, increased unemployment would lead to rising crime rates despite 
of it could also somehow reduce the crime opportunities at the same time.  However, 
unemployment rate could be positively affected by crime rate through two channels: 1) 
in short-run, involving in crimes would reduce people’s participation in legal sectors 
and thus lead to higher unemployment; and 2) in long-run, the criminal records of 
offenders would negatively affect their further payoffs from legal labour market as 
well as their probabilities of getting hired. Therefore, the positive cointegration 
between unemployment and crime (including overall, burglary, and theft) could be the 
result of two effects running through opposite directions. In contrary, unemployment 
has negative correlation with fraud and forgery, indicating increased unemployment is 
related to decreased fraud. This finding could be explained by the fact that a 
significant proportion of fraud and forgery is white-collar crimes and people need jobs 
to do so. An increase in unemployment implies fewer opportunities for white-collar 
crimes and lead to a reduction in fraud and forgery.  
 
Table 3-7 
Unit root tests for residuals  
ADF PP 
Variable Level 
First  
Difference Level 
First 
Difference 
Overall -3.24*** -4.38*** -2.83*** -5.94*** 
Burglary -4.97*** -5.78*** -4.69*** -7.50*** 
Theft and handling -3.90*** -2.83*** -3.04*** -6.32*** 
Fraud and forgery -4.06*** -4.73*** -3.09*** -6.08*** 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; and * significant at 10% level. 
Table 3-8 
cointegration tests 
 Overall crime Burglary 
Theft and 
handling 
Fraud and 
forgery 
Constant 
3.62 
(1.18) 
0.89 
(0.42) 
1.79 
(0.68) 
-1.24 
(1.12) 
Detection rate 
-0.16 
(0.29) 
0.11 
(0.12) 
0.18 
(0.19) 
0.38 
(0.24) 
Custody rate 
-0.88 
(0.27) 
-1.36 
(0.21) 
-1.20 
(0.19) 
-1.13 
(0.25) 
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ILO unemployment 
0.21 
(0.05) 
0.32 
(0.05) 
0.16 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
Linear trend 
0.04 
(0.01) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
The values in the brackets are the estimated standard errors. 
 
3.5.3 Dynamic Error Correction Models (ECM) 
In the presence of cointegration, we are now able to estimate a dynamic ECM model 
using equation (3.4) for each crime. One of the conditions for a correctly specified 
ECM model is that we should include sufficient lags for the differenced variables so 
that the residuals would have the desired properties: normally distributed, not 
correlated, and having constant variances. We start our temptation by including two 
lags for the differenced variables to the right-hand side of equation (4) due to two 
reasons: 1) the sample size of 30 greatly restricts the potential to include large number 
of lags; and 2) as we are analysing annual data, including the information of two years 
before should be long enough to reflect the dynamics in normal cases. Our results 
suggest that, however, the ECM model is “over-fitted” while setting the lag length 
equal to two: although the obtained residuals have the right properties, the coefficients 
are broadly insignificant (including the ECM term). Thus, we reduce the lag length to 
one and re-estimate the system. This adjustment has made significant improvement: 
as some of the independent variables start showing significant coefficients (including 
the ECM term), the residuals still have the correct properties indicating the validation 
of the model. Therefore, based on the ECM model with the lag length of one, we try 
to derive a parsimonious dynamic model by dropping insignificant independent 
variables: one variable at a time until the adjusted R-squared starts falling and the 
standard error of regression starts rising.  
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As the results of parsimonious models are reported in table 3-9 below, we find that, 
firstly, the change in overall crime rate is most significantly affected by the 
contemporary change in detection rate: one percent increase in the probability of 
detection leads to a 0.89 percent reduction in the overall crime rate. Meanwhile, an 
increase in the custody rate also tends to reduce the overall crime, although this 
negative effect is statistically insignificant. Furthermore, the change in unemployment 
rate is positively correlated with the change in overall crime in short-run, reflecting 
the motivation effect of unemployment. However, the coefficient of differenced 
unemployment rate is also insignificant. As we incorporate the long-run information 
into the dynamic model, we find that the once-lagged error correction term has a 
negative and significant effect (at 5% level) on the growth rate of overall crime, 
consistent with expectation. This result indicates that, if the crime rate shifts away 
from its equilibrium level by one percent in current period, this deviation will be 
corrected by 0.43 percent in the next period. In other word, the speed of adjustment is 
around 40 percent per year.  
 
The change in burglary is shown to be significantly affected by the change in custody 
rate as well as that of unemployment rate. Specifically, one percent increase in the 
number of people in custody will reduce burglary by 0.61 percent. Meanwhile, if the 
unemployment rate goes up by one percent, the burglary rate will accordingly rise by 
0.47 percent. Consistent with expectation, the ECM term has obtained negative and 
significant coefficient at 1% level. It suggests a rather quick speed of adjustment: one 
percent drift from equilibrium in burglary will be pulled back to the level it should be 
by 0.94 percent in next period.  
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As seen in the section of data description, theft and handling exhibits identical trend 
over the examined period as burglary because they are both typical property crimes 
and share some common features. In this section, we find that their short-run changes 
also behave in similar way: the differenced theft and handling is significantly 
correlated with the changes of people in custody and unemployment. A one percent 
increase in the number of people in custody has a negative but bigger impact on theft 
than on burglary: 0.89 percent reduction will occur to theft accordingly. On the other 
hand, one percent increase in unemployment will lead to a 0.19 rise in theft, which is 
smaller than the response of burglary. The error correction mechanism shows that 63 
percent of current disequilibrium will be corrected in next period. That is equivalent 
to say that one percent deviation from equilibrium in theft can be drawn back on track 
in less than two years.  
 
As we finally move onto discussing fraud and forgery, we discover that the 
contemporary growth rate in fraud is positively correlated with its once-lagged value, 
and such correlation is significant at 1% level. This is implying that one percent 
growth in fraud one year before will result in a 0.54 percent growth in current period. 
Meanwhile, the coefficient of differenced custody rate tells that one point growth in 
the number of people in custody will reduce fraud and forgery by 0.56 point. In 
addition, the ECM term has a coefficient of -0.79, suggesting a rather strong adjusting 
effect: 79 percent of the disequilibrium will be diminished by the cointegration 
relationship.  
 
We need to point out that we have applied a set of diagnostic tests on the residuals to 
examine their properties and the results are satisfactory. As shown in the lower part of 
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table 3-9, we are able to accept that the estimated residuals are all normally 
distributed (only one exception being the residuals from the model of overall crime), 
serially independent and having constant variances. The only exception is that we 
reject the normal distribution for the residuals in the model of overall crime. In sum, 
our results of diagnostic tests suggest that the parsimonious dynamic models are valid 
and the estimated coefficients are not biased by either incorrectly behaved residuals or 
miss-specified equations.  
Table 3-9 
Parsimonious dynamic models 
 D(overall) D(burglary) D(theft) D(fraud) 
Constant 0.03** (0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
D(crime)(t-1) - - 0.25 (0.17) 
0.54*** 
(0.18) 
D(detection) -0.89*** (0.26) - - 
0.29 
(0.31) 
D(custody) -0.44 (0.27) 
-0.61** 
(0.24) 
-0.89*** 
(0.25) 
-0.56* 
(0.29) 
D(ilo) 0.13 (0.08) 
0.47*** 
(0.07) 
0.19** 
(0.08) - 
ECM(t-1) -0.43** (0.18) 
-0.94*** 
(0.15) 
-0.63*** 
(0.17) 
-0.79*** 
(0.20) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.59 0.74 0.52 0.40 
S.E. of Regression 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Normality Test  8.50** [0.01] 
0.20 
[0.91] 
2.64 
[0.27] 
0.72 
[0.70] 
Serial Correlation 
LM Test 
0.16 
[0.85] 
0.02 
[0.99] 
0.03 
[0.97] 
0.72 
[0.50] 
White 
Heteroskedasticity 
0.20 
[0.99] 
1.08 
[0.42] 
0.29 
[0.98] 
1.97 
[0.14] 
RESET Test 0.53 [0.48] 
0.44 
[0.51] 
0.002 
[0.96] 
0.16 
[0.69] 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; and * significant at 10% level. The values in the rounded 
brackets are the standard errors, while the values in the squared brackets are the associated p-values.  
 
3.6 CONCLUSION  
 
In this paper, we have tested the broadly concerned unemployment—crime 
relationship using annual time series data in England and Wales over the period 1971-
2000. Accordingly, we have chosen the approach of cointegration analysis and error 
correction model to cope with the non-stationary variables. We have found that, in 
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long-run, the overall and individual property crimes are cointegrated with 
unemployment as well as law enforcement instruments. Particularly, unemployment 
rate has positive cointegration with overall crime, burglary and theft, indicating that, 
for such crimes, the motivation effect is stronger than the opportunity effect. 
Increased unemployment rate would reduce the opportunity cost of committing crimes, 
as argued in Ehrlich (1973), and motivate potential offenders to engage in illegal 
activities. Such effect could offset the impact that higher unemployment would reduce 
the potential opportunities for property crimes. In contrary, unemployment is 
negatively correlated with fraud and forgery in equilibrium suggesting that higher 
unemployment could greatly affect the opportunities of while-collar crimes. 
Furthermore, while custody rate is negatively cointegrated with each crime rate 
confirming its negative effect as law enforcement instrument, detection rate has 
negative long-term correlation with overall crime and positive correlation with 
individual property crimes. We argue that the positive cointegration between 
detection rate and property crimes could be caused by a causality running from crime 
to detection: increased crime rate probably requires tougher crime control policies.  
 
As we are also able to examine a dynamic error correction model, we find that the 
changes in crime rates are only affected by the contemporary changes in explanatory 
variables. Specifically, the change of custody rate has the strongest effect on the 
changes in crimes, which is constantly negative. The growth of unemployment also 
has relatively strong and constant effect: it is positively correlated with overall crime, 
burglary, and theft and handling. This finding is consistent with their long-run 
relationships.  
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The error correction term is a beneficial feature for using cointegration and ECM 
analysis. Its associated coefficients have shown rather quick adjusting process. The 
highest speed of adjustment occurs to burglary indication 94 percent of disequilibrium 
will be corrected in one year’s time. Meanwhile, the overall crime has the lowest 
speed of adjustment and 43 percent deviation from equilibrium will be pulled back in 
the next year.  
 
We have adopted Engle-Granger two-step procedure to detect for cointegration. This 
approach has a few limitations. Firstly, cointegraion tested by this approach is unable 
to tell which variable should be taken as explained and which ones are explanatory. 
Theoretically, with infinite samples, treating different variables as dependent should 
yield the same cointegration relationship. However, with limited sample size, using 
different dependent variables is possible to generate different correlations. Secondly, 
this technique ignores the possibility of more than one cointegration relationship in 
the case of including three or more variables. And thirdly, as this approach takes two 
steps to perform, a mistake involved in the first step will be automatically carried into 
the second stage and thus generate misleading results. Such potential issues associated 
with Engle-Granger two step procedure can be avoid by using Johansen cointegration 
test. However, Johansen technique could induce the identification problem. When 
there are more than one cointegration relationships, it would be rather difficult, if not 
impossible, to identify which is the “true” long-term relationship.  
 
Our cointegration model includes four variables as well as a constant and a linear time 
trend, as defined in equation (3.1). Therefore, we cannot ignore the possibility of 
multiple cointegration vectors. Consequently, we have applied both eigenvalue and 
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trace tests to detect the number of cointegrating vectors for each crime type. Our 
results of tests suggest that there only exists one cointegrating relation among relevant 
variables for the overall crime, burglary and theft and handling, according to both 
eigenvalue and trace tests. On the other hand, trace test indicates one cointegration 
relationship for fraud and forgery while the eigenvalue test implies zero. Since the 
cointegration tests have eliminated the possibility of more than one cointegration 
vectors for each type of crime, our application of Engle-Granger two step approach 
will not be affected by the existence of multiple cointegrating relationships.   
 
An issue that usually concerns with time series analysis (and panel data analysis in 
some cases) is the potential structural break, particularly when the data covers several 
decades. Our cointegration analyses in this chapter are conducted upon the time series 
data over 30 years (1971-2000). During this period, any significant social or economic 
change could potentially affect the correlations between our concerned variables. For 
instance, one of the most well-known events in the examined period is that Margaret 
Thatcher became the leader of the Conservatives in 1979 and implemented her 
policies of reducing state intervention and encouraging free market. Such polices 
dramatically increased the unemployment rate in the UK by privatizing many 
nationally-owned enterprises. Similarly, the economic recession in the early 90’s also 
caused awful labour market conditions. There are methods to control the influences of 
such significant events and one of them is to carry out structural break test. 
Alternatively, we could reduce the probability of structural break by shortening the 
time period being covered. As shown in our later chapters, we examine much shorter 
time periods in our panel data and spatial analyses.  
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Another potential shortcoming of this chapter is that we have only 30 samples in total, 
which has greatly restricted our selection of explanatory variables. However, limited 
sample size is a common problem for using time series data. In order to reduce the 
small sample bias, we have tried to strictly control the number of explanatory 
variables and only included the most important ones. Aside from unemployment 
which is our main concern, we argue that law enforcement variables should have the 
closest correlation with crimes. Our argument is supported by most empirical papers 
because, as long as they include variables such as detection rate, conviction rate, 
imprisonment rate etc., these variables show negative and significant effects on 
crimes most of the time. Therefore, we have included crime-specific detection rate 
and custody rate along with unemployment in order to control for their correlations 
with crimes. In the next chapter, we will tackle the issue of limited sample size by 
employing panel data analyses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  88 
Chapter Four: Panel Data Analyses 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The economic analysis of crime is normally traced to Becker (1968) whose seminal 
work on crime and punishment has been the starting point of almost all works in this 
area. Ehrlich (1973) extends Becker’s model and looks at economic factors 
accounting for changes in the incentives for crime. These early analyses provide a 
framework for identifying factors that affect crime. Much empirical work in this area 
uses variables, such as unemployment, income level, that are believed to affect the 
costs and benefits of crime. These variables are presumed to be the factors that affect 
rational criminal behaviour. The main aim of these papers (including this work) is to 
verify if these “deterrence” variables do affect criminal behaviour.  
 
In this chapter, we examine the factors that we believe contribute to crime in England 
and Wales using panel data for the period 1992-2005. Various factors have been 
identified in the literature as affecting crime rates. We do a rigorous empirical 
analysis of these factors for various types of crime in England and Wales for the 
period under consideration. By doing this, we seek to identify what types of crime 
respond most to the so called economic factors and what do not. This is clearly useful 
for policy purpose.   
 
While there are only a limited number of literature in England and Wales analysing 
factors affecting crime rates, even fewer studies have done with panel data analysis at 
our level of disaggregation. In our review of the literature in the next section, we find 
some common issues that these papers do not handle and we intend to fill the gap in 
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this work. First of all, most of the literature we have reviewed focus on analysing 
property crimes such as burglary and theft (e.g. Witt et al., 1998; Reilly and Witt, 
1996). This is probably because people usually believe that property crimes are more 
responsive to the factors affecting the costs and benefits of committing crimes, such 
as law enforcement variables and labour market opportunities. However, we argue 
that violent crimes, such as sexual offences and personal violence, could also be 
analysed in the same framework. Although violent crimes are normally not committed 
for economic benefits, they should still be influenced by variables that change the 
“price” and opportunities for doing so.  
 
Our second finding on the existing literature in England and Wales is that most of 
them define their aim as identifying the effect of unemployment on crime.  They, 
nevertheless, have failed to include a complete set of crime-influencing variables in 
their empirical modes. Both Becker (1968) and particularly Ehrlich (1973) have 
theoretically demonstrated the effects of various factors on crime such as law 
enforcement, social-economic status, demographic composition and so on. Omitting 
some of these variables could not only lead to mis-specified model, but also bias the 
results if the omitted variables are correlated with the included explanatory variables.  
 
The third shortcoming of some existing literature is that they have ignored the 
potential endogeneity of law enforcement variables. This issue is essential in detecting 
the relationship between crime and its relevant factors, as without a control for 
endogeneity, the reversed causality from crime to crime control variables could 
generate biased estimation and thus misleading implications.  
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In this chapter, we intend to empirically test the correlation between different types of 
crime rates and their influencing factors while controlling for the previously 
mentioned issues. We break down the total recorded crime rate into eight individual 
categories as defined by the Home Office and analyse six of them with our empirical 
framework. They are violence against the person, sexual offences, robbery, burglary, 
theft and handling, and fraud and forgery. While the first three types are defined as 
violent crimes, the last three categories are property crimes. We try to avoid the 
omitted variable bias by choosing our explanatory variables according to Ehrlich 
(1973). In particular, we specify an empirical model where crime rate is affected by 
law enforcement instruments, social-economic status as well as demographic 
composition. Moreover, our use of panel data allows us to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity which can further reduce the risk of mis-specified equation. We control 
for the endogenous law enforcement variables by adopting the GMM technique and 
applying instrument variables. Further, we also allow the crime rate to depend on past 
crime rates as we believe that crime rate could have shown persistence over time due 
to either the recidivism of offenders or the effects of lagged explanatory variables, or 
both.  
 
Our panel data is disaggregated by police force areas in England and Wales over the 
period 1992-2005. As a unique feature, we also apply a different, but overlapping data 
set, covering the time period 1987-2005 in England and Wales to check the robustness 
of our results. The difference between the two data sets, aside from the period being 
covered, is that the independent variables of unemployment rate and real average 
weekly earnings are disaggregated by police force areas in the data set of 1992-2005 
while they are disaggregated by regions in the data set of 1987-2005.  As the shorter 
  91 
data (1992-2005) are more accurate in reflecting the variations in explanatory 
variables, we report the results generated by this data set as our main finding. We use 
the obtained results generated by analysing the longer data date through the same 
procedure as our robustness check.  
 
Our main findings include, first of all, the property crimes are better explained than 
the violent crimes by our empirical model which is derived according to Ehrlich 
(1973). Different crimes do react differently to the changes of incorporated 
explanatory variables. Secondly, among all the explanatory variables, law 
enforcement variables have the strongest impacts on different types of crime. Their 
negative and significant associations with crimes have confirmed their deterrence and 
incapacitation effects as predicted by theoretical models and such results are the most 
important findings of the chapter. Thirdly, the social-economic factors, such as 
unemployment and real earnings, have mainly picked up their opportunity effects on 
crimes, particularly property crimes, suggesting worse social-economic conditions 
will reduce crime due to few crime opportunities. Furthermore, our results are rather 
robust when applying the data set 1987-2005 with only few exceptions, which we will 
provide an explanation for.   
 
We structure this chapter in the following order. Section two reviews empirical 
literature in England and Wales as well as other countries that investigate similar 
questions using panel data. In section three, we firstly discuss the theoretical 
background based on which we construct our empirical model. Next, we specify the 
empirical model we will test and introduce the econometric methodologies which we 
shall adopt. Whilst section four describes the two data sets in details and presents 
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summary statistics, section five reports and examines our estimation results. As there 
are two sets of data being employed, the results generated by different data sets will 
be compared together to show whether they are robust across data sets. Finally, 
section six summarises the main findings of this work and points out the potential 
shortcomings that could be improved in the future. 
 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
We construct our empirical model based on the theoretical frameworks developed in 
Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973). As these works have already been discussed 
extensively in the chapter of literature review, we will only briefly outline both of 
them in the section on theoretical background and estimation methodology after 
which we introduce our empirical model.  
 
In this section, we will firstly review the literature in England and Wales that 
investigate the determinants of crime using panel data. These papers are important 
because they are most closely related to our work. Next, we extend our discussion to 
similar literature from other parts of the world, such as Scotland, France, Greece as 
well as the U.S., in order to briefly introduce their research on the same topic by 
implementing panel data. Finally, we point out the potential weakness of the literature, 
particularly in England and Wales, which we try to overcome in our work.  
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4.2.1 Empirical Applications 
4.2.1.1 U.K. Studies 
Carmichael and Ward (2000; 2001) are interested to test the relationships between 
youth unemployment and different types of crime rates in England and Wale using 
panel data. The main difference between the two works is that Carmichael and Ward 
(2000) disaggregate their panel data on regional level over the period 1985-1995, 
while their later work apply an extended data set disaggregated on county-level 
covering the years 1989-1996. The earlier work, Carmichael and Ward (2000), uses 
the crime rates of burglary, criminal damage, robbery, theft, violence against the 
person, and total crime as dependent variables.  As they are primarily interested in the 
unemployment – crime relationship, they separately estimate the effects of youth and 
adult unemployment rates on crime to investigate whether crime rates would respond 
differently to them. They also control for various independent variables including the 
percentage of white population, crime-specific clear-up rate, the percentage of 
convicted criminals receiving prison sentence, and the average sentence length. In 
order to cope with the panel data structure, they adopt the OLS regression with 
region-specific fixed effects to take into account the regional unobservable 
heterogeneity. Their results suggest that, while there is positive correlation between 
unemployment and crime in general, different crime rates could be affected 
differently by youth and adult unemployment. Specifically, burglary is the only crime 
positively affected by both youth and adult unemployment rate. Criminal damage and 
robbery only have positive correlations with youth unemployment rate, while theft is 
only positively related to adult unemployment rate. In contrary, violence against the 
person shows no significant correlation with either youth or adult unemployment rate.  
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In the latter work (2001), as well as renewing their panel data by upgrading the level 
of disaggregation, Carmichael and Ward have also made some adjustment to the 
model specification. On the one hand, they include the crime rate of fraud and forgery 
in their analytical framework as dependent variable. On the other hand, they expand 
their set of independent variables by incorporating population density and the 
percentage of births outside marriage to capture the degree of urbanization and the 
traditional family values respectively. Based on the same estimation methodology, 
both youth and adult unemployment rates have shown positive and significant 
correlations with burglary, theft, fraud and forgery, and total crime. Only adult 
unemployment rate is significantly related to robbery, and neither youth nor adult 
unemployment has shown significant effect on criminal damage and violent crime.  
 
Witt et al. (1998; 1999) also adopt similar research strategy: while they use regional 
level panel data over the period 1979-1993 in the earlier paper, they further 
disaggregate the data by police force areas for the years 1986-1996. In both articles, 
they seek test the relationship between unemployment and different crime rates in 
England and Wales. Moreover, they also intend to identify the effect of income 
inequality on crime rates. In the earlier work, the crime rates being analysed include 
burglary, theft from a vehicle, other theft, shoplifting, and robbery. They assume these 
crimes are affected by the explanatory variables of wage inequality, unemployment 
rate, population density, police employees, as well as demographic variables 
controlling for age distribution. In order to eliminate region-specific fixed effects, 
their analyses are based on first-differenced OLS estimations. The results show that 
both variables of their interest have significant correlations with the property crimes. 
In particular, the growth of male unemployment has positive and significant effect on 
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all the five crime rates being studied. Furthermore, the wage inequality is also 
positively correlated with all the five crime rates, and among which burglary, theft 
from a vehicle and robbery are the most responsive types to the increase in wage 
inequality.  
 
Witt et al. (1999) have made significant changes in their model specification from 
their earlier paper. While the dependent variables are burglary, vehicle crime, 
handling stolen goods as well as other theft, the independent variables include the 
once-lagged crime rate being analysed, unemployment rate, wage inequality, cars per 
capita, once-lagged police per capita, as well as year-specific and area-specific 
dummies. As presented in the paper, they allow the crime rate to follow an AR(1) 
process because the lagged crime rate could reflect the tendency of criminals to keep 
committing crimes even after the other crime-influential factors have changed. 
Furthermore, they adopt the generalised method of moments (GMM) technique to 
cope with the inclusion of lagged dependent variable. Their results show that, firstly, 
the unemployment rate has positive and significant coefficient in the analysis of each 
type of crime, which is consistent with the finding in Witt et al. (1998). Also, the 
wage inequality has constantly shown positive and significant effect on crime rate in 
all cases. This result differs from Witt et al. (1998) in which the wage inequality only 
has significant effect on certain types of crime.  
 
Reilly and Witt (1996) aim to identify the effects of unemployment as well as law 
enforcement instruments on property crimes in England and Wales. The panel data 
employed in their analysis is disaggregated by police force areas covering the period 
1980-1991. The dependent variables include burglary, theft and robbery, and each of 
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them is predicted by the explanatory variables of crime-specific clear-up rate, average 
sentence length, and male unemployment rate. The basic analysis is conducted by 
applying the OLS estimation incorporating both area-specific and year-specific fixed 
effects. However, this basic analysis is unable to control the simultaneity between 
crime rates and law enforcement variables. Accordingly, they apply an unrestricted 
error-correction mechanism (ECM) model to solve for the endogeneity of clear-up 
rate and average sentence length. Their investigations mainly reveal that, in long-run, 
the average sentence length has negative effect on burglary and robbery while the 
clear-up rate is negatively affecting burglary and theft. The negative effects of both 
average sentence length and clear-up rate are consistent with the predicted deterrent 
effect as law enforcement variables. On the other hand, in short-run, the average 
sentence length only negatively affects theft while the clear-up rate only negatively 
affects robbery. As one of their main concerns, unemployment rate has exhibited 
positive effect on both burglary and theft suggesting that the motivation effect of 
unemployment is stronger than its opportunity effect.   
 
Machin and Meghir (2000) exclusively investigate the relationship between property 
crime rates and worsened labour market conditions of less skilled workers. To do so, 
they utilise panel data by police force areas in England and Wales over the period 
1975-1996. The regression analysis is initially applied on the aggregated property 
crime as well as vehicle crime. Then the aggregated property crime is broken down 
into burglary and theft and handling. Each type of crime is explained by the 25th 
percentile real hourly wage, the percentage of people aged 15-24 as well as the 
conviction rate. In addition, both area-specific and year-specific dummies are 
included all the time. The undertaken estimations have found that, firstly, the 25th 
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percentile real wage has negative correlation with the aggregated property crime rate. 
After breaking down the aggregated property crime into sub-categories, this variable 
is still negatively correlated with vehicle crime, burglary, and theft and handling. As 
the 25th percentile real wage is assumed to measure the wage rate of low skilled 
workers, the previous results advocate that higher incomes for low skilled workers 
will reduce the occurring of property crimes. Moreover, the conviction rate constantly 
displays negative correlation with both aggregated and broken-down property crimes. 
This result is supportive for the expectation that conviction rate, as proxy for the 
probability of punishment, has a deterrent effect on property crimes.  
4.2.1.2 European Studies 
Apart from the literature in England and Wales that investigate the relationships 
between crime rates and relevant factors, similar question has been addressed for 
other European countries. By way of example, Reilly and Witt (1992) try to examine 
the relationship between unemployment and crime in Scotland using panel data on 
regional level over the period 1974-1988. The dependent variable is the overall crime 
rate measured by the number of offences per 100 population. The explanatory 
variables include the unemployment rate and the number of completed public 
authority houses per capita. While the former indicates the labour market opportunity, 
the latter is used to capture the regional influence of government or local authority 
due to the unavailability of regional level government expenditure figures. In addition 
to the standard OLS estimation, they also apply fixed and random effects models in 
order to get rid of the region-specific factors. Furthermore, Cochrane-Orcutt and 
Prais-Winsten procedures have also been implemented to deal with the potential 
cross-sectional correlations in the error terms. The most noteworthy finding of this 
paper is the robust positive correlation between unemployment rate and crime rate 
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across different estimations. The coefficient of unemployment is significant in all 
cases while the magnitude ranges from 0.15 to 0.35. Whereas, the effect of public 
houses per capita on crime is sensitive to estimation method. The results show that, 
once the region-specific effects are incorporated through either fixed or random 
effects model, the public houses per capita exhibits negative and significant 
correlation with crime which is consistent with expectation.  
 
Pyle and Deadman (1994b) re-estimates the model specified in Reilly and Witt (1992) 
by extending the panel data to the period 1974-1991. By adopting the same 
explanatory variables and estimation methods, Pyle and Deadman argue that the 
previously positive correlation between unemployment and crime becomes 
insignificant in both fixed and random effects models. Besides, the coefficient of 
unemployment has substantially smaller magnitude in the analyses using the extended 
data. The reason behind this reduced correlation between unemployment and crime 
may be that, as pointed out by Pyle and Deadman, both unemployment and crime 
have common upward time trends over the period 1974-1988 which is reflected by the 
previous positive correlation between the two variables. However, simply extending 
the data set by three years have changed the common trend over time between 
unemployment and crime and weakened their estimated correlation.  
 
Another example of empirical study on a European country is Edmark (2003), which 
uses panel data on county-level from Sweden over the years 1988-1999 to explore the 
effect of unemployment on property crime rates. The property crime rates under 
scrutiny are burglary, robbery, car theft, bike theft, theft/pilfering from motor vehicle 
and shop, and fraud. These crime rates are separately explained by a set of 
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independent variables including unemployment rate, clear-up rate, average income, 
the proportion of divorced, population density, the proportion of people with higher 
education, the proportion of people on social allowance, the proportion of foreign 
citizens, the proportion of 15-24 years old, and the sales of alcohol at the National 
Liquor Monopoly. In addition to these controlling variables, both county-specific and 
year-specific fixed effects are included in the estimations to count for the 
unobservable features that would be otherwise correlated with the independent 
variables. Furthermore, he also makes an attempt to control for unobservable county-
specific time trends by adding both linear and quadratic time trends into the empirical 
model. The estimated results have shown strong evidence that unemployment is 
correlated with some property crimes. Particularly, unemployment rate is positively 
correlated with burglary and car theft and such correlations are insensitive to different 
model specifications. In the meantime, unemployment rate has shown positive effect 
on bike theft in the model without time trends as well as the model with both linear 
and quadratic time trends. Furthermore, the clear-up rate has been a strong predictor 
for the property crime rates. It has constantly shown a negative effect on each type of 
crime rate under study. However, as Edmark acknowledges, one of the potential 
issues associated with this model is that the model is unable to control for the 
simultaneous relationship between the clear-up rate and crime.  
 
A most up to date examination on the relations between crime rates and potential 
explanatory factors is Saridakis and Spengler (2009). The article employs regional 
level panel data in Greece over the period 1991-1998 to examine the issue of their 
concern: the relationship between crime, deterrence and unemployment. The focus 
their analyses on the crime rates of breaking and entering, theft of motor cars, robbery, 
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murder, serious assault, and rape; and each of the crime is regressed on the once-
lagged crime rate, clear-up rate and unemployment rate. Instead of including region-
specific dummies, they take first differences for both dependent and independent 
variables to eliminate the region-specific fixed effects. In order to correct the 
estimation biases caused by including the once-lagged dependent variable, the GMM 
technique is executed to employ instruments for the lagged crime rate. Their results 
denote that property and violent crimes respond quite differently to the controlling 
variables. While the clear-up rate has negative effect on property crimes including 
robbery, breaking and entering, and theft of motor cars, it is not significantly 
correlated with any of the violent crimes. Similarly, while the unemployment rate has 
positive correlation with all the property crime rates, none of the violent crimes are 
significantly affected by unemployment.  
 
Fougere et al. (2003) are interested in examining the influence of unemployment on 
crime rates in France using panel data on regional level over the period 1990-2000. 
Their analyses are performed by applying the OLS estimations including both region-
specific and year-specific fixed effects. The dependent variables under investigation 
are 17 types of crime rates, including both property and violent crimes.21 Each type of 
crime rate is regressed on unemployment rate, which is the main concern of their 
paper, as well as social-demographic controls.22 In general, results obtained suggest 
that property crimes are better explained than violent and family crimes by the same 
                                                
21 The crime rates being analysed are armed or violent robberies, burglaries, car thefts, motorbike thefts, 
thefts of objects from cars, shoplifting, pick pocketing, receiving stolen goods, homicides, voluntary 
wounds, blackmails and threats, rape and other sex offences, family offences, drug offences, damage to 
vehicles, illegal weapon ownership, and violence against police.  
22 The social-demographic variables include fraction of foreigners from North Africa, fractions of 
people aged 15-24 and 25-49, fraction of men living alone, fraction of people in single-parent families, 
fraction of people without any diploma, fraction of high school graduates, fraction of people living in 
rural areas, fraction of people living in cities between 20,000 and 200,000 inhabitants, fraction of 
people living in cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants, and fraction of people living in Paris and its 
suburbs.   
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explanatory variables. Being the main interest of this paper, unemployment has shown 
negative correlation with property crimes including burglaries, theft crimes, as well as 
drug offences. In contrary, unemployment is detected to be positively correlated with 
violent crimes of homicides, threats, violence against police. After unemployment is 
broken down into age groups, youth unemployment has shown positive impact on 
most crimes whereas unemployment of older age groups has negative impacts on 
most crimes.  
4.2.1.3 U.S. Studies 
Meanwhile, Doyle, et al. (1999) and Gould, et al. (2002) defined their interests as 
detecting the effects of labour market conditions on crime in the United States and 
both papers have been previously offered an extensive discussion in Chapter Two. 
Doyle, et al. (1999) use state-level panel data over the years 1984-1993 to examine 
aggregated property and violent crimes. They assume that either property or violent 
crime is predicted by explanatory variables including real annual wage, 
unemployment rate, Gini coefficient, percentage of young male aged between 15 and 
29, probability of arrest and per capita police officers. Moreover, the panel data 
structure also enables them to include state-specific effects to count for the 
unobservable factors that differ across states. In order to control for the endogeneity 
of arrest rate and per capita police, they adopt the GMM technique and apply 
instruments for both endogenous variables. Their principal finding is that, whilst real 
annual wage is negatively correlated with both property and violent crimes, Gini 
coefficient is largely insignificant in explaining both of them.  
 
Gould, et al. (2002) has further refined their focus on the correlation between crime 
and the labour market conditions of less-skilled men, which, in this article, is defined 
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as non-college-educated male. Based on county-level panel data over the years 1979-
1997, they regressed each index crime rate on the independent variables including 
weekly wages, unemployment rate, per capita income, arrest rate, state expenditure 
per capita on police, and state police employment per capita. Additionally, they also 
control for the changes in the age, sex and race composition as well as county-specific 
and year-specific fixed effects. They have largely found that, whilst the wage rate of 
the less-educated is negatively correlated with both property and violent crimes, the 
unemployment rate of less-skilled men have positive effect only on property crimes.  
4.2.2 Weakness of Existing Economic Literature 
Most studies introduced above have shown their interests in examining the 
relationships between unemployment and different crime rates, and most of them have 
indeed found certain evidence supporting a positive effect of unemployment on crime. 
Nevertheless, some common unsolved issues in some of the existing literature need to 
be outlined so that it can be rectified in our analyses in this chapter.  
 
Firstly, by taking the unemployment – crime relationship as their primary concern, 
several current studies have failed to control for a relatively complete set of crime-
influential variables in their analyses. As suggested in Becker (1968) and Ehrlich 
(1973), crime rates should be affected by factors of different aspects such as law 
enforcement, social-economic conditions, as well as demographic compositions. 
Some literature, however, have only included part of the relevant factors and omitted 
other potentially important ones. For example, Carmichael and Ward (2000; 2001) 
have omitted the legal income from labour market which may reflect the 
attractiveness of legal activities; Witt et al. (1996; 1999) do not incorporate the legal 
income as well as the expected severity of punishment in both papers; Reilly and Witt 
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(1996) has left out both legal income and demographic factors whilst Reilly and Witt 
(1992) do not control for legal income, demographic compositions, as well as crime 
control instruments. Therefore, as a result of omitting important factors from the 
empirical model, the estimated correlations between crime rates and the variables of 
concern, mainly unemployment rate, could be spurious. The positive correlation 
between unemployment and crime, as proposed in some articles, may be due to the 
positive correlation between crime and a third variable which is neglected from the 
specification but correlated with unemployment rate.   
 
In chapter, we attempt to introduce a relative complete set of explanatory variables, 
adherent to Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973). We take into account the law 
enforcement instruments by using detection rate and the prison population as proxies 
for the probability of apprehension and the severity of punishment. At the same time, 
we measure the labour market opportunities by income inequality, unemployment rate 
and real average weekly earnings. In addition, the proportion of people aged 15-24 is 
also incorporated as the demographic control to capture the share of more crime-prone 
population. Furthermore, we allow the crime rates to follow an AR(1) data generating 
process by incorporating once-lagged crime rates as explanatory variables. We 
assume the lagged crime rates to capture the persistence in crime as well as the effects 
of lagged explanatory variables. By employing panel data, we can further reduce the 
probability of omitted variable bias through eliminating the unobserved area-specific 
fixed effects.  
 
Another problem appears in current literature is that the law enforcement variables are 
not treated as endogenous (e.g. Carmichael and Ward, 2000; 2001; Witt et. al, 1998; 
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Edmark, 2003). As neglecting the endogeneity of law enforcement controls will break 
down the consistence of estimation, we will explicitly treat our law enforcement 
variables as endogenous by implementing instrumental variables. Such strategy is 
achieved by carrying out the GMM estimations which will be introduced in latter part.  
 
4.3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
 
We construct our empirical model heavily drawing from the theoretical frameworks 
developed in Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973). Frist, we will sketch how crime is 
affected by different factors according to these two articles. Next, by assuming a 
linear function, we spell out our empirical model accordingly and discuss the 
associated estimations issues.  
4.3.1 Theoretical Discussion 
Becker (1968) relates the number of offences one would commit with his probability 
of apprehension and the severity of punishment by assuming each individual is 
economically rational and trying to maximize his expected utility from committing 
crimes. The expected utility from committing an offence for individual i is defined as                 
                                         ,                               (4.1) 
where is his income from an offence; is his utility function; and respectively 
represent his probability of apprehension and the monetary equivalent of punishment. 
Therefore, it can be shown that one’s expected utility from an offence is reduced by 
either higher probability of apprehension or more severe punishment, as demonstrated 
by the first-order conditions of the expected utility with respect to the probability of 
apprehension and the severity of punishment respectively 
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and 
. 
Thus, the number of offences one would commit can be related to his probability of 
apprehension and the severity of punishment as given by equation (4.2). 
                                                                                                     (4.2) 
Furthermore, is expected to have the following properties: 
 
and 
, 
which imply that the number of offences one would commit is decreasing as either the 
probability of apprehension or the severity of punishment increases.  
 
As an extension to Becker (1968), the model in Ehrlich (1973) is also developed upon 
the assumption that individuals are utility maximizing. By allowing individuals to 
freely allocate their time between legal and illegal activities, people’s labour market 
conditions have been incorporated in the decision of whether or not to commit crimes. 
Specifically, both the probability of apprehension and the severity of punishment are 
measuring the risk of illegal activities and an increase in either of them would reduce 
one’s expected return from illegal activities. On the other hand, the unemployment 
rate and legal income level are respectively measuring the uncertainty and potential 
return of legal activities. Each individual is assumed to maximize his expected utility 
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by optimally allocate his time and other resources between legal and illegal activities. 
Thus, one’s expected utility function to be maximized can be specified as 
                      ,              (4.3) 
where U is his utility function; is his leisure time; is his probability of 
apprehension; is the unemployment rate; and Xs are his monetary returns from four 
status that he could be end up with23.  
 
By maximizing the utility function, one’s participation in illegal activities can be 
related to the included factors. First, an increase in either the probability of 
apprehension or the severity of punishment will reduce one’s incentive to participate 
in illegal activities because the expected cost of punishment of doing so becomes 
higher. Second, either increased illegal payoffs or decreased legal incomes will 
increase one’s participation in illegal activities due to the increased relative benefit 
between illegal and legal activities. Third, an increase in unemployment rate will have 
ambiguous effect on one’s participation in illegal activities. On the one hand, higher 
unemployment rate will unambiguously increase one’s participation in illegal 
activities through reducing his opportunity cost of doing so. On the other hand, an 
increase in the probability of the least desirable status (unemployed in legal activities 
and failed in illegal activities) will increase one’s the demand for wealth and hence 
reduce his incentive to participate in illegal activities. 
 
                                                
23 The four statuses one could end up with are a. successful in illegal activities and employed in legal 
labour market, b. successful in illegal activities and unemployed in legal labour market, c. failed in 
illegal activities and employed in legal labour market, and d. failed in illegal activities and unemployed 
in legal labour market.  
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Given the crime participation on individual level, the aggregated supply of offences 
can be specified as a function of the factors influencing individual crime participation  
                                                   ,                                     (4.4) 
where Q is the aggregated supply of offenses; P and F respectively represent the 
average values of probability of apprehension and severity of punishment across all 
individuals; and respectively represent the average illegal and legal returns 
across all individuals; P and respectively represent the average unemployment 
probability and environmental factors, such as family background, education and so 
on,  across all individuals. We expect the aggregated level of offences is affected the 
same way by the relevant factors as the individual crime participation. 
4.3.2 Empirical Model and Estimation Methodology 
Based on equation (4.4) above, we specify our empirical model to be tested in the 
form of equation (4.5) below by assuming a linear relationship between crime rate and 
its influencing variables.  
           . (4.5) 
In our specification, each type of crime rate is assumed to be affected by law 
enforcement instruments, labour market opportunities, demographic composition, as 
well as its once-lagged value.  
 
We use the detection rate and prison population as proxies for the probability of 
apprehension and the severity of punishment and expect both of them to have 
negative effects on crime rate as predicted by the theoretical models. As we have 
realised that some papers use conviction rate as a proxy for the probability of 
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apprehension, we argue that the deterrence effect of detection rate on potential 
offenders should be at least as strong as that of conviction rate. This is because, for 
real offenders, being detected is often regarded as the first step of punishment. Even 
though the conviction depends on a number of exogenous variables such as the 
evidence presented by the police, who the judges are etc., the potential criminals still 
would try to avoid detection in first place. Very few offenders will be so confident, 
when arrested, that they will not be convicted by the court. We use prison population 
to measure the severity of punishment because, firstly, the other commonly used 
variable, the average sentence length, is not separately provided for individual crime 
types; and secondly, prison population can be used as an alternative as its deterrence 
effect on crime has been demonstrated by a number of studies such as Levitt (1996), 
Wolpin (1978), and Saridakis (2008). Prison population could be an imperfect 
measure for the severity of punishment. However, other things being equal, more 
people in prison in time period t comparing to previous period could mean that 
offenders are getting released less often or, for the same type of crime, more people 
are sentenced into prison. Therefore, on average, the severity of punishment increases.  
 
The labour market conditions are represented by Gini coefficient, unemployment rate 
and real average weekly earnings in our empirical model. Gini coefficient, measuring 
income inequality, is expected to be positively correlated with crime rates (Choe 2008; 
Kelly 2000; Scorzafave and Soares 2009). This is because higher Gini coefficient 
indicates that larger proportion of national income is possessed by a smaller group of 
people and the majority of the population disproportionally shares the rest of the 
national income. In such case, more people are at the bottom end of wealth 
distribution with lower opportunity cost if commit crimes. Consequently, this may 
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lead to higher crime rates. The effect of unemployment on crime is ambiguous to 
predict as argued in Ehrlich (1973). Furthermore, unemployment rate may have both 
motivation and opportunity effects on crime as argued in Cantor and Land (1985). As 
higher unemployment motivates potential offenders to commit crime by decreasing 
their opportunity cost of doing so, it also reduces the opportunities for certain crimes 
and thus tends to reduce those crime rates. Therefore, the net effect of unemployment 
rate will depend on which effect is stronger, motivation or opportunity, and could be 
positive, negative or even insignificant. Likewise, the average weekly earnings is also 
expected to have ambiguous effect on crime due to the same reason. Whilst higher 
earnings could reduce people’s incentives to commit crimes, it could also increase the 
opportunities for property crimes. Therefore, the net effect of real earnings on crime 
rates could be positive, negative, or insignificant.   
 
Our empirical model includes the percentage of population aged 15-24 for 
demographic control because young people are usually regarded as more crime-prone 
than older age groups due to their lower opportunity cost (Levitt 1988; 1998 and 1999; 
Cohen and Land 1987). Furthermore, the punishment for young offenders under the 
age of 18 is much lenient than that for adult offenders. Moreover, the criminal records 
of juvenile offenders will be sealed when they reach the age of 18 thus not affecting 
their future labour market outcomes. For these reasons, we expect a positive 
correlation between the proportion of young people and the crime rates. However, we 
could also argue that young people have higher opportunity cost of committing crimes 
in terms of future job opportunities than older age groups. Particularly for young 
people over the age of 18, committing crimes and getting caught could reduce their 
future opportunities in labour market because they are less likely to get hired and 
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could be paid with lower wages on average. Such effect could deter young people 
from participating in illegal activities. Therefore, in theory, if this effect dominates, 
the proportion of young people could have negative effect on crimes.  
We include the once-lagged crime rate as explanatory variable to measure the 
persistence of crime rate over time, and there could be several reasons why crime rate 
can be thought to be self-correlated over time: (1) recidivism caused by, among other 
things, negative expected payoffs from the labour market for being a criminal; and (2) 
business cycle features such as recessions affecting the crime rate over successive 
periods. Furthermore, the lagged crime rate could act as a proxy for the effects of 
lagged independent variables, such as lagged unemployment rate, lagged detection 
rate, and lagged earnings and so on, that may explain the contemporary crime rate. 
Therefore, we expect the coefficient of once-lagged crime rate to be positive.  
 
As shown in equation (4.5), we count for area-specific unobserved factors by 
incorporating the areas-specific fixed effects. However, given that prison population 
and Gini coefficient are only available on national level, we are unable to apply year-
specific dummies to eliminate the factors that only vary by years. For compensation, 
we adopt time trend instead to count for unobserved trends. The dummy variable 
included in the empirical model indicates the counting rules change introduced in 
1998, which will be given detailed discussion in the section of data description.  
 
We firstly estimate the empirical model using the standard OLS method without 
controlling for lagged crime rate and area-specific fixed effects as an exploratory 
analysis. The potential problems associated with this approach are that, firstly, the 
OLS estimation could be biased by the potential correlations between the independent 
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variables and time-invariant police force area characteristics . Such area-specific 
characteristics, if correlated with the independent variables and not eliminated from 
estimation, will be left in the error term and cause correlation between the error term 
and the independent variables. Thus, the OLS estimation will be biased by violating 
the assumption that explanatory variables should be independent from the error term.  
 
In order to avoid the potential correlation between the independent variables and the 
error term, we re-estimate our empirical model with cross-sectional fixed effects 
method that explicitly eliminates the area-specific characteristics. We adopt this 
approach in order to show how the coefficients are affected by eliminating the area-
specific fixed effects. However, in this stage, we still exclude the once-lagged crime 
rate from the equation because its inclusion requires special treatment.  
 
The second problem associated with the OLS estimation, as well as the fixed effects 
model, is the potential reverse causality from crime rate to certain explanatory 
variables. In particular, a positive shock in the crime rate may, in short-run, reduce the 
detection rate and prison population if the budget for law enforcement is inflexible. In 
long-run, on the other hand, increased crime rate could trigger higher investment by 
the government on police and justice expenditure which, in turn, may increase 
detection rate and prison population. This would again present a rise to the correlation 
between the error term and the law enforcement instruments, detection rate and prison 
population, and thereby bias both the OLS and cross-sectional fixed effects 
estimations. 
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Furthermore, our inclusion of the once-lagged crime rate as explanatory variable will 
cause the correlation between itself and the area-specific fixed effects . A common 
strategy to eliminate the correlations between the fixed effects and independent 
variables is to estimate a fixed-effects or first-differenced model. Conversely, the 
inclusion of the lagged crime rate  as an explanatory variable invalidates the 
conclusions from such traditional panel data estimation techniques (Baltagi 2004; 
Hsiao 2003). Instead, we estimate our full empirical model given by equation (4.5) 
using a dynamic panel data fixed effects estimation strategy developed in Arellano 
and Bond (1991). The main intuition behind such estimation methodology is briefly 
outlined below.24  
 
For the ease of exposition, the empirical model can be re-written as  
                                           ,                                     (4.6) 
where and represent the contemporary and once-lagged crime rate respectively; 
represents a vector of explanatory variables such as detection rate, prison 
population etc. Then, following Arellano and Bover (1995), each variable is taken 
“orthogonal deviation” to eliminate the time-invariant fixed effects  and thus 
equation (4.6) becomes  
                                                .                                        (4.7) 
In equation (4.7), the variable  is defined as 
                                  ,                                (4.8) 
                                                
24 For a detail discussion please refer to Baltagi 2004; Hsiao 2003. 
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where  is the number of observations for each i. Equation (4.8) is also known as 
“forward orthogonal deviation” because it subtracts the contemporaneous observation 
from the average of all the future available observations. 25 Other variables in equation 
(4.7) are defined similarly. 
 
By construction,  and are correlated. Furthermore, if is not strictly 
exogenous, there will also be correlation between and . For example, if is 
detection rate or prison population which is not strictly exogenous, the forward 
orthogonal deviation of detection rate of prison population will be correlated with 
in equation (4.7). Thus, to break the correlation between the error term and right-
hand side variables in equation (4.7), instrumental variable estimation is applied. 
Potentially, all available lags of , starting from , can be used as instruments 
for . In addition, all available lags of detection rate and prison population, starting 
from the second lag, are used as instruments for the forward orthogonal deviations of 
detection rate and prison population since they are also correlated with .26  
 
Thus, the model specified in equation (4.5) is estimated with the GMM technique 
using the moment conditions generated by applying appropriate instruments. A robust 
variance-covariance matrix is used to obtain autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
corrected standard errors for the coefficients. The validity of the GMM estimation 
critically depends on the fact that the instruments are exogenous. As there are more 
                                                
25 Another way of removing the fixed effects is to take the first difference instead of the orthogonal 
deviation, as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). However, unlike the orthogonal deviation 
approach, the first difference approach introduces first order serial correlation in the first difference 
regression errors. 
26 We are assuming that the detection rate and prison population are not strictly exogenous, rather they 
are predetermined. 
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instruments than the parameters to be estimated (over-identified model) in the 
extended model, the Sargan/Hansan test of over-identifying restrictions can be carried 
out to test for the validity of the instrument set.27  
 
A potential problem with the “orthogonal deviation GMM” estimators is that moment 
conditions can increase prolifically. In particular, the number of instruments is 
quadratic in the time dimension of the panel. This can cause problems in finite 
samples. Specifically, since the number of elements in the estimated variance matrix 
of the sample moments is quadratic in the instrument count, it is quartic in T. A finite 
sample may lack adequate information to estimate such a matrix well (Roodman 
2009). Furthermore, it can potentially weaken the Sargan/Hansen test for over-
identifying restrictions to the point where it generates “very” good p-values of 1 
(Anderson and Sorenson 1996).  
 
Another point worth mentioning is that the asymptotics of this type of dynamic panel 
models are based on the “large N and small T” assumption. That is, the asymptotic 
properties, such as consistency, of the estimators are based on the assumption of large 
cross sectional dimension and small time dimension. The cross sectional dimension of 
43 police force areas is not exactly “large” by normal standards. Hence, the results 
estimated by the GMM method in this chapter should be interpreted in light of this 
data limitation. 
 
4.4 DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
                                                
27 Baltagi (2004) contains a detailed description of this test. 
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The empirical analyses in this chapter are based on two panel data sets in England and 
Wales. The first data set is used to provide the main estimation results and is 
disaggregated by 43 police force areas28 in England and Wales covering the period 
1992-2005. In this data set, prison population and Gini coefficient are aggregated on 
national level due to the data availability. All the other variables, on the other hand, 
are disaggregated by police force areas. The second data set is used to check the 
robustness of the results generated by the first data set, and it is disaggregated by 43 
police force areas in England and Wales over the period 1987-2005. In the second 
data set, the prison population and Gini coefficient are aggregated on national level; 
the unemployment rate and real average weekly earnings are aggregated on regional 
level;29 and the crime rate, detection rate and young people proportion are aggregated 
on police force area level. Therefore, the difference between the two data sets is that 
the first one provides more accurate measurements for the independent variables 
across areas but covers a shorter time period, while the second one is less accurate to 
measure the area-variations of independent variables but over a longer time period.  
Table 4-1 
Aggregation level of independent variables 
Independent 
variables 1992-2005 1987-2005 
Detection rate Police force area Police force area 
Prison population National National 
Gini coefficient National National 
Proportion of young 
people Police force area Police force area 
                                                
28 There are in total 43 police force areas in England and Wales. They are Avon and Somerset, 
Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Cheshire, Cleveland, Cumbria, Derbyshire, Devon and Cornwall, 
Dorset, Durham, Essex, Gloucestershire, Greater Manchester, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Humberside, 
Kent, Lancashire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, City of London, Merseyside, Metropolitan Police 
District, Norfolk, Northamptonshire, Northumbria, North Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, South Yorkshire, 
Staffordshire, Suffolk, Surrey, Sussex, Thames Valley, Warwickshire, West Mercia, West Midlands, 
West Yorkshire, Wiltshire, Dyfed-Powys, Gwent, North Wales, and South Wales. 
 
29 There are in total 10 government regions in England and Wales. They are North East, North West, 
Yorkshire and the Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, East, London, South East, South West, and 
Wales (See Appendix II for regions’ corresponding police forces). 
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Unemployment rate Police force area Regional 
Real earnings Police force area Regional 
4.4.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variables in this chapter are six types of crime rates defined as the 
number of offences per 100,000 population. The crime rates being examined here are 
violence against the person, sexual offences, robbery, burglary, theft and handling, 
and fraud and forgery.30 While the first three types are defined as violent crimes, the 
last three types are regarded as property crime. The crime rates data are obtained from 
two sources: (1) before the year 2001, they are collected from the annual command 
papers Criminal Statistics and (2) since 2001, they are obtained from the Crime in 
England and Wales. 31 Both these documents are published by the Home Office.  
 
Two things about the crime rate data are worth mentioning. First, prior to 2001, the 
crime rates were measured as the number of offences recorded by police per 100,000 
population. However, since 2001 the crime rates have been measured by the number 
of offences per 1000 population. Therefore, to have consistent series, the post-2000 
crime rates have been multiplied by 100. One problem with the re-scaled crime rates 
is that the crime rates for the post-2000 period are less accurate and exhibit few, even 
no, variations over time and areas. This is particularly true for the sexual offence and 
robbery. Due to their nature, crime rates of sexual offences and robbery are much 
lower than the other crime rates included. Before the year 2001, the crime rates of 
sexual offences were lower than 100 per 100,000 population and those of robbery 
                                                
30 Criminal damage and other offences have been excluded from the analysis because there are large 
number of samples missing from the time periods under test. 
 
31 The serial numbers of Criminal Statistics are Cm847, Cm1322, Cm1935, Cm2134, Cm2410, 
Cm2680, Cm3010, Cm3421, Cm3764, Cm4162, Cm4649, Cm5001 and Cm5312. Crime in England 
and Wales, 2001/02, 2002/03, 2003/04, 2004/05 and 2005/06 
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were lower than 200 per 100,000 population for most police force areas. In the year 
2001, the crime rates of sexual offences have become approximately 1 per 1000 
population for most police force areas and those of robbery have been approximated 
to 1 or 2 per 1000 population. Being multiplied by 100, it is not surprising to see that 
the crime rates of sexual offences have been 100 per 100,000 population and those of 
robbery have become 100 or 200 per 100,000 population for most police force areas. 
As this situation is quite similar for the following 4 years in the data sets, the post-
2000 crime rates present fewer variations in the analysis. Furthermore, there are some 
0s in the crime rates of sexual offences and robbery in the year 2001 and onward 
which is also due to the reduced accuracy. Those 0s represent that the number of 
offences is less than 1 per 1000 population in some areas. Although it is probably not 
the case, the crime rates of these areas have to be 0 per 100,000 population after being 
multiplied by 100. 
 
Second, there have been changes in the counting rules for the crime rates since April 1, 
1998. These new rules have brought two major adjustments. First, the crime rates and 
relevant statistics have been documented according to the financial year system, 
which starts from 1st of April and ends on 31st of March the following year, rather 
than normal calendar year. Second, the definitions of some types of crime have been 
broadened and thus their crime rates exhibited upward shifts since 1998.32 The most 
affected types are violence against the person and fraud and forgery and their crime 
rates have shown obvious upward shifts. Therefore, a dummy variable is included in 
                                                
32 The category of “violence against person” has been broadened to include harassment, cruelty to or 
neglect of children, assault on a constable and common assault. The “sexual offenses” category has 
been added with soliciting or importuning by man. “Theft and handling” has included the new sub-
categories of vehicle interference and tampering. “Fraud and forgery” has been expanded to include 
bankruptcy and insolvency offenses and vehicle/driver fraud. The definitions of “robbery” and 
“burglary” have not been affected by the change in counting rules. 
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the analyses aiming to capture the changes in the counting rules since 1998. The 
dummy variable takes the value of one for the post-rule change period and zero 
otherwise.  
 
The statistic summaries for the crime rates are given in table 4-2 and 4-3. As there are 
two sets of panel data being employed, table 1 summarizes the crime rates statistics 
for the data set 1992-2005 and table 4-3 presents the statistics for the data set 1987-
2005. The summary tables also report the number of observations for each type of 
crime rate. There should be 602 observations in the data set 1992-2005 (43 areas by 
14 years) and 817 observations in the data set 1987-2005 (43 areas by 19 years) if no 
observation is missing.  
Table 4-2 
Statistics for crime rates 1992-2005 
 Violent crimes 
 Overall crime 
Violence 
against person Sexual offences Robbery 
Mean 11,955 1,075 81 104 
Median 9,133 743 67 63 
Maximum 158,500 13,039 807 1,192 
Minimum 3,797 180 0 0 
Std. Dev. 16,484 1,294 71 137 
Observations 602 602 602 602 
 Property crimes 
  Burglary 
Theft and 
handling 
Fraud and 
forgery 
Mean  1,984 5,735 668 
Median  1,603 3,996 349 
Maximum  16,827 101,400 23,100 
Minimum  400 1,300 101 
Std. Dev.  1,481 10,615 1,999 
Observations   602 602 602 
 
Table 4-3 
Statistics for crime rates 1987-2005 
 Violent crimes 
 Overall crime 
Violence 
against person Sexual offences Robbery 
Mean 11,503 896 77 93 
Median 8,778 517 61 42 
Maximum 158,500 13,039 807 1,192 
Minimum 3,797 175 0 0 
Std. Dev. 16,690 1,173 71 144 
Observations 817 817 817 817 
 Property crimes 
  Burglary Theft and Fraud and 
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handling forgery 
Mean  1,995 5,761 611 
Median  1,586 3,900 300 
Maximum  19,815 101,400 23,100 
Minimum  400 1,300 97 
Std. Dev.  1,751 10,955 1,842 
Observations   817 817 817 
 
4.4.2 Independent Variables 
A host of independent variables are included in the analyses as proxies for the benefits 
and costs of committing crimes. These include detection rate, prison population, Gini 
coefficient, unemployment rate, real average weekly earnings and proportion of 
young people in the population. They are disaggregated on different levels because of 
the data availability. 
4.4.2.1 Detection Rate 
The detection rate is measured by the proportion of recorded offences that have been 
“cleared up”. The “cleared up” offences are referring to those cases in which the 
offenders have been identified and given caution, fined or charged by the police. 
Therefore, the detection rate is included in the analyses as proxy for the probability of 
apprehension. According to Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), higher probability of 
apprehension will increase the expected punishment of committing crimes and thus 
reduce the expected returns of doing so. As a result, the crime rate will be lowered 
due to the deterrent effect of higher probability of apprehension. The data of detection 
rate is disaggregated by police force areas in both data sets and obtained from the 
annual command paper Criminal Statistics with serial numbers provided before. The 
basic statistics of crime-specific detection rates are presented in the table 4-4.33 
Table 4-4 
Statistics for detection rates 1992-2005 
                                                
33 In order to save space and to keep the flow of the text, only statistics of independent variables for 
1992-2005 are reported here, as it is the principal data set.  All tables of statistics for independent 
variables, 1987-2005, are listed in Appendix III.  
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 Violent crimes 
 Overall crime 
Violence 
against person Sexual offences Robbery 
Mean 28 72 64 32 
Median 27 76 68 30 
Maximum 69 97 124 96 
Minimum 14 24 21 10 
Std. Dev. 8 15 22 13 
Observations 602 602 602 602 
 Property crimes 
  Burglary 
Theft and 
handling 
Fraud and 
forgery 
Mean  19 23 46 
Median  16 22 44 
Maximum  56 54 98 
Minimum  7 8 9 
Std. Dev.  8 7 16 
Observations   602 602 602 
 
4.4.2.2 Prison Population 
The prison population is included as independent variable in the analyses to measure 
the severity of punishment. As demonstrated in Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), 
more severe punishment is expected to reduce crime rate by increasing the expected 
cost of committing crimes for potential offenders. Therefore, when more offenders are 
sentenced into prison, potential criminals will expect more severe punishment if 
commit crimes and thus reduce their criminal activities. In addition, more prison 
population could reduce crime rate through the incapacitation effect. As more 
offenders sentenced into prison, it will be temporally impossible for them to commit 
further crimes while serving in prison. Thus, the crime rate will be lower for a period 
of time.  
 
The prison population is calculated as the number of offenders sentenced into prison 
divided by the total population. In other words, it measures the number of offenders in 
prison per 100,000 population. The data is obtained from the annual command paper 
Prison Statistics England and Wales prior to year 2003. Since 2003, the data has been 
documented in the Offender Management Caseload statistics, a publication of the 
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Home Office. Although this variable varies by crime type, it is only available on 
national level in both data sets. The basic statistics of prison population are 
summarised in table 4-5.  
 
 
Table 4-5 
Statistics for prison population 1992-2005 
 Violent crimes 
 Overall crime 
Violence 
against person Sexual offences Robbery 
Mean 94 21 9 12 
Median 100 21 9 12 
Maximum 116 28 12 16 
Minimum 64 14 6 8 
Std. Dev. 18 4 2 2 
Observations 602 602 602 602 
 Property crimes 
  Burglary 
Theft and 
handling 
Fraud and 
forgery 
Mean  14 10 10 
Median  16 11 11 
Maximum  17 12 12 
Minimum  9 7 7 
Std. Dev.  3 1 1 
Observations   602 602 602 
 
As shown in both table 4-5, the statistics of prison population for theft and handling 
and fraud and forgery are exactly the same. This is because the prison population of 
these two types of crime have been summed up and reported as one in the statistical 
publications. Since there is no way to separate the prison population between the two 
types of crimes, the summed prison population is included in the estimations of both 
theft and handling and fraud and forgery.  
4.4.2.3 Gini Coefficient 
Gini coefficient is an economic indicator measuring the degree of income inequality. 
The variable of Gini coefficient included in this chapter measures the inequality of 
post-tax income and it is aggregated on national level on both data sets. The data is 
obtained from the website of the National Statistics.  
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An increase in income inequality is expected to positively affect the crime rates, 
particularly property crime rates, by decreasing the opportunity cost of committing 
crimes for those at the lower end of the income distribution. Furthermore, as the 
income inequality reflects the wealth distribution between the rich and the poor, large 
increase in the income inequality could motivate the poor people to carry out anti-
social behaviours or even violence crimes for revenge or releasing the anger. 
Therefore, higher income inequality could also lead to increased violent crime rates. 
The statistics of Gini coefficient will be reported later along with the other 
independent variables.  
4.4.2.4 Unemployment Rate 
The variable of unemployment rate is defined as the ratio of unemployment benefits 
claimants to the number of people in the workforce. The original data is available on 
both regional level and local authority34 level with the region-level data being 
available for a longer time period. On the other hand, the data on local authority level 
is only available from the year 1992. Therefore, the unemployment rate in the data set 
1992-2005 is aggregated from local authorities up to police force areas while the 
unemployment rate in the data set 1987-2005 is only on regional level. The original 
data source is the website of nomis – official labour market statistics.35 
 
An increase in the unemployment is expected to have ambiguous effect on crime rates 
according to relevant literatures. On the one hand, higher unemployment rate will 
reduce the labour market opportunities for potential offenders and thus increase their 
                                                
34 “Local authorities” are lower government level than government regions but similar to county level. 
Data by local authorities typically contain six metropolitan counties, 27 non-metropolitan counties, 56 
unitary authorities and the region of London, which has 32 London boroughs and the city of London. 
 
35See https://www.noisweb.co.uk.  
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incentives to commit crimes through the motivation effect. On the other hand, higher 
unemployment rate will reduce the opportunities for certain crime types and thus 
reduce occurrence of those crimes due to the opportunity effect. For this reason, the 
net effect of unemployment on crime rates will depend on each specific case.  
4.4.2.5 Real Average Weekly Earnings  
The variable of real average weekly earnings is measured by the deflated average 
weekly earnings for all industries. The original data is available on both regional level 
and local authority level. The region-level data is collected from the Regional Trends, 
a Home Office publication, while the local authority data is from Annual Survey of 
Hours and Earnings.36 Like unemployment rate, the variable of real earnings in the 
data set 1992-2005 is aggregated from local authorities into police force areas while 
real earnings in the data set of 1987-2005 is only aggregated on regional level.  
 
The variable of real average weekly earnings is expected to be negatively correlated 
with crime rates. As real earnings measures the payoffs of legal labour market, an 
increase in the real earnings will increase the opportunity cost of committing crimes 
and thus reduce people’s intension to involve in illegal activities. Moreover, higher 
real earnings may also imply more opportunities for property crimes. Consequently, 
the net effect of real earnings on crime rates could be ambiguous and depending on 
the type of crime being analysed.  
4.4.2.6 Young People Proportion 
The variable of young people proportion is defined as the ratio between the number of 
young people aged between 15 to 24 years old and the entire population. The original 
                                                
36 Regional Trends is a publication that summarized various aspects of the U.K. by government regions. 
It summarizes the “real average weekly earnings” from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
published by the Office for National Statistics. 
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data is available on local authority level and has been aggregated into police force 
areas according to the geographic boundaries in both data sets. The data source is the 
mid-year estimated population by age groups and sex obtained from the National 
Statistics.37 The number of people aged between 15 and 24 has been calculated by 
aggregating two original age groups   15-19 and 20-24.  
 
Younger people are shown to be more prone to commit crimes than their older 
counterparts. One key reason for such behaviour is that the opportunity cost of 
committing crime is much lower for the younger people than their older counterparts. 
First, the younger people have, on average, lower earnings than their older 
counterparts. Therefore, if caught, they have less to lose when it comes to foregone 
earnings. Second, the penalty associated with committing crimes is probably lower for 
the younger people than their older counterparts because they usually receive lenient 
punishment and if they are under 18, their criminal records will be sealed by the age 
of 18. As a result, the proportion of young people could be positively correlated with 
crime rates in later empirical analyses. On the other hand, however, young people 
could also be deterred to commit crimes by the fact that, if they do so and get caught, 
their future labour market opportunities could be negatively affected by their criminal 
records. Hence, the net effect of the proportion of young people on crime could be 
ambiguous.  
 
Table 4-6 below presents the key statistics for Gini coefficient, unemployment rate, 
real average weekly earnings, and the proportion of young people.  
Table 4-6 
Statistics for other independent variables 1992-2005 
 Gini Unemployment Real average Young people 
                                                
37 See http://www.statistics.gov.uk. 
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coefficient weekly earnings 
Mean 38.06 4.21 159.01 12.22 
Median 38.00 3.57 143.98 12.18 
Maximum 40.40 11.52 574.29 15.07 
Minimum 36.10 0.61 65.59 8.11 
Std. Dev. 1.13 2.40 65.62 1.08 
Observations 602 602 602 602 
4.5 RESULTS 
 
In this section, we will firstly report the results of property crimes as they are 
expected to be more responsive to the controlling variables, especially to the social-
economic factors, than the violent crimes. Next, the results of violent crimes will be 
reported to provide some interesting implications on the correlations between violent 
crimes and the controlling variables, which is less obvious to observe.  
 
Each type of crime rate is analysed by three estimation methods as mentioned in the 
sub-section of empirical model and estimation methodology: the OLS estimation 
without fixed effects and lagged crime rate, fixed-effects estimation without lagged 
crime rate, and the GMM estimation on the full empirical model specified by equation 
(5). Furthermore, as there are two data sets being employed, the estimation based on 
the data set 1992-2005 will be reported first as the main results. Then the estimations 
based on the data set 1987-2005 will be presented to check the robustness of the 
coefficients. All variables, both dependent and independent, are taken logarithm 
before carrying out regression analysis.  
 
4.5.1 Burglary  
The estimation results of burglary based on the data set 1992-2005 are presented in 
table 4-7.  
Table 4-7 
Burglary 1992-2005 
  126 
variable OLS Cross-Section Fixed Effect GMM 
C 12.62* (2.47) 
12.56*** 
(1.34) - 
Crime(t-1) - - 0.53*** (0.06) 
Detection Rate -0.25 (0.17) 
-0.15*** 
(0.03) 
-0.08*** 
(0.01) 
Prison Population 0.77*** (0.12) 
-0.06 
(0.08) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
Gini Coefficient -2.98 (2.04) 
-1.04*** 
(0.19) 
-0.31 
(0.21) 
Young People 0.91 (0.65) 
-0.17 
(0.23) 
-0.16 
(0.12) 
Unemployment 0.36*** (0.10) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
Real Earnings 0.44 (0.27) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.07*** 
(0.01) 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Squared 0.40 0.94 0.67 
S.E. of Regression 0.39 0.12 0.09 
J-Statistic - - 41.84 
Over Identification Test - - 0.17 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
The J-statistic is computed for the Sargan/Hansen over-identifying restrictions. Under the 
null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, the J-statistic follows a Chi-
Squared distribution with the degree of freedom being the difference between the 
instrument rank and the number of coefficients estimated. The reported over-identification 
test is the corresponding p-value.   
 
As shown in the first column of table 4-7, the detection rate of burglary has negative 
but insignificant coefficient in the basic OLS estimation. Once the area-specific fixed 
effects are eliminated, the coefficient of detection rate has become negative 
significant at 1% level in the cross-sectional fixed effect model. When estimating with 
the GMM technique, the detection rate still has negative and highly significant 
correlation with burglary as shown in column three. Whilst all three estimations have 
generated negative coefficient for the detection rate as predicted, the magnitude of the 
coefficient is decreasing from column one to column three. This decreasing pattern is 
explainable: as we eliminated the area-specific fixed effects using fixed-effect and the 
GMM estimations, smaller share of the variations in burglary is explained by the 
detection rate. In addition, as additional relevant variable are controlled for (i.e. once-
  127 
lagged crime rate), the correlation between detection rate and burglary becomes more 
significant.  
 
The coefficient of prison population is positive and significant in the standard OLS 
estimation, contrary to the expectation. As the area-specific fixed effects are explicitly 
eliminated, the coefficient of prison population becomes negative but insignificant as 
shown in the second column. Subsequently, when the once-lagged burglary rate enters 
the equation as explanatory variable as well as both detection rate and prison 
population are instrumented by their lagged values to control for their endogeneity, 
the prison population has shown negative and highly significant correlation with 
burglary as predicted.  
 
Furthermore, we do not find significant correlations between burglary and Gini 
coefficient, the proportion of young people, and unemployment. Gini coefficient has 
negative and insignificant coefficient in the OLS estimation, which turns to significant 
once the fixed effects are eliminated in the fixed-effect estimation. After further 
controlling measures applied for the endogenous variables as well as lagged crime 
rate in the GMM estimation, its coefficient becomes insignificant again. While the 
proportion of young people constantly shows insignificant effect on burglary, the 
coefficient of unemployment moves from positive and significant in the OLS 
estimation to negative and insignificant once the previously mentioned estimation 
issues are controlled in the GMM model. The insignificant correlation between 
unemployment and burglary is not surprising due to the two offsetting effects, namely 
motivation and opportunity. Additionally, the negative sign for unemployment is 
indeed consistent with the feature of burglary. As such crimes mainly target private 
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dwellings, higher unemployment rate may significantly reduce the opportunities for 
burglary as more people would stay at or near their homes. As a result, although the 
coefficient is insignificant, the unemployment does seem to reduce burglary through 
opportunity effect.  
 
The variable of real earnings has constantly shown positive effect across estimations. 
When the relevant estimation issues have been controlled for, the real earnings has 
shown positive and highly significant correlation with burglary in both fixed effect 
and the GMM estimations. This result suggests that the variable of real earnings has 
picked up the opportunity effect on burglary and higher income will increase the 
burglary rate by providing more opportunities.  
 
There are two points worth mentioning about the GMM estimation. First, the once-
lagged burglary rate has indeed obtained positive and significant coefficient as 
predicted. The magnitude of 0.53 suggests a quite strong self-correlation in burglary 
over time. Secondly, the over-identification test has shown that the instruments 
applied for the lagged burglary rate, contemporary detection rate and prison 
population are indeed uncorrelated with the error term and thus valid as instruments.  
The estimation results based on the data set 1987-2005 are reported in table 4-8. 
These analyses are carried out to check whether the previously estimated coefficients 
are significantly affected by the changes in the data set.  
Table 4-8 
Burglary 1987-2005 
variable OLS Cross-Section Fixed Effect GMM 
C -4.76* (2.60) 
11.11*** 
(2.09) - 
Crime(t-1) - - 0.71*** (0.03) 
Detection Rate -0.36*** (0.13) 
-0.21*** 
(0.05) 
-0.14*** 
(0.01) 
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Prison Population -0.21*** (0.05) 
-0.54*** 
(0.04) 
-0.47*** 
(0.01) 
Gini Coefficient 2.90*** (0.46) 
0.26 
(0.31) 
1.03*** 
(0.04) 
Young People 0.75* (0.42) 
-1.08*** 
(0.40) 
-0.38*** 
(0.11) 
Unemployment 0.63*** (0.09) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
-0.07*** 
(0.01) 
Real Earnings 0.02 (0.06) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Squared 0.35 0.90 0.81 
S.E. of Regression 0.42 0.16 0.10 
J-Statistic - - 41.27 
Over Identification Test - - 0.18 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
The J-statistic is computed for the Sargan/Hansen over-identifying restrictions. Under the 
null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, the J-statistic follows a Chi-
Squared distribution with the degree of freedom being the difference between the 
instrument rank and the number of coefficients estimated. The reported over-identification 
test is the corresponding p-value.   
 
As shown in table 4-8, both detection rate and prison population have shown negative 
and highly significant (at 1% level) correlation with burglary. These results are 
consistent with those based on the data set 1992-2005 as well as with the expectations.  
 
The effect of Gini coefficient becomes positive and significant for the data 1987-2005. 
While this finding has enhanced the previous insignificant correlation between 
burglary and Gini coefficient, it also agrees with the expectation that higher income 
inequality will increase crime rates. Moreover, the effects of both young people and 
unemployment on burglary have been reinforced by applying the longer data set. 
Specifically, the proportion of young people still has the same negative sign as before 
which becomes significant in this case. This result denotes that an increase in the 
proportion of young people will reduce the crime rate of burglary. Such finding may 
be explained by the fact that young people, on average, have lower income levels than 
older people. Hence, while an increase in the number of young people could 
potentially increase the number of motivated offenders, it could also greatly reduce 
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the opportunities for property crimes. Furthermore, by applying the data set 1987-
2005, the study has also confirmed the previous finding that higher unemployment 
tends to reduce burglary by generating a negative and significant coefficient for 
unemployment. Therefore, in our analyses, unemployment mainly picks up the 
opportunity effect on burglary.  
 
The only variable affected by using longer data set is real earnings and its coefficient 
changes from positive and significant in previous analyses to negative and significant 
now. This result implies that, while this variables picks up its opportunity effect on 
burglary, it reflects its motivation effect using the longer data set. As we eliminate the 
period 1987-1991 from the data set 1987-2005 and re-estimate the model, we obtain 
the same results to the previous finding that real earnings is positively and 
significantly correlated with burglary. Thus, we argue that the switched sign of this 
variable is caused by the extra information given by the years 1987-1991 and we will 
explain this in later discussion.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the GMM estimation based on the data 1987-2005 has given a 
positive and significant coefficient for the once-lagged burglary rate. This rather high 
self-correlation of 0.71 has reinforced the previous finding that the crime rate of 
burglary is highly affected by its lagged value and suggesting a quite persistent 
pattern. The over-identification test has shown that the instruments employed for 
lagged burglary rate, contemporary detection rate and contemporary prison population 
are indeed valid as instruments for being independent from the error term.  
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4.5.2 Theft and Handling 
The analyses of theft and handling are conducted by the same procedure. The results 
based on the data set 1992-2005 are reported in table 4-9.  
 
Table 4-9 
Theft and handling 1992-2005 
variable OLS Cross-Section Fixed Effect GMM 
C 20.93* (11.71) 
11.94*** 
(1.06) - 
Crime(t-1) - - 0.62*** (0.04) 
Detection Rate -0.65*** (0.19) 
-0.23*** 
(0.04) 
-0.14*** 
(0.03) 
Prison Population 0.37*** (0.10) 
-0.23*** 
(0.09) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
Gini Coefficient -3.61 (2.71) 
-0.61*** 
(0.12) 
-0.23** 
(0.10) 
Young People -0.18 (1.17) 
-0.01 
(0.24) 
0.16 
(0.10) 
Unemployment 0.19 (0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
Real Earnings 0.48 (0.35) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.08*** 
(0.01) 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Squared 0.25 0.97 0.66 
S.E. of Regression 0.46 0.09 0.07 
J-Statistic - - 42.24 
Over Identification Test - - 0.19 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
The J-statistic is computed for the Sargan/Hansen over-identifying restrictions. Under the 
null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, the J-statistic follows a Chi-
Squared distribution with the degree of freedom being the difference between the 
instrument rank and the number of coefficients estimated. The reported over-identification 
test is the corresponding p-value. 
 
As shown in table 4-9, the variable of detection rate has constantly exhibited negative 
and significant correlation with theft and handling across estimations. This result 
reflects the expectation that detection rate, as proxy for the probability of 
apprehension, should negatively affect crime rate (theft and handling in this case) 
through both deterrence and incapacitation effects. The prison population, on the 
other hand, has displayed unstable coefficient over estimations. Its effect is positive 
and significant in the OLS estimation, changes to negative and highly significant in 
the fixed effect model, and switches back to positive and significant at 10% level in 
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the GMM model. Given the estimation result generated by the GMM method, we 
should be cautious to conclude that prison population is positively correlated with 
theft and handling because there may be several reasons for the positive effect of 
prison population. First, higher prison population may be caused by higher crime rate 
if the detection rate remains unchanged. When there are more offenders and the same 
proportion of them has been detected, more offenders will be sentenced into prison 
accordingly. Second, the variable of prison population is aggregated on national level 
and thus cannot reflect its variations by areas. Third, the prison population of theft and 
handling is reported together in data with that of fraud and forgery as one category. 
Hence, this limitation of data may also bias the estimation results.  
 
The Gini coefficient has shown negative correlation with theft and handling in all 
three estimations, insignificant in the OLS estimation and significant in fixed-effect 
and the GMM estimations. These results are contrary to the expectation that higher 
income inequality will increase property crime rates through reducing the opportunity 
cost of committing crimes by the poor. However, as higher income inequality also 
indicates that larger proportion of wealth is possessed by smaller proportion of 
population, the opportunities for property crimes could be reduced consequently as 
fewer wealthy people will be around. Another possible explanation is that the variable 
of Gini coefficient is aggregated on national level and thus exhibits no variation 
across areas. For this reason, its coefficient may be biased by this data limitation.  
 
Based on our analyses, we do not obtain significant effects of young people 
proportion and unemployment on theft, just like the case of burglary. However, this 
alone is not enough to conclude that there is no correlation between them and the 
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crime of theft. This is because, although the proportion of young people is predicted 
to positively affect crime given that they are more crime-prone, we also believe that 
such positive effect could be counterbalanced by the fact that young people, on 
average, have lower incomes (if any) and possess less valuable goods and provide 
fewer opportunities for property crimes. Therefore, the estimated coefficient for the 
proportion of young people could reflect both effects and appears to be insignificant. 
Likewise, unemployment is also well-known for having two opposite effects on 
crimes: motivation and opportunity. Moreover, as higher unemployment often 
indicates an economy downturn, people are less likely to consume on expensive 
goods and thus provide fewer targets for potential thieves. As a result, the estimated 
insignificant coefficient potentially suggests that motivation and opportunity effects 
are roughly equally strong.  
 
Our results suggest a positive correlation between real earnings and theft and such 
correlation is insignificant in the OLS estimation and significant at 1% level once we 
control for area-specific fixed effects and endogenous variables. This result implies 
that real earnings mainly picks up its opportunity effect on theft, just like the case of 
burglary: higher income levels will increase people’s consumption on valuable goods 
and thus provide more opportunities for property crimes.  
 
In addition, our GMM estimation shows a rather strong positive correlation between 
the contemporary and once-lagged crime rate of theft with a magnitude of 0.62. 
Furthermore, the over-identification test has captured an insignificant p-value of 0.19, 
indicating that the null hypothesis of valid over-identifying restrictions cannot be 
rejected and hence the employed instruments are truly valid.  
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We report our results using the data set 1987-2005 in table 4-10 which can be 
compared with previous results. However, it is important to note that, in the GMM 
estimation, being most suitable for our empirical model, we have attained highly 
significant p-value for the over-identification test. Such result implies that the 
instrument variables we adopt for the endogenous variables (lagged crime rate, 
contemporary detection rate and prison population) are invalid as instruments 
probably due to their correlations with the error terms. Consequently, the estimations 
generated by the GMM model lose their power to be unbiased and consistent, thus 
cannot be used as solid evidence.  
Table 4-10 
Theft and handling 1987-2005 
variable OLS Cross-Section Fixed Effect GMM 
C 7.66 (5.31) 
11.91*** 
(0.83) - 
Crime(t-1) - - 0.42*** (0.03) 
Detection Rate -0.96** (0.38) 
-0.27*** 
(0.03) 
-0.26*** 
(0.02) 
Prison Population -0.23* (0.13) 
-0.52*** 
(0.03) 
-0.45*** 
(0.01) 
Gini Coefficient 1.19** (0.49) 
-0.10 
(0.17) 
0.55*** 
(0.05) 
Young People -0.09 (1.00) 
-0.45*** 
(0.08) 
-0.41*** 
(0.04) 
Unemployment 0.43*** (0.15) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
Real Earnings -0.09 (0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.01) 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Squared 0.29 0.96 0.73 
S.E. of Regression 0.45 0.10 0.08 
J-Statistic - - 58.48 
Over Identification Test - - 0.01 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
The J-statistic is computed for the Sargan/Hansen over-identifying restrictions. Under the 
null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, the J-statistic follows a Chi-
Squared distribution with the degree of freedom being the difference between the 
instrument rank and the number of coefficients estimated. The reported over-identification 
test is the corresponding p-value. 
 
As we check the results, the analyses based on the longer data set have confirmed the 
effects of lagged crime rate, detection rate, and unemployment rate. In the meantime, 
  135 
they have provided opposite results for prison population, Gini coefficient and real 
earnings. However, as we shall remember that the results given by the GMM 
estimation are questionable due to the invalid instruments, such results cannot be used 
as solid evidence to generate further inferences.   
4.5.3 Fraud and Forgery 
As usual, we report the results based on the data set 1992-2005 as our main results in 
table 4-11 below. 
Table 4-11 
Fraud and forgery 1992-2005 
variable OLS Cross-Section Fixed Effect GMM 
C 24.86* (13.27) 
10.97*** 
(2.41) - 
Crime(t-1) - - 0.23*** (0.02) 
Detection Rate -0.46*** (0.08) 
-0.30*** 
(0.07) 
-0.45*** 
(0.06) 
Prison Population 0.39* (0.23) 
-0.23 
(0.19) 
-0.39*** 
(0.11) 
Gini Coefficient -5.62 (3.49) 
-1.06*** 
(0.31) 
-0.62*** 
(0.22) 
Young People -0.40 (1.15) 
-0.01 
(0.47) 
-1.01*** 
(0.32) 
Unemployment -0.10 (0.14) 
-0.13 
(0.11) 
-0.11* 
(0.06) 
Real Earnings 0.78* (0.46) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Squared 0.34 0.91 0.73 
S.E. of Regression 0.58 0.22 0.19 
J-Statistic - - 32.06 
Over Identification Test - - 0.56 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
The J-statistic is computed for the Sargan/Hansen over-identifying restrictions. Under the 
null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, the J-statistic follows a Chi-
Squared distribution with the degree of freedom being the difference between the 
instrument rank and the number of coefficients estimated. The reported over-identification 
test is the corresponding p-value. 
 
According to table 4-11, we find that fraud and forgery is negatively affected by both 
detection rate and prison population at 1% significance level. Whilst the coefficient of 
detection rate is constantly negative and highly significant, the effect of prison 
population is less stable across estimations. It is positive and significant at 10% level 
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in the OLS estimation, negative and insignificant in the fixed-effect model, and 
becomes negative and highly significant (at 1% level) in the GMM model. These 
results support the expected negative effects of both detection rate and prison 
population as law enforcement instruments.  
 
Same as for burglary and theft, we achieve negative correlation between Gini 
coefficient and fraud and forgery. Since the variable of income inequality has 
constantly shown negative effect on property crime rates that have been analysed, it 
may be argued that such negative effect is due to the fact that, with higher income 
inequality, larger proportion of wealth is shared by fewer people implying fewer 
opportunities for property crimes. Moreover, both unemployment and the proportion 
of young people have negative effects on fraud and forgery under the GMM 
estimation. We may explain the negative effect of young people with the fact that 
over 90 percent of the cases in fraud and forgery are cheque and credit card fraud and, 
hence, the opportunities of this crime should be negatively correlated with the number 
of young people. This is because, in general, they have lower income and should 
spend less both in store and online. For this reason, the predicted positive correlation 
between the proportion of young people and crime rate could be offset by the reduced 
crime opportunities due to higher proportion of young people. Consequently, the net 
effect of young people proportion on property crime rates, fraud and forgery in this 
case, may be insignificant or even negative. Furthermore, unemployment rate has also 
picked up its opportunity effect by showing a negative and significant coefficient. 
This result can be again explained by the fact the majority of this type of crime are 
cheque and credit card fraud; an increase in unemployment will not only reduce 
people’s spending by cheques and credit cards, but also reduce the opportunities of 
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potential offenders to commit such crimes as they normally need jobs to do so. In 
addition, our results suggest that real earnings is positively correlated with fraud in all 
cases implying that an increase in earnings will lead to higher rate of fraud. 
Unsurprisingly, this variable has, once again, picked up its opportunity effect just as it 
did in the analyses of both burglary and theft.  
 
The once-lagged crime rate shows a positive and significant (at 1% level) correlation 
with the contemporary crime rate with the magnitude of 0.23. This result confirms our 
prediction that crime rate should be persistent over time. Also, the over-identification 
test has revealed a p-value of 0.56 indicating the instrument variables that we 
implemented for lagged crime rate, contemporary detection rate and prison population 
are truly valid and have supplied with useful information for estimating our model.   
 
For the purpose of comparison, we also report the results based on the data set 1987-
2005 are in table 4-12.  
Table 4-12 
Fraud and forgery 1987-2005 
variable OLS Cross-Section Fixed Effect GMM 
C 9.97* (5.51) 
10.78*** 
(2.14) - 
Crime(t-1) - - 0.30*** (0.08) 
Detection Rate -0.55*** (0.13) 
-0.32*** 
(0.06) 
-0.28*** 
(0.07) 
Prison Population -0.36** (0.10) 
-0.46*** 
(0.09) 
-0.40*** 
(0.06) 
Gini Coefficient -0.23 (0.71) 
-0.52 
(0.41) 
-0.20 
(0.19) 
Young People -0.39 (1.06) 
-0.38* 
(0.21) 
-0.44 
(0.38) 
Unemployment 0.10 (0.14) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
Real Earnings 0.15** (0.05) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.03** 
(0.02) 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Squared 0.25 0.89 0.71 
S.E. of Regression 0.63 0.24 0.19 
J-Statistic - - 37.44 
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Over Identification Test - - 0.31 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
The J-statistic is computed for the Sargan/Hansen over-identifying restrictions. Under the 
null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, the J-statistic follows a Chi-
Squared distribution with the degree of freedom being the difference between the 
instrument rank and the number of coefficients estimated. The reported over-identification 
test is the corresponding p-value. 
 
Generally speaking, our analyses based on the longer data set have generated 
reasonably consistent results as our previous findings. Specifically, both detection rate 
and prison population are negatively correlated with fraud and forgery and the 
correlations are significant at 1% level most of the time. Moreover, Gini coefficient 
and the proportion of young people still have negative effects on fraud reflecting their 
opportunity effect on property crime, although their coefficients become less 
significant.  
  
The only significant change made by applying the longer data set is the effect of real 
earnings on fraud: while the effect is positive earlier reflecting the opportunity effect, 
it becomes negative and significant when using the longer data set picking up its 
motivation effect.  As we have observed the same change in the analyses of burglary, 
we will explain such phenomenon together in later discussion.  
 
The GMM estimation shows that the once-lagged crime rate is correlated with 
contemporary crime rate at a rate of 0.30, which is coherent with the previous finding. 
Furthermore, the over-identification test has also confirmed the validation of 
employed instruments.  
4.5.4 Robbery 
According to the Home Office, robbery has been categorized as violent crime because 
the occurring of such crimes is usually accompanied with physical harm implied onto 
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the victims. However, it cannot neglect that the motivation of committing such crimes 
is usually of financial interest. Therefore, robbery is expected to respond in similar 
way to the independent variables as do with property crimes. The estimation results 
based on the primary data set 1992-2005 are reported as following in table 4-13. 
Table 4-13 
Robbery 1992-2005 
variable OLS Cross-Section Fixed Effect GMM 
C 116.61 (615.40) 
77.59 
(132.60) - 
Crime(t-1) - - 0.44*** (0.004) 
Detection Rate -3.59*** (1.26) 
-0.88** 
(0.48) 
-3.42*** 
(0.03) 
Prison Population 4.63 (4.75) 
-0.04 
(1.72) 
-2.59*** 
(0.32) 
Gini Coefficient -6.74 (12.18) 
-0.62 
(2.28) 
1.03** 
(0.50) 
Young People 17.36* (10.09) 
16.10 
(10.28) 
1.03* 
(0.60) 
Unemployment 2.52 (12.44) 
-21.02** 
(8.52) 
-12.69*** 
(0.66) 
Real Earnings 0.80** (0.40) 
0.15*** 
(0.04) 
0.09*** 
(0.003) 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Squared 0.28 0.89 0.33 
S.E. of Regression 115.72 45.02 35.70 
J-Statistic - - 36.23 
Over Identification Test - - 0.36 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
The J-statistic is computed for the Sargan/Hansen over-identifying restrictions. Under the 
null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, the J-statistic follows a Chi-
Squared distribution with the degree of freedom being the difference between the 
instrument rank and the number of coefficients estimated. The reported over-identification 
test is the corresponding p-value. 
  
The first thing to notice in table 4-13 is that both detection rate and prison population 
have displayed negative and significant impacts on robbery as law enforcement 
instruments. Whilst the coefficient of detection rate is constantly negative and 
significant in all three estimations, the effect of prison population is insignificant in 
both the OLS and fixed-effect estimations and becomes highly significant (at 1% level) 
once the relevant estimation issues are controlled by the GMM technique.  
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Meanwhile, we also find that both Gini coefficient and the proportion of young people 
present positive and significant correlations with robbery, thus supporting our 
expectations. As we have predicted that an increase in the income inequality will 
increase crimes by reducing the opportunity cost of committing crimes for the people 
at the lower end of wealth distribution, our results have indeed reinforced such 
predictions. Furthermore, the proportion of young people could positively affect 
robbery through two channels: on the one hand, higher proportion of young people 
increases the number of motivated robbers given the lower opportunity cost of young 
population; on the other hand, higher proportion of young people also means more 
potential targets for robbery. Due to its nature, robbery often occurs on the streets of 
less affluent areas. In addition, the targets of robbery are usually the valuable 
belongings carried by passengers and pedestrians, such as mobile phones, ipods, 
laptops, wallets and purses and so on. Consequently, for robbers, young people are 
usually seen as attractive targets since they are relatively less cautious and more likely 
to possess trendy electronic gargets. As a result, higher proportion of young people 
increased the number of both potential robbers and potential victims, hence, 
significantly increases the crime rate of robbery.  
 
Whilst unemployment rate shows negative and significant correlation with robbery, 
real earnings exhibits positive and significant effect on the same crime. Both of them 
have picked up their opportunity effects. In particular, as long as the potential 
estimation issues are controlled, higher unemployment rate will reduce the crime rate 
of robbery, reflecting the fact that robbery primarily occurs on the streets and, the 
more people being unemployed, the fewer commutes would be required. Thus, it 
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provides fewer opportunities for potential robbers. Whereas, with higher income, 
people tend to make more purchases, thus provide more opportunities for robbery.  
 
The coefficient of once-lagged robbery rate is positive and significant at 1% level. 
The magnitude of 0.44 suggests quite strong persistence in robbery which is again 
consistent with expectation. Meanwhile, the over-identification test has confirmed 
that the instruments employed for the endogenous variables in the GMM estimation 
are indeed valid and independent from the error term.  
 
Table 4-14 below shows the counterpart results generated by the data set 1987-2005.  
Table 4-14 
Robbery 1987-2005 
variable OLS Cross-Section Fixed Effect GMM 
C -662.20*** (254.37) 
-215.79 
(258.73) - 
Crime(t-1) - - 0.76*** (0.001) 
Detection Rate -4.14*** (1.24) 
-0.41 
(0.44) 
-2.18*** 
(0.04) 
Prison Population 17.96*** (5.68) 
-2.00 
(2.55) 
-8.26*** 
(0.93) 
Gini Coefficient 10.64*** (4.02) 
1.83 
(2.84) 
0.85* 
(0.47) 
Young People 18.60* (10.80) 
15.73 
(12.59) 
-1.67*** 
(0.39) 
Unemployment 12.22** (5.14) 
0.75 
(1.72) 
-3.15*** 
(0.54) 
Real Earnings 0.40** (0.18) 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Squared 0.24 0.87 0.59 
S.E. of Regression 123.63 51.97 35.08 
J-Statistic - - 34.55 
Over Identification Test - - 0.49 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
The J-statistic is computed for the Sargan/Hansen over-identifying restrictions. Under the 
null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, the J-statistic follows a Chi-
Squared distribution with the degree of freedom being the difference between the 
instrument rank and the number of coefficients estimated. The reported over-identification 
test is the corresponding p-value. 
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As shown in table 4-14, the estimation results based on the data set 1987-2005 are 
quite consistent with previously findings, confirming the robustness of our results. 
Especially, both detection rate and prison population have shown negative 
correlations with robbery indicating their deterrent (and probably also incapacitation) 
effects on crime as law enforcements. Gini coefficient displays positive and 
significant correlation with robbery implying that higher income inequality will 
increase robbery through lowering the opportunity cost to the least affluent. 
Additionally, both unemployment rate and real earnings have picked up their 
opportunities effects on robbery: higher unemployment rate will reduce the 
opportunities and hence the crime rate for robbery; while higher income will increase 
the opportunities for potential robbers and hence increase the crime rate of robbery.  
 
The only exception is the proportion of young people which has obtained unstable 
coefficients across estimations. The correlation between the proportion of young 
people and robbery is positive in both the OLS and fixed-effect estimations. Once the 
GMM estimation is applied, the coefficient of young people turns into negative and 
significant at 1% level.38 Therefore, the coefficient changing is probably as a result of 
the inclusion of extra 5 years in the data set 1987-2005. In this case, the coefficient of 
young people is rather sensitive to the period under examination.  
 
The GMM estimation based on the data set 1987-2005 has confirmed the significant 
self-correlation in robbery. In addition, the over-identification test has proved the 
validity of using lagged values as instruments for the endogenous variables.  
                                                
38 By restricting the data set 1987-2005 to only include the period 1992-2005, the coefficient of young 
people are constantly positive, which is consistent with the previous finding.  
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4.5.5 Sexual Offences 
Sexual offence is a typical violent crime and does not pursue financial benefit. Such 
crime may also be affected by the explanatory variables, but probably in a less 
obvious way. For example, the law enforcement variable may still have deterrence or 
incapacitation (or both) effect on sexual offensive activities. Higher unemployment 
rate may reduce the potential contacts between potential offenders and victims, so it 
reduces the opportunities of such crime. Similarly, higher incomes could also reduce 
the possible contacts between offenders and victims. This is because, with higher 
income, the potential victims (mostly women), are able to afford more self-protections, 
such as cars, instead of walking or taking public transportation. For these reasons, 
sexual offences has also been analysed in the same empirical framework as property 
crimes in hope to reveal some less obvious relationships between this type of crime 
and potentially relevant factors. The analyses using the data set 1992-2005 are 
reported below in table 4-15.  
 
Table 4-15 
Sexual offences 1992-2005 
variable OLS Cross-Section Fixed Effect GMM 
C 737.29* (437.49) 
69.90 
(76.62) - 
Crime(t-1) - - 0.22*** (0.001) 
Detection Rate -1.04* (0.56) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
1.37*** 
(0.05) 
Prison Population -1.88 (4.13) 
-9.95*** 
(2.53) 
-15.25*** 
(0.71) 
Gini Coefficient -12.65* (7.47) 
-1.98 
(1.54) 
-1.44*** 
(0.33) 
Young People -10.36 (9.65) 
4.79** 
(2.07) 
0.51 
(0.55) 
Unemployment -1.42 (3.94) 
3.39 
(2.32) 
9.84*** 
(0.33) 
Real Earnings 0.42* (0.25) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.08*** 
(0.003) 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Squared 0.25 0.81 0.03 
S.E. of Regression 61.67 31.40 32.15 
J-Statistic - - 37.39 
Over Identification Test - - 0.32 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
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The J-statistic is computed for the Sargan/Hansen over-identifying restrictions. Under the 
null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, the J-statistic follows a Chi-
Squared distribution with the degree of freedom being the difference between the 
instrument rank and the number of coefficients estimated. The reported over-identification 
test is the corresponding p-value. 
 
The detection rate of sexual offences has changing coefficient across estimations. In 
the OLS estimation, the coefficient is negative and significant (at 10% level), 
confirming the expected deterrent effect of law enforcement. As the area-specific 
fixed effects are eliminated in the second estimation, the coefficient turns positive and 
insignificant. Once the GMM technique is applied to further control the possible 
estimation issues, detection rate has shown positive and highly significant (at 1% 
level) correlation with sexual offences. The result of GMM estimation, although 
contrary to expectation, is reasonable due to the seriousness of sexual offences. As 
this type of crime is so severe that it induces enormous damage to both the victims 
and the society, higher rate of sexual offences would demand higher probability of 
detection to combat the crime. As a result, although we have controlled the 
endogeneity of detection rate, its positive coefficient could still reflect the positive 
correlation between sexual offences and detection rate.  
 
The prison population has attained overall negative coefficient, which is insignificant 
in the OLS estimation but significant in both fixed-effect and the GMM estimations. 
This result is in line with the expectation and probably reflects the incapacitation 
effect of prison population. The motivation of such offences is obviously not for 
financial gains, but it should be rather heavily correlated with the offenders’ 
psychological characteristics. As more offenders are jailed and temporally separated 
from the potential victims, there will be less offenders remaining in the society. This 
eventually would reduce reoccurrences of sexual offences.  
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Gini coefficient shows negative correlation with sexual offences in all estimations. Its 
coefficient is significant at 10% level in the OLS estimation, insignificant in the fixed-
effect estimation, and highly significant (at 1% level) in the GMM estimation. 
However, it is still not enough to conclude that income inequality, as a macro-
economic indicator, is negatively related with sexual offences. Hence, further 
investigation in their correlation, if any, is necessary.  The coefficient of young people 
is negative and insignificant in the OLS estimation. It becomes positive and 
significant in the fixed-effect model and changes to positive and insignificant in the 
GMM model. Given the results, there seems no strong evidence indicating a causal 
relationship between the proportion of young people and sexual offences. 
Furthermore, we find that both unemployment and real earnings have achieved 
positive coefficients in most cases. Nonetheless, we still cannot conclude with 
confidence that an increase in either unemployment or income will lead to higher 
crime rate of sexual offences. This type of crime deserves formal analysis that 
specially designed to suit its characteristics.   
 
One of the results that do make sense is the significant self-correlation in sexual 
offences at a rate of 0.22 as suggested by our GMM estimation. This result is 
consistent with the expectation that crime rate is persistent. In this case, the offenders 
commit such crimes mainly due to their different “taste” from others. Therefore, as 
long as they are not detected and sentenced into prison, they will probably keep 
committing such crimes because their “taste” does not disappear.  
 
We use table 4-16 to present the results estimated from the data set 1987-2005.  
Table 4-16 
Sexual offences 1987-2005 
variable OLS Cross-Section GMM 
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Fixed Effect 
C 140.21 (88.33) 
56.88 
(86.63) - 
Crime(t-1) - - 0.24*** (0.002) 
Detection Rate -1.64* (0.98) 
0.10 
(0.37) 
0.38*** 
(0.01) 
Prison Population 54.54 (47.83) 
-10.09** 
(4.05) 
-13.68*** 
(0.64) 
Gini Coefficient -2.76 (1.69) 
-2.54* 
(1.42) 
-1.51*** 
(0.20) 
Young People -9.40 (11.41) 
9.58*** 
(2.06) 
9.26*** 
(0.17) 
Unemployment 6.38 (5.65) 
-1.95*** 
(0.53) 
-2.39*** 
(0.12) 
Real Earnings 0.18 (0.13) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02*** 
(0.004) 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Squared 0.16 0.82 0.04 
S.E. of Regression 65.62 30.51 29.92 
J-Statistic - - 41.21 
Over Identification Test - - 0.22 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
The J-statistic is computed for the Sargan/Hansen over-identifying restrictions. Under the 
null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, the J-statistic follows a Chi-
Squared distribution with the degree of freedom being the difference between the 
instrument rank and the number of coefficients estimated. The reported over-identification 
test is the corresponding p-value. 
 
We have found that estimating the empirical model with the data set 1987-2005 has 
produced largely consistent results as our previous findings. First, the coefficient of 
detection rate is negative and significant at 10% level in the OLS estimation, positive 
and insignificant in the fixed-effect estimation, positive and highly significant in the 
GMM estimation. The changing pattern of the coefficient is exactly the same as 
previous results and has confirmed that sexual offences is indeed positively correlated 
with its detection rate. Second, prison population has shown negative and significant 
impact in both fixed-effect and the GMM estimations. This result is also consistent 
with the previous finding that sexual offences is negatively affected by the 
imprisonment rate. Third, the variables of Gini coefficient, young people and real 
earnings have also displayed the same signs as before. However, as mentioned earlier, 
we are unable to explain their estimated impacts on sexual offences with confidence 
due to the lack of established theories that relate these variables to sexual offences. In 
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addition, the GMM model has also confirmed the positive self-correlation in the crime 
rate of sexual offences, as well as the validity of applied instruments for the 
endogenous variables.   
 
The only exception is the unemployment rate. In the analyses based on the longer data 
set 1987-2005, the coefficient of unemployment is positive and insignificant in the 
OLS estimation, negative and highly significant (at 1% level) in both fixed-effect and 
the GMM estimations. This result supports the expectation and advocats that higher 
unemployment will reduce the crime rate of sexual offences probably through 
reducing the opportunities for such crimes.  
4.5.6 Violence against the Person 
Violence against the person refers to those offences which have harmed or potentially 
harmful to the physical well-beings of individuals. In some cases, however, the 
offenders carried out such violent actions still aiming for financial gains. Under such 
circumstances, the offences will be recorded as violence against the person as long as 
the victims are physically harmed or threatened. The crime rate of violence against the 
person could be, at some level, correlated with the economic variables in a similar 
way to property crimes. The empirical analyses are firstly conducted using the data set 
1992-2005 as usual, the results of which are reported in table 4-17.  
Table 4-17 
Violence against the person 1992-2005 
variable OLS Cross-Section Fixed Effect GMM 
C 20.03** (8.78) 
12.56*** 
(2.90) - 
Crime(t-1) - - 0.41*** (0.03) 
Detection Rate -0.82** (0.42) 
-0.24* 
(0.12) 
-0.51*** 
(0.07) 
Prison Population 0.12 (0.67) 
-0.58 
(0.42) 
1.39*** 
(0.18) 
Gini Coefficient -3.28* (1.87) 
-1.88*** 
(0.53) 
-2.61*** 
(0.19) 
Young People -0.32 0.91** 0.16 
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(1.02) (0.42) (0.10) 
Unemployment 0.23** (0.13) 
0.002 
(0.10) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
Real Earnings 0.31 (0.24) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.16*** 
(0.01) 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Squared 0.69 0.92 0.73 
S.E. of Regression 0.42 0.21 0.20 
J-Statistic - - 40.18 
Over Identification Test - - 0.25 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
The J-statistic is computed for the Sargan/Hansen over-identifying restrictions. Under the 
null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, the J-statistic follows a Chi-
Squared distribution with the degree of freedom being the difference between the 
instrument rank and the number of coefficients estimated. The reported over-identification 
test is the corresponding p-value. 
 
As the detection rate has constantly shown negative and significant impact on the 
personal violence in all three estimations, prison population has attained positive 
correlation with such crime in the GMM estimation. Whilst we acquire negative and 
significant effect of Gini coefficient on personal violence, the proportion of young 
people is positively, but insignificantly, correlated with this crime rate. Moreover, 
whilst unemployment rate shows negative and insignificant effect on violent crimes, 
real earnings is positively correlated with such crimes. Given the fact that some 
personal violence are committed for economic returns as mentioned earlier, one 
potential explanation for both coefficients of unemployment and real earnings could 
be that either higher unemployment or lower income may reduce personal violence 
through their opportunity effects.   
 
The coefficient of lagged crime rate suggests that violence against the person, like 
other crimes, is positively self-correlated. Meanwhile, the over-identification test 
cannot reject the validity of the employed instruments by generating an insignificant 
p-value of 0.25.  
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The estimation results based on the data set 1987-2005 are presented in table 4-18.  
 
Table 4-18 
Violence against the person 1987-2005 
variable OLS Cross-Section Fixed Effect GMM 
C 6.82** (3.37) 
8.53*** 
(2.11) - 
Crime(t-1) - - 0.39*** (0.04) 
Detection Rate -0.94** (0.47) 
-0.28** 
(0.11) 
-0.33*** 
(0.08) 
Prison Population 0.22 (0.29) 
-0.25*** 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
Gini Coefficient 0.39 (0.45) 
-1.05*** 
(0.40) 
-1.12*** 
(0.13) 
Young People 0.22 (0.94) 
1.09*** 
(0.27) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
Unemployment 0.32*** (0.11) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
-0.08** 
(0.04) 
Real Earnings -0.08** (0.04) 
-0.003 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Squared 0.71 0.93 0.73 
S.E. of Regression 0.42 0.21 0.18 
J-Statistic - - 74.53 
Over Identification Test - - 0.0001 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
The J-statistic is computed for the Sargan/Hansen over-identifying restrictions. Under the 
null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, the J-statistic follows a Chi-
Squared distribution with the degree of freedom being the difference between the 
instrument rank and the number of coefficients estimated. The reported over-identification 
test is the corresponding p-value. 
 
The results generated by applying the data set 1987-2005 have proved our previous 
findings are rather robust. In particular, we find negative and significant coefficient 
for the detection rate, whilst prison population has negative but insignificant 
correlation with personal violence. Furthermore, Gini coefficient still shows strong 
negative impact on personal violence implying that higher income inequality will 
reduce such crime rate. The proportion of young people has displayed positive 
coefficient which is also consistent with the previous result. In addition, while 
unemployment rate mainly demonstrates negative effect, real earnings is positively, 
but insignificantly, correlated with violent crime.  
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With the longer data set, the once-lagged crime rate obtains a coefficient of 0.39, 
suggesting a significant self-correlation over time. Nonetheless, given the p-value of 
0.001, the over-identification test has rejected the validity of using the lags of 
endogenous variables as instruments.  
4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, we have performed various panel data analyses to indentify the effects 
of crime-influential factors on different types of crime rates in England and Wales. 
We are motivated by the fact that literature in England and Wales investigating 
similar problems are limited in both aspects of quantity and quality, especially when 
comparing to literature in the United States. As we have surveyed the existing 
literature that detecting the determinants of crimes in England and Wales using panel 
data, we have found some potential issues that may bias the results of those literature, 
such as uncontrolled endogeneity of law enforcement variables, omitted variables and 
so on. Therefore, we tackled those associated estimation issues in the work of this 
chapter by adopting appropriate methodologies and variables.  
 
The crime rates of our interest are violence against the person, sexual offences, 
robbery, burglary, theft and handling, and fraud and forgery. We choose the 
explanatory variables strictly according to Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) to reduce 
the risk of omitting relevant variables and to incorporate the factors representing law 
enforcement, economic conditions, as well as demographic feature. In addition, our 
panel data aggregated by police force areas has enabled us to avoid the potential bias 
caused by the correlation between independent variables and area-specific fixed 
effects. As a further temptation to include a relatively complete set of explanatory 
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variables, we also incorporate once-lagged crime rate into the right-hand side of our 
empirical model as we believe it may measure the persistence in crime as well as the 
effects of lagged independent variables. To cope with our model specification as well 
as the endogeneity of law enforcement variables, we have applied the GMM 
technique to produce unbiased estimates. We report our main results based on the 
panel data set cover the period 1992-2005. However, as a robust check, we also 
present the results based on the data set 1987-2005 afterwards. The main difference 
between the two data sets is the aggregation level of two independent variables: while 
unemployment and real earnings are aggregated by police force areas in the data set 
1992-2005, they are on regional level in the data set 1987-2005.  
 
We can summarise the estimation results as follows. First, the property crimes are 
better explained by our empirical model. While analysing property crimes, the 
estimated coefficients for independent variables are more consistent with expectations 
than violent crimes and easier to explain in the case of they are not supporting the 
expectations.  
 
Second, detection rate and prison population are the strongest predictor for both 
violent and property crimes. They have shown negative and significant effects on 
different crime rates in most cases confirming their effectiveness as law enforcement 
instruments. This result does not get affected by applying different data sets and is 
very consistent across different estimations. The only exceptions are that prison 
population is positively correlated with theft and handling and violence against the 
person whilst the detection rate is positively correlated with sexual offences. Since it 
is possible that more law enforcement effort is required by higher crime rates, the 
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positive correlations between law enforcement instruments and certain types of crime 
rates are explainable in this way.  
 
Third, the social-economic factors of unemployment rate and real earnings, which are 
also our main concern, have also obtained stable and reasonable correlations with our 
examined crime rates, particularly property crime rates. Our results show that they 
have both picked up their opportunity effects on the crime rates of burglary, theft and 
handling, fraud and forgery as well as robbery and these findings are not affected by 
using longer data set 1987-2005 in most cases. However, we do find two exceptions: 
the variable of real earnings shows its opportunity effect on burglary and fraud based 
on the data 1992-2005. Once we apply the longer data set, real earnings picks up its 
motivation effect for both burglary and fraud. As we delete the 5 extra years (1987-
1991) from the data set 1987-2005, the estimation results confirms the previous 
findings that real earnings mainly shows its opportunity effects. Hence, we are able to 
conclude that by including the period 1987-1991 into the sample, it would alter the 
effect of this variable in the analyses of burglary and fraud.  
 
The difference in the coefficient of real earnings as discussed above may be explained 
by macroeconomic situation at the early 1990s.  The UK experienced a period of 
serious recession between 1990 and 1992, triggered by saving and loan crisis in the 
United States. During this recession, important economic indicators such as real 
earnings also experienced deterioration. The data set 1992-2005 principally measures 
the correlation between crime rates and social-economic factors in a period of 
economic growth. As demonstrated in our empirical analysis, during this period, the 
social-economic factors mainly picked up the opportunity effects.  This is because on 
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the one hand, people are more likely to spend under good economic conditions, hence, 
providing relatively more opportunities for property crimes. On the other hand, 
potential offenders may not be facing serve economic difficulties in times of 
prosperity. Property crimes committed may largely due to increasing opportunities, 
not economic desperations. Consequently, during economic growth, the opportunity 
effects appear to be stronger than the motivation effects. On the contrary, the data set 
1987-2005 has incorporated the period of economic recession in the early 1990s. 
During economic uncertainties, the correlations between social-economic factors and 
property crimes should be dominated by the motivation effects, rather than the 
opportunity effects. This is because, in recessions, potential offenders are more likely 
to be facing financial problems, which may drive them to commit property crimes as a 
solution. An inevitable decrease in the earnings during economic downturn, not only 
create fewer opportunities for property crimes, as people tend to spend less, more 
importantly, it also may turn more people into potential criminals due to their 
economic desperations.  As a result, the motivation effects appear to be stronger than 
the opportunity effects, in times of economic crisis. In summary, adding the period 
1987-1991 into the data set has altered the net effects of real earnings on burglary and 
fraud. 
 
Another potential reason for the change in the coefficient of real earnings is that John 
Major became the leader of the Conservatives in 1990. Therefore, while the period 
1992-2005 is only under the leaderships of John Major and Tony Blair, the period of 
1987-2005 is also governed by Margaret Thatcher who was in office from 1979 to 
1990. While Margaret Thatcher focused on social and economic reform which led to 
relatively unstable environment, John Major is famous for his mild-mannered 
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governing style. Under his leadership, the economy in the UK stably grew over time 
and the unemployment rate was back in control and stayed on normal level. Such 
positive atmosphere could change people’s style of consuming and saving and, 
therefore, the opportunities and motivations of illegal activities.  
  
Fourthly, the variable of Gini coefficient has constantly exhibited negative and 
significant correlation with different crime rates, which is opposite to expectation. 
Apart from the fact that Gini coefficient is aggregated on national level and cannot 
well reflect the variations of income inequality across areas, its negative effect may be 
explained by the reason that higher income inequality will reduce the number of rich 
people and thus reduce the crime opportunities. The proportion of young people 
shows mixed influences on different crime rates and is insignificant in most cases. 
However, we explain the unstable impact of young people by arguing that, whilst 
higher proportion of young people implies more motivated offenders, it could also 
reduce the opportunities for crimes, particular property crimes, because they are, on 
average, having lower income levels and processing less valuable goods. Also, as we 
argues before, the severe consequence of committing crimes and getting caught for 
young people, such as less labour market opportunities in the future, could prevent 
them from participating in illegal activities and thus offset their positive effects on 
crime.  
 
The fifth conclusion can be drawn from this chapter’s analyse is that, consisting with 
expectation, each type of crime rate is significantly correlated with its once-lagged 
value suggesting strong persistence over time.  This may be due to the offenders’ 
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persistent preference for crimes, the impacts of lagged independent variables, as well 
as the impact of lagged business cycle.  
 
Whilst we have attempted to provide unbiased results by using the most refined data 
set and appropriate estimation methodologies available, we shall nevertheless 
acknowledge the potential limitations of this work. First of all, the prison population 
and Gini coefficient are aggregated on national level and shows no variation across 
areas. Such data limitation could affect the estimation results. Second, the empirical 
model adopted in this chapter is unable to distinguish the motivation effect from the 
opportunity effect for some independent variables. As predicted by the theories, 
several variables could have the double-edged effect on crimes rates: namely 
motivation and opportunity. Our estimation results have suggested that in some cases, 
these two effects are equally strong. Therefore, without distinguishing between them, 
the coefficients of certain variables, such as unemployment rate, will remain 
ambiguous. Third, the empirical analyses in this chapter are based on the framework 
where crime rate is assumed to be affected only by its local factors. As offenders are 
mobile, the crime level in one area, however, could be affected by the conditions of 
neighbouring areas. Ignoring such “interaction” between neighbouring areas may 
potentially bias the effects of concerned variables. In order to incorporate such 
dependence between neighbourhoods, our next chapter will focus on detecting the 
spill-over effects of crime rates as well as relevant explanatory variables.  
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Chapter Five: Spatial Analyses 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Using a set of panel data, last chapter has provided a detailed analysis on the relations 
between various crime rates and other explanatory variables both in local areas over 
time, and across 43 police force areas in England and Wales.  The assumption taken 
for such analysis is that each crime rate is only affected by local explanatory factors, 
and not influenced by any aspects from neighbouring areas.  One may argue that this 
cannot comprehensively explain the complex relations between crime rates and 
factors such as unemployment, as crime rates in one area may be affected by crime 
rates and/or explanatory factors of its surrounding areas.  In this chapter, we continue 
our analysis of factors affecting crime by looking at whether crime policies in one 
region affect crime in neighbouring regions. In particular, it tries to analyse whether 
crime rate in an area can depend not only on its local opportunities, but also on the 
opportunities in neighbouring areas. The rationale for hypothesizing such spatial 
spillover of crime is that, given people are mobile, an individual may choose to 
commit crime in a neighbouring area if the net benefit of doing so is higher than that 
from his home area. This could happen if, for example, the home area has tougher law 
enforcement (captured by a higher probability of detection) than that in the 
neighbouring area. In this case, some offenders will leave the home area due to fewer 
opportunities and commit crimes in neighbouring areas instead.  This is the idea of 
crime displacement where the home area’s policies displace crimes to neighbouring 
regions.39 
                                                
39 The following taken from the abstract of Measuring Criminal Spillovers: Evidence from Three 
Strikes (Tabarrock and Helland, 2009) summarises why economists regard this as a market failure.  
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This chapter firstly develops a simple theoretical model to analyse why people 
commit crimes and whether they do so in different regions. It then applies empirical 
analysis, by using panel data for 43 police force areas in England and Wales over the 
period 1998-2001, to estimate the strength and direction of such spillovers.   
 
The model of crime spillover is constructed between two neighbouring areas to show 
how people allocate time between work and criminal activity. Spillovers are captured 
by allowing individuals to choose between home and neighbouring area to commit 
crimes. Committing crime in the neighbouring area may involve a higher cost which 
can be captured by a travel cost.  Nevertheless, it could be more beneficial to do so if 
the opportunities are more abundant and/or the law enforcement is less tough in the 
neighbouring area.  Tightening up the law enforcement in only one area may have the 
unintentional consequence of increasing the crime rate in the neighbouring area. 
Similarly, worse economic conditions in home area may also drive offenders to the 
neighbouring area for better opportunities. Therefore, this model will analyse the 
effects of variables such as detection rate and unemployment on the crime rates of 
both home and neighbouring area. Furthermore, this model will also predict the 
direction of these spill-over effects. For instant, the tightened law enforcement in one 
area will, in short-run, increase the crime rate in the neighbouring area through a 
negative spill-over effect. As time goes by, however, the crime rate of the 
neighbouring area could be reduced through the incapacitation effect. This is because 
tightened law enforcement leads to more crime prone people being caught and locked 
                                                                                                                                       
California’s Attorney General was pleased to announce that “An unintended but positive consequence 
of ‘Three-Strikes’ has been the impact on parolees leaving the state… The growth in the number of 
parolees leaving California is staggering.” Law enforcement officer in other states were presumably 
less pleased. A displaced criminal is a benefit to California but a cost to other states. If such criminal 
spillovers are important, law enforcement will over-invest in policies that encourage displacement.  
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up and results in lower crime rates in both areas. As a result, the net effect will depend 
on the relative strength of the two effects. 
 
After establishing this theoretical framework, the chapter will then apply spatial 
analysis to empirically test the inter-dependent relationship between the crime rates of 
contiguous areas. Specifically, spatial error and spatial lag models will be applied to 
study the spill-over effect of six types of crimes40 with panel data covering 43 police 
force areas in England and Wales for the period 1998-2001. In addition, this chapter 
will also specify an empirical model to test whether crime rate is not only affected by 
local factors such as law enforcement and labour market opportunities, but also 
influenced by these characteristics of neighbouring areas.  
 
The chapter is constructed as follows: section two reviews relevant literatures that try 
to explain the non-random spatial distribution of crime rates in different areas. 
Following the theoretical framework proposed in Fabrikant (1979), a simple model of 
crime spillovers is constructed to analyses one’s decision on where to commit crimes: 
home or neighbouring areas. Hypotheses are then derived for later empirical test. 
Spatial analysis models are also included in this section which will be followed by 
their applications. Section three provides data description for both dependent and 
independent variables while section four tests the spatial distributions of these 
variables. Section five describes the empirical model under estimation and relevant 
statistical issues. This section also presents the estimated results and the implied 
interpretations. Section six summarizes the main results and the implications. It also 
                                                
40 The six types of crimes are violence against the person, sexual offences, robbery, burglary, theft and 
handling, and fraud and forgery.  
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discusses potential short-comings of this work on which may be improved in future 
researches.  
 
5.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
5.2.1 Theoretical Perspectives 
The uneven but non-random distribution of crime rate over space has been observed 
for a long time. Social scientists have developed different theories and techniques to 
explain such phenomenon. Anselin et al. (2000) has given a relatively comprehensive 
review on relevant theories methodologies. As summarized in their article, early 
sociological theories investigating the relationship between place and crime can be 
traced back to the middle of the 19th century: Guerry (1833, cited in Anselin et al. 
2000) and Quetelet (1833, 1842, cited in Anselin et al. 2000), when they attempted to 
explain the differences in community crime levels with the social conditions of the 
resident population. Later on, such research made remarkable progress in the early 
20th century thanks to the enormous contribution of the Chicago School. They 
obtained the record of each juvenile offender with their age, sex and home address 
and plotted on a map of Chicago. Based on the distribution of these juvenile offenses, 
Shaw and Mckay (1942) found a negative relationship between juvenile crime and the 
distance from central business districts.  
 
More recent researches on crime distribution over space have greatly benefited from 
the invention of the Geographic Information Systems (GIS), which have made 
computerized mapping and spatial statistics possible. Adopting this technique, Curry 
and Spergel (1988) has found that delinquency is strongly correlated with poverty, 
while gang homicide, however, is predicted by the ethnic-race composition of local 
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community based on the data from the U.S. Cohen et al. (1998) has also utilized the 
GIS system and investigated the distribution of gangs. They found that gangs are 
normally concentrated in neighbourhoods dominated by ethnic minorities. In addition, 
the “underclass”, such as living in poverty and being unemployed, have also been 
positively correlated with gang activities.  
 
Large proportion of papers analysing the distribution of crime rate have all, by some 
extend, benefited from two broadly cited theories, namely the routine activity theory 
and the social disorganization theory. The routine activity theory was initially 
developed in Cohen and Felson (1979) and later refined in Felson (1986, 1994). 
Brantingham and Brantingham (1993) have extended this theory to explain the 
distribution of crime. Instead of emphasizing the characteristics of offenders, this 
theory focuses on the circumstances in which they commit crimes. It argues that each 
successful offense requires the convergence in both time and space dimensions of 
three minimal elements: 1) an offender with both the intention to violate the law and 
the ability to carry out such action; 2) a person or object providing a suitable target; 
and 3) the absence of guardians capable to prevent such violation. Accordingly, the 
probability that an offense will occur at any specific time and place should be a 
function of the convergence of the three necessary elements. Any social conditions 
that affect the convergence of the three basic elements could possibly explain the 
variations in crime rate. 
 
Place is essential in this theory in two ways. First, the physical features of a place can 
reduce the supervision effect that pedestrians could have. Newman (1972) has offered 
an example of this type. Public housings can increase population density in a building 
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which could provide guardians against illegal activities, as the probabilities of people 
watching each others’ back is higher in high-intensity estates. At the same time, 
however, because people are living vertically in public housings, such distribution can 
actually reduce the monitoring effect on each floor and weaken the informal social 
control among neighbours. Second, criminal activities are more likely to take place in 
target-rich environment. For example, thefts in a shopping mall, auto thefts from a 
large car park, or robberies in concentrated commercial areas (e.g. Engstad 1975; 
Brantingham and Brantingham 1982). In addition, certain activities such as alcohol 
consumption seem to be positively correlated with violent crimes (Roncek and Bell 
1981); and abandoned buildings could attract illegal drug dealers. Based on the 
routine activity theory, therefore, it is not surprising that crime rate is not randomly 
distributed over space and certain crime types of crime tend to concentrate on certain 
places, namely crime hot spots.  
 
The social disorganization theory is another one trying to explain the relationship 
between crimes and their occurring locations. It was developed in Shaw and McKay 
(1942), as they were attempting to establish a positive relationship between 
delinquency and the communities unable to conform to common values and to solve 
problems for the residents. The paper argues that delinquency is not a unique response 
of unique individuals; it is normal reaction by normal individuals to abnormal 
conditions. If a community cannot provide adequate protection for its residents and 
their properties and has to depend on outside agencies, some individuals will take the 
opportunity to conduct illegal activities at their will. In their empirical analysis, Shaw 
and McKay tried to explain the community-level delinquency rate with community-
level economic conditions, ethnic heterogeneity and population turnover. Such 
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explanatory factors are incorporated in hope to capture the instability and insecurity of 
communal environment.  Their analysis proposes a spatial distribution pattern that 
juvenile delinquency rate is highest in inner-city areas and is decreasing with the 
distance away from city centre. As the analysis was carried out for the period of 1900-
1933, large number of immigrants entered United States during that time and urban 
areas were the only places they could afford to live. Such fact implies that higher 
degrees of residential instability, ethnic diversity and social-economic deprivation are 
positively associated with the degree of urbanization and, hence, positively correlated 
with delinquency rate. Additionally, within inner-city areas, the probability of 
becoming an offender is associated with one’s interpersonal network involving his 
family, gangs, and the neighbourhood. Finally, the degree of social and economic 
deprivation, population turnover and ethnic heterogeneity are all associated with 
social disorganization and hence, with crime.  
 
The social disorganization theory has been followed by many latter papers.  The 
degree of social disorganization is normally represented by five factors, namely, 
demographic, economic, social, family disruption and urbanization. Each of these 
factors can be measured by specific variables. For examples, economic status can be 
measured by various income levels; demographic conditions can be measured by the 
ethnic composition; family disruption can be measured by the percentage of single 
parent family; urbanization can be measured by population density and so on. Harries 
(1995) has found that poverty provides the strongest explanatory power for crime. 
Cahill and Mulligan (2003) has used ethnic composition, education, population 
density and other variables to measure the degree of social disorganization and tested 
their effects on violent crime. The results are generally consistent with expectation 
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that higher degree of social disorganization is positively correlated with crime rate. 
One exception is that the population density does not exhibit significant effect as 
expected.  
 
One common feature shared by the routine activity theory and the social 
disorganization theory is that they both attempt to explain the spatial variations in 
crime rates. More specifically, they seek to answer why the crime rates of certain 
areas are persistently higher than other areas? Instead of studying the behaviour of 
offenders, both theories focus on the characteristics of crime-prone locations. The 
aforementioned assumption by panel data analysis is that the crime rates of different 
areas are affected by specific features of those areas, but are independent from the 
features of neighbouring areas. Whereas, according to arguments presented above, 
crime rates could have spill-over effect across neighbouring areas. The crime rate of 
one area should, therefore, be affected by not only local relevant factors, but also such 
factors of neighbouring areas as well as neighbouring crime rates.  
 
Fabrikant (1979) has developed a theoretical model which aims to derive an optimal 
allocation of police manpower when taking into consideration the possible spill-over 
effect of crime rate between neighbouring communities. This paper was motivated by 
two opposite opinions.  On the one hand, Gylys (1974) suggests that “the residents of 
each political area have a positive marginal rate of substitution between another area’s 
consumption of police services and the goods that it consumes itself”. In other words, 
an increase in the police manpower in one area will not only reduce the local crime 
level, but also benefit the neighbouring areas. On the other hand, Press (1970) and 
Mehay (1977) oppose Gylys’s argument by providing empirical analyses suggesting 
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that the increased law enforcement personnel in one area motivate criminals to spill 
over into adjacent areas.  Having considered the opinions from both sides, Fabrikant 
(1979) tries to establish a theoretical model that is able to explicitly derive the effect 
of increased police manpower in one area on the crime rates of neighbouring areas.  
 
The theoretical framework is constructed by incorporating the criminal spill-over 
effect into the theory of rational choice as developed in Becker (1968) and Ehrlich 
(1973). Potential criminals are assumed to be economically rational and attempt to 
maximize their expected utilities subject to their constraints. Thus, by allowing for 
people to commit crimes in both “home” and neighbouring areas, potential criminals 
will evaluate the expected punishment (subject to the probabilities of detection, 
conviction and imprisonment) and potential gain of illegal activities from not only the 
“home” area, but also evaluate these factors for neighbouring areas. Additionally, they 
need to evaluate the cost of travel in committing crimes in neighbouring areas. 
Potential criminals will be motivated to commit crimes in neighbouring areas by the 
expected gain over what they can get in their own areas, net the travelling cost and 
relative risk of committing crimes in neighbouring areas.   The criminal spill-over 
equation between communities i and j can be derived by solving a system of supply-
of-offenses and demand-for-control equations and expressed by the following 
function.41 
                                                                                       (5.1) 
The dependent variable is the aggregated number of offenses committed in 
community j by offenders residing in community i. The independent 
variable represents the costs of committing crimes in community j when the 
                                                
41 For a complete derivation of the flows model see Fabrikant (Chs. 1, 2).  
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offenders are residing in community i. Such costs include the travel expenses and the 
time spent on travelling and carrying out the offenses.  As it is difficult to exactly 
measure , it can be approximated by the distance the offender has to travel. 
represents the ratio between the potential gain from committing crimes in 
community j and that from committing crimes in community i. This variable measures 
how attractive committing crimes in community j is when the offenders are living in 
community i. is defined as the ratio between and  which represent the 
clear-up rates in community j and i respectively. For someone living in community i, 
higher  ratio represents relatively greater risk of getting detected in community j 
which will be less attractive as a result. The last independent variable is 
represented by the ratio between the number of potential offenses in community j and 
that in community i and measuring the relative competition pressure between 
communities j and i. The rationale is that higher number of potential offenses in a 
given community implies more fierce competition between offenders and thus lower 
marginal gain for an additional offense. When the competition pressure is higher in 
community j relative to that in community i, committing offenses in community j 
becomes less attractive with other variables being equal.   
 
Given the definitions of the independent variables, their associations with aggregated 
offenses committed in community j by offenders from community i can be derived 
accordingly. 
, ,  and . 
The above relationships suggest that the number of offenses spilling over to a 
neighbouring area depends on the relative conditions of both areas. Specifically, the 
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spillovers of offenses into a neighbouring area is negatively correlated with the 
travelling expenditure (usually measured by travelling distance), positively correlated 
with the relative potential gain from neighbouring area, negatively correlated with the 
relative risk of detection of neighbouring area, and negatively correlated with the 
relative competition pressure (measured by the number of potential offenses) of 
neighbouring area.  
5.2.2 A Model of Crime with Neighbourhood Effects 
In this section, we construct a simple model of crime which allows the offenders to 
spillover into neighbouring areas. Unlike Fabrikant, we derive the criminal’s choice 
explicitly from optimising behaviour. For simplicity, this model is developed upon a 
two-region situation: region 1 (home) and region 2 (neighbouring). Assume that there 
are in total N individuals living in region 1 and only a fraction of will commit crime 
under certain circumstances. The rest of the population, , will never commit 
crime either because they are incorruptible or because they do not have the access to 
do so. People likely to commit crime, , will be generically labelled by i and 
individual i is allowed to choose between his home region (1) and the neighbouring 
region (2) to commit crime. Otherwise, he can choose to stay crime free. The trade-off 
between region 1 and 2 is that committing crime in the neighbouring region (2) will 
induce higher travel cost than remaining in home region (1). However, region 2 may 
have better opportunities for crime or lower probability of detection. For the moment, 
this model assumes that crime opportunities in each region are exogenously given as 
are the detection rates and punishment. The wage rate from legal sector is normalised 
to zero. Furthermore, the crime opportunities and wage rate are measured by how 
many units of a single consumption good they can buy.  The punishment and travel 
cost are also measured by the units of the consumption good. 
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Let and denote the crime opportunities of region 1 and region 2 respectively in a 
single period; and denote the probability of detection in region 1 and region 2 
respectively; denotes the punishment which is identical to region 1 and 2; and 
denotes the travel cost of committing crime in region 2. 
 
Given the notations, the expected return of criminal activity in region 1 is ; and 
the expected return of criminal activity in region 2 is . In order to obtain 
non-zero crime level in region 1, it must satisfy given that the wage rate of 
legal sector has been normalized to 0. In addition, in order to make sure some 
corruptible people from region 1 will commit crime in region 2, it must satisfy .  
 
Given the above assumptions, a corruptible individual will commit crime in his home 
region (region 1) if 
. 
Otherwise, he will travel to commit crime in the neighbouring region (region 2). Thus 
a critical value for the travel cost can be derived which is 
. 
When , the corruptible individual commits crime in the home region (region 1). 
Otherwise, he travels to the neighbouring region (region 2) to commit crime. If the 
travel cost t follows a distribution with cumulative distribution function F, then the 
crime rate in the neighbouring region (region 2) is given by . By substituting 
the critical value of t, the crime rate of region 2 as a result of criminals migrating from 
region 1 becomes 
                                              ,                                       (5.2) 
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which implies the crime in region 2 due to the criminal spillovers from region 1 is a 
function of parameters in both region 1 and region 2. In addition, the crime in region 1 
is simply 
                                            .                                      (5.3) 
 
As shown in the crime rate function of region 2, the crimes in regions 2 due to the 
criminal spillovers from region 1 is a function of relative criminal opportunities and 
detection rates between region 2 and region 1. Furthermore, this simplified theoretical 
model can be easily extended to incorporate punishment and labour market conditions 
varying across regions. For example, if the punishment  is allowed to vary across 
region 1 and region 2, it will have similar effect as the detection rate. When the 
punishment in region 2 becomes relatively milder comparing to that of region 1, 
potential criminals could spillover into region 2 as a rational response.  
 
Based on our model of crime spillovers, predictions can be derived for later empirical 
tests. As potential offenders prefer to commit crimes in opportunity-rich environment, 
regions with higher crime rates are likely to motivate offenders to spillover into 
neighbouring regions, because crime rate itself can reflect the criminal opportunities. 
When the criminal opportunities are exogenously given, higher crime rate in a region 
implies more fierce competition between potential offenders and some of them will 
spillover into neighbouring regions where the crime rates are lower. Thus, the crime 
rate of one region is expected to be positively correlated with the crime rates of its 
neighbouring regions. Such prediction will be tested in later part with spatial analysis 
models which allow the crime rate of one region depends on the crime rates of its 
neighbouring regions in addition to a set of independent variables.  
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Besides, the relative criminal opportunities between neighbouring regions can also be 
affected by a set of crime-influential factors. For example, higher income in one 
region will relatively increase the opportunities for crimes, especially property crimes, 
in this region to that of neighbouring regions. This can be appealing for offenders 
from neighbouring regions to spill over, hence, leave their own regions with fewer 
crimes. Likewise, higher detection rate in one region will relatively reduce criminal 
opportunities in this region to that of neighbouring regions. Thus, potential offenders 
may be more likely to spill into neighbouring regions due to better opportunities.  
Again, for the same reason, higher unemployment rate in one region could imply 
financial motivations for more offenders, hence creating fiercer competition between 
them. With more opportunities in neighbouring regions, some of them may relocate to 
neighbouring regions and contribute to crime rates of respective regions. These 
predictions can be tested through specifying an empirical model where the crime rate 
of one region is affected not only by its local explanatory factors such as detection 
rate, income level, unemployment rate and so on, but also by such factors from 
neighbouring regions. This model will also be tested with the data of England and 
Wales later.  
 
It is worth noting that the analysis can be extended to non economic crimes (such as 
sexual offenses) by putting the act of committing these crimes in the utility function. 
However, the incentives still matter in that one would like to commit crime where it is 
relatively cheaper. Hence, the relative abundance of opportunities still matter for 
deciding where to commit crime as does relative costs. 
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The above model however captures the deterrence effect. What about the 
incapacitation effect? It might be argued that the incapacitation effect leading to 
higher penalties in one region leads to lowered crime in both regions. The intuition is 
as follows. If certain people are more crime prone then increased vigilance leading to 
more such people being locked up, hence, reduces the number of such crime prone 
people in the population and holding everything else constant reduces crime rate. 
However, one has to note that as a result of lower crime in region 1 (because of the 
increased penalty) fewer people are being caught (even though the fraction of 
criminals in region 1 who are caught increases). Therefore, the net impact of the 
incapacitation effect depends on whether the actual number of imprisoned people 
increases or decreases because of the increased vigilance. If indeed the incapacitation 
effect leads to more criminal types being locked up and the strength of that is bigger 
than the incapacitation effect, we would see a long run decline in crime in both areas 
as a result of increased vigilance in one area. Thus, one way to reconcile the opposing 
viewpoints in may be that the Press (1970) and Mehay (1977) were considering the 
deterrence effect while Gylys (1974) believed that the incapacitation effect would be 
the dominant effect. 
5.2.3 Methodologies 
There are two basic econometric models analysing the spatial dependence between 
neighbouring areas: the Spatial Autoregressive model (SAR) and the Spatial Moving 
Average model (SMA). Anselin (1988) has provided comprehensive discussion on 
both models. Given that the structure of these spatial analysis models and their 
relevant estimation strategies are quite standard, this chapter will draw extensively 
from Anselin (1988) when introducing the basic models. The main objective of this 
chapter is to apply the spatial analysis models to identify the spill-over effect of crime.  
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A general form of spatial dependence model is shown in the following equation.  
                                                                                             (5.4) 
 In equation (5.4), y represents an nx1 vector of cross-sectional dependent variable 
and X is an nxk matrix of independent variables. and are known nxn spatial 
weight matrices that may take different forms, such as first-order contiguity relations, 
second-order contiguity relations, and functions of distances between areas etc. The 
first-order contiguity spatial weight matrix is the broadly used one which reflects the 
first-order contiguous relationships between different areas. Specifically, the elements 
of the first-order contiguity spatial weight matrix, , represents whether or not the 
two corresponding areas, i and j, are sharing common border (or point). While its 
main diagonal elements all have the value of zero, the off-main diagonal elements, , 
take either the value of one or zero. The value of one indicates that areas i and j are 
first-order neighbours (sharing common border) while the value of zero indicates 
otherwise. Practically, the spatial weight matrix is usually standardized so that for 
each i, . Such practice is for making sure that the spatial lag of, for example, 
dependent variable  equals to the average value of the dependent variables of 
neighbouring areas to a given area i. However, standardizing the spatial weight matrix 
is only optional and the non-standardised spatial weight matrix can also do the job.  
 
By imposing restrictions on the model given by equation (5.4), two broadly used 
spatial dependent models can be derived. They are going to be discussed separately 
along with their estimation issues. By setting , equation (5.4) can be simplified 
to the form: 
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                                                                                                  (5.5) 
This model is referred as the SAR model which is also called the spatial lag model for 
simplicity. is the spatial lag of dependent variable y which gives the spatially-
weighted average value of y in neighbouring areas. The inclusion of the spatial lag 
variable into the right hand-side of equation (5.5) can allow for spatial dependence 
existing in dependent variable y. In other words, the value of dependent variable y is 
determined not only by a set of explanatory variables, but also by the values of y from 
neighbouring areas. The coefficient of , , is measuring the strength of spatial 
dependence. In order words, measures how much in the variation of dependent 
variable y can be predicted by the average value of y in neighbourhood areas.  
 
However, the inclusion of the spatial lag of y will cause estimation problems for the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methodology, in that the estimated coefficients will be 
biased and inconsistent for both and . This is because the spatial lag term is 
equivalent to an endogenous variable due to its correlation with the error term , even 
if is i.i.d. This fact violates one of the classic assumptions that independent 
variables should be uncorrelated with the error term for OLS method to generate 
unbiased and consistent estimates. Anselin (1988) has suggested a maximum 
likelihood approach which is able to provide consistent estimates. 42Alternatively, the 
                                                
42 This maximum likelihood approach assumes the error term is normally distributed and the 
estimation can be carried out by a few steps: firstly, perform the OLS estimation for the 
model , which regresses the dependent variable on the independent variables from its own 
area; secondly, perform OLS estimation for the model , which regresses the spatial lag of 
dependent variables on the same set of independent variables; thirdly, compute residuals from each of 
the previous regressions by and ; fourthly, given and find that 
maximizes the concentrated likelihood function: ; 
And finally, given that maximizes , compute and . 
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spatial lag model can also be estimated by the Two-Stage Least Squares approach 
(TSLS) as suggested in Anselin (1988).43  The choices of instruments for follow 
the expectation of y conditional on X: 
                                        (5.6) 
As a result, the instruments will include a set of explanatory variables X as well as 
their spatial lags WX. In this way, Two-Stage Least Squares estimation will not be 
unbiased by the inclusion of . 
 
On the other hand, setting in equation (5.4) generates the SMA model, which is 
also known as the spatial error model, given by equation (5.7).  
                                                                                                           (5.7) 
The expression of SMA model shows that the error term is spatially autoregressive 
and the strength is measured by . This assumption could be reasonable if some 
influencing variables are unobservable or omitted from the estimation system and 
these omitted variables are spatially dependent. Since there is no endogenous variable, 
such as the spatial lag of y, included in equation (5.7) and the spatial dependence is 
only occurring to the error term, the OLS method will provide unbiased and consistent 
estimates for the desired coefficients . However, the OLS estimation will be 
inefficient due the violation to one of the classic assumptions. For the OLS method to 
generate BLUE estimates, one assumption is that the error terms should be 
independent from one another with zero mean and constant variances. Conversely, 
equation (5.7) has shown that the error terms are spatially correlated and their 
                                                
43 The Two-Stage Lease Squares estimation has also been discussed in Anselin (1980, 1990), Land and 
Deane (1992), Kelejian and Robinson (1993), Kelejian and Prucha (1998). 
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variance/covariance matrix has inconstant variances on the main diagonal and 
systematic nonzero elements off the main diagonal. This can be demonstrated by the 
expression of the variance/covariance matrix given .  
                                                                     (5.8) 
According to the features of the variance/covariance matrix as shown in equation 
(5.8), the estimated variances of the coefficients will tend to be smaller than they 
actually are and the hypothesis tests will exaggerate the significance of the 
coefficients.  
 
It is not difficult to show that if , the autoregressive coefficient of the error term, 
were known, the regression given by equation (5.7) can be estimated by OLS with 
spatially filtered variables and : 
                                               ,                                   (5.9) 
where and are the spatial lags of dependent and independent variables and the 
error term, , follows the classic assumptions of the OLS model. However, the  
coefficient is practically unknown and has to be estimated along with the regression 
coefficients . Therefore, Anselin (1988) and relevant literatures have designed 
alternative estimation approaches which are able to avoid the influence of spatially 
correlated error terms. One of such approaches is the maximum likelihood estimation. 
By assuming the error terms are normally distributed, a likelihood function can be 
derived which needs to be maximized.44 
                                                
44In the likelihood function given by equation , are the 
eigenvalues of the spatial weight matrix W. Since  and can both be expressed as functions of the 
autoregressive coefficient , the above likelihood function can be reduced to the concentrated form 
which only contains  as the unknown parameter as shown in equation (5.10). The estimated value of 
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The SAR model and the SMA model can also be combined with a set of spatial lags 
of independent variables. The extended SAR and SMA models can be expressed 
respectively by the following equations.  
                                                                                  (5.11) 
And 
                                                                                              (5.12) 
The extended SAR model given by equation (5.11) has similar features as the 
standard SAR model given by equation (5.5). One significant change, however, is that 
a set of spatial lags of independent variables can no longer be used as instruments in 
the Two-Stage Least Squares estimation since they have already entered the equation 
as independent variables. Consequently, a set of valid instruments is necessary for 
applying the Two-Stage Least Squares estimation. The maximum likelihood 
estimation, on the other hand, can still obtain consistent estimates for both the 
extended SAR and SMA models.  
 
5.2.4 Applications 
Due to rather limited numerber of literatures applying either the SAR or the SMA 
model on crime rate analysis, only two articles have been found for each case.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
 can simply be found by maximizing the concentrated likelihood function within the acceptable 
interval  and .        (5.10) 
In the concentrated likelihood function given by equation (5.10),  is the residual sum of squares 
from equation (5.9): regressing the spatially filtered dependent variable on the spatially filtered 
independent variable. 
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Martin (2002) applies the SAR model to analyse the pattern of residential burglary in 
the city of Detroit based on the social disorganization theory. The spatial unit of 
analysis is the census tract and three hundred and twenty of them have entered the 
sample as proxies for neighbourhoods in Detroit. The dependent variable is the 
average burglary rate over the years 1995-1997. The independent variables have been 
selected according to the social disorganization theory. Initially, 11 variables have 
been chosen to represent the factors that influence the degree of social disorganization. 
However, as some of the variables are highly correlated, a principle components 
factors analysis has been conducted looking for a small number of linear 
combinations of these variables. Four factors have been produced as a result, namely, 
concentrated poverty, social capital, age composition and residential stability.  
 
An OLS estimation has been performed as the first step. The results suggest that age 
composition is the strongest predictor for residential burglary rate, as it is positively 
correlated with the proportion of young people. The percentage population living in 
poverty also has positive effect on burglary rate as expected. The residential stability, 
though, has surprisingly obtained positive coefficient. The positive effect of 
residential stability does not necessarily mean that stable and familiar neighbourhood 
cannot improve the guardian effect that neighbours have for each other. It is possibly 
because more affluent and stable areas could be more appealing to potential criminals.  
 
For further investigation, the SAR model is applied to detect the potential spatial 
dependence in burglary rate. The results have shown that the overall fit of the model 
has been substantially improved by introducing the spatial lag of the dependent 
variable. It has demonstrated that approximately 60 percent of the variation in 
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burglary rate can now be explained comparing to 46 percent in the OLS estimation. 
Nevertheless, including the spatial lag of the dependent variable has reduced the 
magnitude of each coefficient for the independent variables. In addition, the 
residential stability becomes no insignificant as a result of including the spatial lag of 
burglary rate.  
 
The application of SMA model has been given an example in Andresen (2006). The 
aim of this article is to analyse the spatial dependence in crime rates of different types 
using the data of Vancouver in 1996. The dependent variables under investigation are 
the crime rates of automotive theft, break and entering and violent crime. After 
separately mapping the crime rates over space with Geographic Information System 
software (GIS), the distributions of different types of crime rates have all shown very 
uneven patterns which have been taken as the evidence for applying the SMA model 
on the analysis. The census tract has been chosen to be the spatial analysis unit and 
there are totally 87 of them in Vancouver.  
 
Initially, 13 independent variables have been selected to represent the factors 
influencing the degree of social disorganization such as ethnic heterogeneity, 
economic status, population composition and so on. Due to the potentially high 
correlation between these independent variables, Andresen has applied the general-to-
specific method to reduce the influence of such correlation: for each type of crime rate, 
the model begins with including all independent variables; then the variable with the 
most insignificant coefficient will be dropped and the equation will be re-estimated. 
The same process will be repeated until all the remaining variables have significant 
coefficients.  
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The main findings of this paper can be summarized by the following points. Firstly, 
the variations in all three types of crime have been largely explained by the 
independent variables:  53, 65 and 78 percent respectively for automotive theft, break 
and entering and violent crime. Secondly, unemployment rate, young people 
percentage and the standard deviation of average family income have all exhibited 
positive correlations with the three crime rates in question. In particular, the 
unemployment rate has the strongest effect on these three crime rates. Thirdly, the 
proportion of single-parent households has positive impact on break and entering but 
shows no significant impact on automotive theft and violent crime. Finally, the ethnic 
heterogeneity shows significant and negative relationship with automotive theft and 
violent crime but insignificant correlation with break and entering. The negative effect 
of ethnic heterogeneity is opposite to the expectation that increasing diversity in 
ethnic composition will increase crime rate since it is supposed to measure the 
communal stability. One possible explanation could be the definition of this variable: 
ethnic heterogeneity has been defined as the percentage of recent (1981-1996) 
immigrants within the total census tract population. This is a different way of defining 
ethnic composition contrary to traditionally measurement on the proportions of 
different ethnic groups. Since the immigrants in Vancouver mainly containing 
economic-class, entrepreneurial-class and investor class, the proportion of them is not 
expected to directly affect crime rates such as automotive theft. 
 
Martin (2002) and Andresen (2006) both try to explain the observed uneven and non-
random distribution of crime rates with the spatial dependence model, either the SAR 
or the SMA. The unmentioned assumption behind both papers is that the non-random 
distribution of crime rates is caused by the spatial dependent effect. A major 
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difference between these papers is that Martin (2002) applies the SAR model as it 
assumes the spatial dependence exists in the dependent variable. In other words, the 
crime rate in one region is affected not only by local explanatory variables, but also 
by the crime rates of neighbouring regions. This assumption is true when crimes can 
actually spill over into neighbouring regions due to the change in relative conditions 
of neighbouring regions. On the other hand, Andresen (2006) attributes the non-
random distribution of crime to the feature of the error term. It assumes that the error 
terms are spatially dependent rather than normally distributed.  Such assumption is 
reasonable when there are independent variables omitted from the equation and the 
omitted variables are spatially dependent.  
 
Cahill and Mulligan (2007) and Malczewski and Poetz (2005) have also observed the 
non-random distribution of crime rates. Both papers attempt to explain this pattern 
with spatial heterogeneity. With visualization mapping equipment, it is found that the 
dependent variables in both papers, violent crime in Portland and residential burglary 
in London (Ontario) respectively, are highly concentrated at city centre areas. This 
clustering pattern reduces with the distance from city centre. Instead of assuming 
crime rates are spatially dependent, the two papers employ models allowing the 
coefficients of independent variables to vary over space. In other words, the crime 
rates of different regions are allowed to response differently to their local predictors. 
In order to estimate the coefficients varying across regions, both papers have 
employed the Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) and compared the results 
to those generated by the conventional OLS regression. One of the most important 
propositions for this is that the GWR regression has substantially improved the 
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explanatory power of the independent variables and some of the coefficients do 
display significant variations across neighbourhoods.  
5.2.5 Weakness of Existing Empirical Literature  
One similarity between the cited literatures and this chapter is that they have all 
noticed the uneven but non-random distribution of crime rates over space. Moreover, 
they are all attempting to explain such pattern with economic theories. There are, 
nonetheless, some advantages of this chapter comparing to other empirical literatures 
discussed above, especially Martin (2002) and Andresen (2006). Firstly, this chapter 
breaks down the overall crime rate into six categories according to the definitions 
given by the Home Office, as it acknowledges that different types of crimes have 
different features and thus probably respond differently to the same influencing 
factors. In contrast, the introduced empirical papers select only certain types of crime 
and some even select aggregated crime. None of them have provided comprehensive 
and yet systematic analysis for each individual type of crime. Secondly, this chapter 
has a unique data structure that is spatial-temporal. The data covers 43 police force 
areas in England and Wales over the period 1998-2001. Not only does such data 
structure increase the sample size and thus the degree of freedom for the analysis, it 
also makes it possible to introduce both year-specific and area-specific dummy 
variables.  By doing so, the risk of omitting relevant but unobservable variables can 
be largely reduced. Thirdly, this paper applies both the SAR and the SMA models to 
detect spatial dependence, differing to both Martin (2002) and Andresen (2006), in 
which only one model is adopted. Additionally, this chapter also examines an 
extended model incorporating both independent variables and their spatial lags. The 
aim is that, by testing and comparing models as widely as possible, one is able to 
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make an informed judgment on which model is the “best” to reflect the crime 
generating process.  
 
5.3 DATA DESCRIPTION  
 
Appendix IV contains a map showing the distribution of overall crime rate across 
police force areas in England and Wales for the year 2000/2001. As seen in the map, 
the highest crime rate occurs to the metropolitan areas such as Greater London, West 
Midlands, Great Manchester, and West Yorkshire. The second highest crime rate 
concentrates in the centre of England and Wales, created by regions of East Midlands 
and West Midlands.  In contrast, most of coastal areas record a lower crime rate.  
 
The dependent variables in this chapter are the six types of crime rates. The 
independent variables are chosen according to the classic theories of crime analysis 
developed in Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973). These influential factors include 
crime control, social-economic as well as demographic factors which can be 
represented by a set of variables which will be introduced in details. The data covers 
43 police force areas in England and Wales for the time period 1998-2001. 
5.3.1 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables under analysis are six types of crime rates defined by the 
Home Office, namely, violence against the person, sexual offences, robbery, burglary, 
theft and handling, and fraud and forgery. The first three categories have been defined 
as violent crimes given that they would threaten the physical well-beings of victims. 
The last three categories are defined as property crimes, since they are mainly 
targeting at personal properties, thus threaten victims’ economic well-beings of. 
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Although robbery mainly aims at properties, it usually involves in physical attacks, 
hence, it has been treated as violent crime. 
 
As mentioned previously, the crime rates under analysis are aggregated by police 
force areas and there are in total 43 of them across England and Wales. The time 
period being covered in this study is between 1998 and 2001. Such data structure is a 
unique feature of this thesis. As it is a spatial-temporal panel, it is possible to include 
both region-specific and year-specific fixed effects to account for the variables which 
might otherwise be correlated with the explanatory variables. This procedure can 
reduce the risk of fixed effects being included in the error term, thus avoid the 
estimation bias caused by simultaneous problem.  
 
This spatial-temporal data structure, however, requires special arrangement when 
constructing the spatial weight matrix. As this chapter employs the first-order 
contiguity matrix, areas with common borders (or common point) will be considered 
as first-order contiguous areas and assigned with the value of 1 for the corresponding 
elements in the spatial weight matrix. Whereas, neighbourhoods with no common 
border (or common point) will be given the value of 0 in the spatial weight matrix. 
For England and Wales, the contiguous relationships between police force areas can 
be found in the map in Appendix IV and a 43*43 dimension first-order contiguity 
matrix can be constructed accordingly. However, due to the spatial-temporal data 
structure of this paper, the spatial weight matrix should have a dimension of 172*172 
given that there are 43 police force areas over 4 years (43*4=172). In the spatial 
weight matrix, the police force areas are firstly arranged in alphabetical order. The 
organized police force areas are then stacked year by year from 1998 to 2001. Such 
  183 
organization method applies to both horizontal and vertical dimension of the spatial 
weight matrix. Next, the 43*43 dimension first-order contiguity matrix, which reflects 
the contiguous relationship between police force areas, is only applied to the sub-
matrices on the main diagonal of the 172*172 dimension spatial weight matrix. The 
off-main diagonal sub-matrices have all zero values.  
 
The detailed crime rates by police force areas were documented in Criminal 
Statistics45 before and including the year 2000. It then has been transferred to Crime 
in England and Wales46 after 2000. It is worth noticing that, up to and including year 
2000 the crime rates were measured by the numbers of offenses recorded by police 
per 100,000 population. Year 2001 and onwards, the crime rates have been measured 
by the numbers of offenses per 1000 population. This change has reduced the 
accuracy in crime rates which has been discussed in last section. The statistic 
indicators on dependent variables are given in the following table. The number of 
observations in the last row gives idea on whether there is any missing value in the 
dataset. Since the data covers 43 police force areas over the period 1998-2001, there 
should be 172 observations (43 areas multiplied by 4 years) for each type of crime 
rate if no value is missing.  
 
 
Table 5-1 
Statistics for crime rates 
 Violent crimes 
 Overall crime 
Violence 
against person Sexual offences Robbery 
Mean 11,854 1,120 73 110 
Median 8,827 860 63 64 
Maximum 158,500 9,300 544 757 
Minimum 4,760 380 0 0 
Std. Dev. 18,605 1,211 59 143 
Observations 172 172 172 172 
 Property crimes 
                                                
45 The serial numbers of Criminal Statistics are Cm4649, Cm5001 and Cm5312. 
46 Crime in England and Wales, 2001/02. 
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  Burglary 
Theft and 
handling 
Fraud and 
forgery 
Mean  1,737 5,580 892 
Median  1,486 3,649 416 
Maximum  9,123 101,400 23,100 
Minimum  400 1,400 200 
Std. Dev.  1,134 11,774 2,733 
Observations   172 172 172 
 
5.3.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables include the detection rate, unemployment rate, real average 
weekly earnings and young people proportion. According to Becker (1968) and 
Ehrlich (1973), either higher probability of getting punished or more severe of 
punishment would reduce the incentive to commit crimes.  This chapter however, 
only includes the detection rate as the law enforcement instrument because the data of 
prison population is only national and exhibits no variation across police force areas.  
 
The social-economic statuses are represented by the unemployment rate and real 
average weekly earnings. As unemployment rate and average earnings could 
respectively represent the risk and potential income from legal labour market, Ehrlich 
(1973) has demonstrated their effects on crime rates: higher unemployment rate 
would have ambiguous effect on crime rate while higher average earnings could 
discourage criminal involvement.  
 
The demographic factor is represented by young people proportion which refers to the 
percentage of 15 to 24 years old out of the total population. The idea is that young 
people, especially those less educated or unemployed, have been commonly regarded 
as more likely to commit crimes than other age groups. Since young people usually 
have relatively lower income by average than other age groups, their opportunity cost 
is lower. In other words, there is a bigger chance for them that the expected return 
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from criminal activities would exceed how much they can get from the legal labour 
market. For the same reason, those less educated or unemployed young people are 
even more likely to commit crimes due to their lower opportunity cost.  
 
Another reason to suspect that crime rate is affected by young people proportion is 
that the punishment for youth criminals is usually more lenient than that for adults. 
Since a stigma of criminal record is expected to greatly reduce the probability of 
employment and therefore reduce the expected payoffs from the legal labour market. 
As a result, this may foster repeated offenders among young people. Furthermore, for 
those under the age of 18, their criminal records will be sealed by the age of 18 and 
therefore will not affect their labour market outcomes. For this reason, it is arguable 
that the under 18s have even less to lose when committing crimes. 
5.3.2.1 Detection Rate 
The detection rate is measured by the proportion of recorded offences that have been 
cleared up. More specifically, the cleared up offences are referring to those cases 
when the offenders have been identified and given caution, fined or charged by the 
police. The data is disaggregated by police force areas and covers the period 1998 to 
2001. The data source is also the annual command paper Criminal Statistics with 
serial numbers provided before. The following table gives the statistical summary as 
well as the information about any missing value. 
 
Table 5-2 
Statistics for detection rates 
 Violent crimes 
  Overall crimes 
Violence against 
person Sexual offences Robbery 
Mean 29 76 65 31 
Median 27 78 64 29 
Maximum 69 97 103 93 
Minimum 14 26 31 10 
Std. Dev. 9 13 17 13 
Observations 172 172 172 172 
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 Property crimes 
    Burglary 
Theft and 
Handling 
Fraud and 
forgery 
     
Mean  17 22 44 
Median  14 21 44 
Maximum  56 54 86 
Minimum  7 9 9 
Std. Dev.  8 7 16 
Observations   172 172 172 
 
5.3.2.2 Unemployment Rate 
The unemployment rate is constructed by dividing the number of unemployment 
benefit claimants by the number of workforce. The original data is on local authority 
level and has been aggregated according to police force areas. The data used here is 
from the website of nomis—the official labour market statistics.47  
5.3.2.3 Real Average Weekly Earnings 
This variable is measured by the deflated average weekly earnings for all industries 
and the original data is on local authority level. The same way has been applied to 
aggregate the original data into the frame of police force areas. The data is 
documented in Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, collected from the website of 
national statistics.48  
5.3.2.4 Young People Proportion 
This variable is constructed by dividing the number of population between 15 to 24 
years old by the population of all age groups. The original data is also estimated on 
local authority level and has been manually aggregated into police force areas 
according to geographic boundaries. The data source is also from the website of 
National Statistics.  
 
                                                
47 https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/Default.asp 
48 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/hub/index.html  
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The following table summarizes the key statistical indicators for unemployment rate, 
real average weekly earnings and young people proportion. 
Table 5-3 
Statistics for other independent variables 
 Unemployment 
Real average weekly 
earnings Young People 
Mean 3.04 183.14 11.68 
Median 2.77 196.56 11.53 
Maximum 7.11 509.81 13.44 
Minimum 0.61 91.93 9.46 
Std. Dev. 1.27 70.77 0.92 
Observations 172 172 172 
 
5.4 DETECTING SPATIAL DEPENDENCE 
 
There are tests designed to detect the spatial distribution pattern of a given variable. 
Applying such tests can explicitly demonstrate whether the under testing variable is 
randomly distributed rather than displaying clustering pattern in the observations over 
space. The use of such tests can be very flexible. Before applying regression analysis, 
the dependent and independent variables can be tested to suggest whether spatial 
dependence presents and therefore spatial regression models should be considered. 
The residuals from different regressions can also be tested. For the OLS regressions, 
spatial dependence in the residuals would suggest that there could be omitted or 
unobservable variables remained which are spatially dependent.  Hence, the 
specification of estimation should be modified with caution. Similarly, such tests can 
also be applied on the residuals generated by spatial regression models such as the 
SAR and the SMA. Such performance can check whether the spatial dependence in 
either the dependent variable or the error term has been successfully removed by the 
spatial regression model.  
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Although there are quite a few tests detecting spatial dependence, Moran’s I and 
Geary’s c are among the best known ones and are not difficult to compute. The 
Moran’s I statistic can be computed by the following equation: 
                               ,                  (5.13) 
where N is the number of observations; is the element in the spatial weight matrix 
corresponding to the observation pair i and j; and  are the observations for 
location i and j with mean ; is a constant and takes the form . For a 
row-standardized spatial weight matrix, equals N since  is the sum of all weights 
and each row of the row-standardized spatial weight matrix sums to 1. In this case, the 
I statistic can be reduced to the following form: 
                                     .                     (5.14) 
 
On the other hand, the Geary’s c statistic can be computed as following: 
                               ,                    (5.15) 
with the same notation as Moran’s I statistic.  
 
The statistical inference may be made according to a standardized z-value rather than 
the computed I or c statistics. The z-value may be constructed by subtracting the 
theoretical mean from the computed I or c statistic and dividing the result by the 
theoretical standard deviation. One thing worth noting is that the theoretical mean and 
standard deviation would both vary depending on the specific assumption made for 
the observation distribution. A common approach is to assume that the variable under 
testing follows a normal distribution. The z-value, in this case, would follow a 
standard normal distribution using the proper theoretical mean and standard deviation. 
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The statistical inference can be made by simply compare the computed z-value with 
the critical values of standard normal distribution. Another commonly used approach 
is to assume that each observation is equally likely to occur at all locations. In other 
words, the observations and their spatial arrangement are assumed to be irrelevant. 
This is referred as the randomization assumption. The z-value of this case also follows 
a standard normal distribution and the statistical inference can be made the same way 
as the assumption of normal distribution. The last approach is similar to the 
randomization assumption. Each observation is regarded to be equally likely to occurr 
at any location. The difference is that the mean and standard deviation of I or c 
statistic are generated empirically. Practically, this is carried out by randomly 
reshuffling the observations over all locations and re-computing the I or c statistic for 
each new sample. This is referred as the permutation approach and the mean and 
standard deviation for I or c statistic are then simply the computed moments.  
 
Before conducting any regression analysis, all variables in this chapter, both 
dependent and independent, have been tested by both Moran’s I and Geary’s c 
techniques in order to get an idea about the distribution of observations over space. 
The 172*172 dimension spatial weight matrix has been row standardized before being 
applied in the tests and the results are summarised in the following tables.  
 
 
Table 5-4 
Dependent variables: crime rates 
Moran’s I Test Geary C Test Variables 
Normal Randomization Permutation Normal Randomization Permutation 
Overall 0.04 (0.05) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.55*** 
(0.06) 
0.55*** 
(0.11) 
0.55*** 
(0.12) 
Violence 
against the 
person 
0.16*** 
(0.05) 
0.16*** 
(0.05) 
0.16*** 
(0.03) 
0.48*** 
(0.06) 
0.48*** 
(0.10) 
0.48*** 
(0.11) 
Sexual 
offences 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.11** 
(0.04) 
0.58*** 
(0.06) 
0.58*** 
(0.11) 
0.58*** 
(0.11) 
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Robbery 0.35*** (0.05) 
0.35*** 
(0.05) 
0.35*** 
(0.06) 
0.57*** 
(0.06) 
0.57*** 
(0.07) 
0.57*** 
(0.08) 
Burglary 0.11** (0.05) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.59*** 
(0.06) 
0.59*** 
(0.09) 
0.59*** 
(0.09) 
Theft and 
handling 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.57*** 
(0.06) 
0.57*** 
(0.11) 
0.57*** 
(0.12) 
Fraud of 
forgery 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.05* 
(0.02) 
0.55*** 
(0.06) 
0.55*** 
(0.12) 
0.55*** 
(0.13) 
 
The reported values in the table are the I or c statistic with the corresponding standard 
deviation in the brackets. In general, the results have shown evidences that the spatial 
dependence exists in each type of crime and it would be necessary to apply spatial 
regression models. In particular, the crime rates of four types, namely, violence 
against the person, sexual offences, robbery and burglary, have generated constantly 
significant statistics by rejecting all three assumptions in both Moran’s I and Geary’s 
c tests. For the rest of three types, theft and handling and fraud and forgery, the 
overall test statistics cannot reject the assumptions of normal and random distribution 
in Moran’s I test. However, for the permutation assumption and the whole Geary’s c 
tests, the computed statistics have been able to reject the null hypothesis of no spatial 
dependence existing. According to the test results, it would be reasonable to pay 
attention to the spatial dependent feature displayed by the dependent variables and 
such feature deserves explicit control. 
 
The same tests have also been applied on the independent variables.  
Table 5-5 
Independent variables: detection rates 
Moran’s I Test Geary C Test Variables 
Normal Randomization Permutation Normal Randomization Permutation 
Overall 0.34*** (0.05) 
0.34*** 
(0.05) 
0.34*** 
(0.05) 
0.71*** 
(0.06) 
0.71*** 
(0.07) 
0.71*** 
(0.07) 
Violence 
against the 
person 
0.28*** 
(0.05) 
0.28*** 
(0.05) 
0.28*** 
(0.05) 
0.84*** 
(0.06) 
0.84*** 
(0.06) 
0.84*** 
(0.06) 
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Sexual 
offences 
0.41*** 
(0.05) 
0.41*** 
(0.05) 
0.41*** 
(0.05) 
0.61*** 
(0.06) 
0.61*** 
(0.05) 
0.61*** 
(0.05) 
Robbery 0.29*** (0.05) 
0.29*** 
(0.05) 
0.29*** 
(0.05) 
0.74*** 
(0.06) 
0.74*** 
(0.07) 
0.74*** 
(0.07) 
Burglary 0.48*** (0.05) 
0.48*** 
(0.05) 
0.48*** 
(0.06) 
0.51*** 
(0.06) 
0.51*** 
(0.07) 
0.51*** 
(0.07) 
Theft and 
handling 
0.37*** 
(0.05) 
0.37*** 
(0.05) 
0.37*** 
(0.05) 
0.69*** 
(0.06) 
0.69*** 
(0.07) 
0.69*** 
(0.07) 
Fraud of 
forgery 
0.34*** 
(0.05) 
0.34*** 
(0.05) 
0.34*** 
(0.05) 
0.73*** 
(0.06) 
0.73*** 
(0.06) 
0.73*** 
(0.06) 
 
Table 5-5 shows that each type of detection rate is spatially dependent according to 
the overall highly significant test statistics. Similar conclusion can be made for the 
rest three independent variables: unemployment rate, real average weekly earnings 
and young people proportion. The results are given in table 5-6.  
Table 5-6 
Other independent variables 
Moran’s I Test Geary C Test Variables 
Normal Randomization Permutation Normal Randomization Permutation 
Unemploy-
ment rate 
0.27** 
(0.05) 
0.27*** 
(0.05) 
0.27*** 
(0.05) 
0.64*** 
(0.06) 
0.64*** 
(0.06) 
0.64*** 
(0.06) 
Real 
earnings 
0.80** 
(0.05) 
0.80*** 
(0.05) 
0.80*** 
(0.05) 
0.11*** 
(0.06) 
0.11*** 
(0.06) 
0.11*** 
(0.07) 
Young 
people 
-0.12** 
(0.05) 
-0.12** 
(0.05) 
-0.12*** 
(0.05) 
1.11* 
(0.06) 
1.11** 
(0.05) 
1.11** 
(0.05) 
 
Aside from detecting spatial dependence, the test statistics can also tell whether the 
dependence is positive or negative. Given the obtained test results, all variables, both 
dependent and independent, have exhibited positive dependence over space except the 
young people proportion. Actually, the young people proportion has shown significant 
negative spatial dependence between neighbouring locations. Such inferences can be 
made by comparing the computed I or c statistic to their theoretical mean. For 
Moran’s I test, the I statistic would indicate positive spatial dependence if it is higher 
than the theoretical mean; an I statistic lower than the theoretical mean would indicate 
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otherwise. For Geary’s c test, the case is opposite. The c statistic higher than 
theoretical mean indicates negative dependence while lower than theoretical mean 
indicates otherwise.  
 
5.5 EMPIRICAL MODELS AND RESULTS 
 
The basic empirical model under analysis is given by the following equation: 
 
               (5.16) 
 
The analysis of each type of crime will start with a conventional OLS estimation 
following the equation (5.15). One year lagged detection rate enters the equation 
instead of the contemporary detection rate to avoid the simultaneous problem. Both 
year-specific and area-specific dummies are included to control for the fixed effects 
which otherwise could be correlated with the independent variables. The inclusion of 
these dummy variables is an important advance on existing research, as most of which 
only employ cross sectional data and thus cannot control for the unobservable fixed 
effects. The other independent variables have been explained in the data description 
section.  
 
Since heteroscedasticity often exists in cross sectional data (cross sectional-temporal 
data in this case), robust OLS estimations will be carried out if heteroscedasticity has 
been detected. The robust OLS estimations will not affect the magnitudes of 
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coefficients: they will only correct the standard deviations of the coefficients and 
therefore generate the correct significant inferences.  
 
In order to detect the spatial spillovers, the SAR and the SMA models will then be 
applied and the estimated results will be reported along with the results of standard 
and robust OLS estimations. Such arrangement will make it easy to observe how the 
estimated coefficients vary, in the sense of magnitudes and significance, across 
different models. In addition, it will also be easy to pick up the “best model” for the 
type of crime being analysed by comparing the goodness-of-fit of different models. 
Both SAR and SMA models will be estimated with the Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
method following the approaches suggested in Anselin (1988).  
 
It is worth stressing is that there is no ready-to-use robust ML estimation in the 
software package to tackle heteroskedasticity in either SAR or SMA model. Instead, 
one feasible solution is to implement the Groupwise Heteroskedasticity (GHET) 
technique to reduce the influence of heteroskedastic variances of the error terms. 
However, applying such technique requires some knowledge about the possible cause 
of the heteroskedastic error terms. For example, the size, population or population 
density of different areas could all be the potential causes of heteroskedasticity and 
the GHET technique is based on such knowledge. Before applying the GHET 
technique, a categorial variable must be specified according to the possible reason of 
heteroskedasticity. This categorial variable only contains integer values and will 
divide the observations into different groups.  If the categorial variable indeed reflects 
heterogeneous characteristics between groups, the variances of the error terms should 
be constant within groups and varying across groups. Therefore, by specifying a 
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categorial variable and applying the GHET technique, the influence of 
heteroskedasticity will be reduced if the estimated groupwise variances are indeed 
unequal according to a Log Likelihood Ratio test (LR). A detailed application of 
GHET technique and categorial variable can be found in latter analysis.  
 
As for further investigation, the crime rate being analysed will also be estimated by an 
extended equation that includes the spatial lags of independent variables. The 
specification is given by equation (5.17). 
        
(5.17) 
In this extended model, the crime rate of each area is assumed to be predicted not only 
by the independent variables of its own area, but also by the independent variables of 
its neighbouring areas. By applying the spatial weight matrix, the average values of 
the independent variables from neighbouring areas enter the equation (5.17) to 
represent their spill-over effects on the crime rate being analysed. As usual, both year 
and area dummies are included to count for the year-specific and area-specific fixed 
effects. The model specified by equation (5.17) will firstly be estimated by the 
standard OLS estimation. If heteroskedasticity is detected, two robust OLS 
estimations will be applied to correct the standard deviations of the coefficients and 
thus the significant inferences.  
 
All variables will be taken logarithm before estimations except for sexual offences 
and robbery. As there are 0s in the crime rates, these two types of crime and their 
controlling variables will be estimated on their levels. The spatial weight matrix 
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applied in both SAR and SMA models will be the row-standardized 172*172 
dimension spatial weight matrix.  
5.5.1 Burglary  
Table 5-7 gives the estimation results for burglary following equation (5.15). Both 
year and area dummies are included in all the estimations. However, given there are in 
total 3 year dummies and 42 area dummies, their estimated coefficients are not 
reported in the table to save space.  
 
Table 5-7 
Burglary 
Robust OLS  
Variables OLS White Jacknife 
Spatial Error Spatial Lag 
Constant 2.19 (1.91) 
2.19 
(1.91) 
2.19 
(2.36) 
1.85 
(1.57) 
0.13 
(1.67) 
Detection(t-1) -0.06* (0.03) 
-0.06* 
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.06** 
(0.02) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
Young People 0.40 (0.32) 
0.40 
(0.33) 
0.40 
(0.42) 
0.48* 
(0.26) 
0.41 
(0.26) 
Unemployment 0.14 (0.10) 
0.14 
(0.13) 
0.14 
(0.16) 
0.11 
(0.10) 
0.12 
(0.09) 
Real Earnings 0.95*** (0.36) 
0.95** 
(0.40) 
0.95** 
(0.48) 
0.99*** 
(0.30) 
0.96*** 
(0.29) 
Lambda - - - 0.32*** (0.0006) - 
Spatial Lag - - - - 0.29*** (0.09) 
Log Likelihood 256.79 256.79 256.79 261.35 260.50 
Normality-Prob 0.62 0.62 0.62 - - 
Heteroskedasticity 
BP-Prob 0.0007 - - 0.00004 0.0001 
Heteroskedasticity 
Spatial BP-Prob - - - 0.00004 0.0001 
Spatial Lag 
Dependence-Prob 0.34 - - 0.98 0.006 
Spatial Error 
Dependence-Prob 0.13 - - 0.003 0.03 
Observations 172 172 172 172 172 
*** represents significant at 1% level; ** represents 5% level; * represents 10% level. In OLS estimation, both 
spatial lag and spatial error dependences are diagnosed by the robust Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test which does not 
require the normality of the error terms. In SMA model, the spatial lag dependence is based on the LM test and the 
spatial error dependence is based on the LR test. In the SAR model, the spatial lag dependence is based on the LR 
test and the spatial error dependence is based on the LM test. Lambda in the first part of the table represents the 
spatial dependence coefficient of the error term in the spatial error model. Spatial lag in the first part of the table 
represents the included spatial lag of dependent variable in the spatial lag model. 
 
 
As seen in the lower part of table 5-7, there are two tests for heteroskedasticity. The 
first one is either the Lagrange Multiplier test developed by Breusch and Pagan (the 
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BP test) or its studentized version suggested by Koenker and Bassett (the KB test). 
Which one to apply depends on the outcome of normality test. If the error terms are 
non-normal (for a significant level of 1%), the BP test will automatically be dropped 
and the KB test will be used instead. The second test for heteroskedasticity is only 
applied in spatial error and spatial lag models. As the BP test ignores the spatial 
dependence in the model, the second test is the spatially adjusted BP statistic which is 
based on the same principle. As shown in the table, they usually generate very similar 
results.  
 
The reported statistics for the heteroskedasticity tests represent the statistical 
probabilities with the null hypothesis being the absence of heteroskedasticity. Given 
the results of such tests, heteroskedasticity constantly exists in the standard OLS, 
spatial error and spatial lag models. As heteroskedasticity usually underestimates the 
standard deviations of the coefficients and thus exaggerates their significances, the 
estimation results cannot be interpreted without controlling for heteroskedasticity. 
Two robust OLS estimations are therefore applied to correct the influence of 
heteroskedasticity in the standard OLS estimation and their results are also reported in 
table 5-7.  
 
For both spatial error and spatial lag models, GHET technique is applied to generate 
unbiased inferences. As a categorial variable must be specified in the GHET 
technique, this paper has chosen the northern dummy to do the job. This is the result 
of a number of experiments. Different categorial variables, such as metropolitan 
dummy, population density dummy with different criteria and population size dummy 
with different criteria, have been applied separately hoping to capture the 
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heteroskedasticity. None of those categorial variables, however, have generated 
significantly different groupwise variances. In contrast, the northern dummy has 
succeeded. The idea is that, by looking at the data, the northern areas on average have 
much higher unemployment rates and lower income comparing to the middle and 
southern areas. The crime rates, on the other hand, also appear to be higher in 
northern areas on average. Such distinctions between northern areas and the rest of 
England and Wales have inspired the selection of the categorial variable, which has 
indeed generated significantly unequal groupwise variances in most cases.  
 
Table 5-8 gives the estimations of both spatial error and spatial lag models after 
correction of heteroskedasticity with the GHET technique. The corrected results are 
presented along with the original results in order to show how the coefficients vary 
before and after controlling for heteroskedasticity. All the estimations include the year 
and area dummies. Their coefficients are not reported to save space.   
Table 5-8 
Burglary 
 
Variables Spatial Error 
Spatial Error 
GHET Spatial Lag 
Spatial Lag 
GHET 
Constant 1.85 (1.57) 
1.87 
(1.55) 
0.13 
(1.67) 
0.16 
(1.66) 
Detection(t-1) -0.06** (0.02) 
-0.06** 
(0.02) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
Young People 0.48* (0.26) 
0.49* 
(0.26) 
0.41 
(0.26) 
0.43* 
(0.26) 
Unemployment 0.11 (0.10) 
0.10 
(0.10) 
0.12 
(0.09) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
Real Earnings 0.99*** (0.30) 
0.98*** 
(0.29) 
0.96*** 
(0.29) 
0.94*** 
(0.29) 
Lambda 0.32*** (0.0006) 
0.36*** 
(0.09) - - 
Spatial Lag - - 0.29*** (0.09) 
0.31*** 
(0.10) 
Log Likelihood 261.35 265.41 260.50 261.96 
Heteroskedasticity 
BP-Prob 0.00004 - 0.0001 - 
Heteroskedasticity 
Spatial BP-Prob 0.00004 - 0.0001 - 
Spatial Lag 
Dependence-Prob 0.98 - 0.006 - 
Spatial Error 
Dependence-Prob 0.003 - 0.03 - 
Groupwise  - 0.02 - 0.09 
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Heteroskedasticity-Prob 
Observations 172 172 172 172 
*** represents significant at 1% level; ** represents 5% level; * represents 10% level. In SEM model, the spatial 
lag dependence is based on the LM test and the spatial error dependence is based on the LR test. In the SAR model, 
the spatial lag dependence is based on the LR test and the spatial error dependence is based on the LM test. 
Lambda in the first part of the table represents the spatial dependence coefficient of the error term in the spatial 
error model. Spatial lag in the first part of the table represents the included spatial lag of dependent variable in the 
spatial lag model. The groupwise heteroskedasticity is diagnosed by LR test with the null hypothesis being equal 
groupwise variances.  
 
By and large, the coefficients are quite robust over specifications given table 5-7 and 
5-8. The lagged detection rate has negative and significant coefficient in all 
estimations except only the second robust OLS estimation. Such result is consistent 
with the expectation that the lagged detection rate could negatively affect crime rate 
through two channels: the potential criminals could learn that the detection rate had 
gone up from past experience, through friends or media reports. Realising such 
situation could deter the potential offenders to commit crimes by increasing their 
expected punishment from criminal activities. The second channel is through 
incapacitation. With more criminals being detected and put in jail, it is impossible for 
them to commit crimes in current time period.  
 
Real earnings has also exhibited stable coefficient across estimations: positive and 
highly significant in all cases. This is not surprising since higher incomes can provide 
more opportunities for property crimes. For burglary, the main targets are those 
portable and valuable goods such as laptops, mobile phones and jewelleries etc from 
private dwellings. With higher incomes, people usually consume more on such goods 
and therefore provide more opportunities for burglary.  
 
The coefficient of unemployment rate is also very robust across estimations. It shows 
positive but insignificant in all cases. Nonetheless, this result does not necessarily 
mean that unemployment rate has no significant correlation with burglary rate, as the 
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reason of which could be complicated. The unemployment rate can have positive 
effect on crime rate, especially property crimes, since higher unemployment rate 
would reduce the expected return from legal labour market. The drop in the 
opportunity cost of committing crimes could be an incentive for some people to get 
involved in criminal activities. Given the nature of burglary, the crime takes place 
mostly in private dwellings. When unemployment rate is higher, more people would 
be staying at or near home in turn presenting fewer opportunities to potential 
criminals.  Consequently, the unemployment rate could pick up both motivation and 
deterrence effects on burglary and give insignificant coefficient.  
 
The coefficient of young people proportion is positive but insignificant in the OLS 
estimations. When spatial analysis models have been applied, young people 
proportion becomes positive and significant in most cases. The constantly positive but 
less significant effect of young people proportion could be explained by a 
combination of different reasons. On the one hand, more young people could increase 
the criminal supply given their lower opportunity cost to commit crimes than any 
other age groups. On the other hand, young people are also the targets of such crimes. 
Young people count the majority of college and university students most of whom 
possess laptops and mobile phones. They usually share houses with 2 or 3 housemates. 
Such houses are more attractive to potential criminals. This is because, firstly, the 
student houses are often located in less affluent areas and may not have anti-burglar 
measures installed. This makes them easier targets for burglars. Secondly, it is 
perhaps more profitable to attack student residences given that each student would 
possess at least one laptop and a mobile phone, as mentioned in previous chapter. 
Attacking one student house could obtain 2 to 3 laptops and mobile phones at one 
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time, which may be more than twice the profit of attacking a normal residence. Given 
the above reasons, young people proportion is expected to have positive effect on 
burglary. However, burglary is typically a property crime and the fact is that young 
people have less to spend and possess less valuable goods than adults given their 
much lower incomes (if any). Although laptops and mobile phones are important 
targets of burglary, it is also true that potential burglars may be interested in other 
valuable goods that are often unaffordable by young people, such as high-end 
jewellery. Therefore, this fact could offset the positive effect of young people have on 
burglary and generate insignificant coefficient.  
 
Both spatial error and spatial lag models have detected positive and significant spatial 
dependence. After applying the GHET technique to tackle heteroskedasticity, the 
spatial dependence is still positive and highly significant in both spatial analysis 
models. It is perhaps worth noting that the spatial dependence detected in the spatial 
error model has very different implication from that detected by the spatial lag model. 
Distinctively, the positive spatial dependence generated by the spatial error model 
implies that some influential factors have been left in the error term and such factors 
are spatially dependent. The spatial lag model, on the other hand, implies a spill-over 
effect of crime. When the burglary rate is high in a certain area, potential burglars will 
choose neighbouring areas to commit such crimes for relatively target-rich 
environments.  
 
The goodness-of-fit of estimation is measured by the log likelihood ratio because the 
traditional R squared is not applicable to the spatial regression models. By presenting 
the log likelihood ratios, the goodness-of-fit of both spatial error and spatial lag 
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models can be properly measured. In addition, it is also possible to directly compare 
the goodness-of-fit across estimations so that picking up the “best” model.  According 
to the results given in table 5-7and 5-8, the spatial error model with GHET technique 
may be regarded as the best one in explaining the variations in burglary because of its 
highest log likelihood ratio. It is worth noting that the coefficient of real earnings is 
raised from 0.95 in the OLS estimations to 0.98 in the GHET spatial error model. 
Comparing to the coefficient of 0.94 in the GHET spatial lag model, the variable of 
real earnings becomes more powerful to explain the variations in burglary when the 
spatial dependence is controlled by the spatial error model. This phenomenon could 
be supportive to the above argument that the spatial error model with GHET 
technique performs better than the GHET spatial lag model in controlling the spatial 
dependence for burglary. In other words, the excluded explanatory variables are 
having greater spatial effects than the spill-over of burglary rate.  
 
The proportion of young people does not exhibit strong impact on burglary (its 
coefficient is significant only on 10% level), although it shows positive effect as 
predicted by theory. Another way to capture the effect of young people is to 
incorporate the youth unemployment rate as an explanatory variable, instead of the 
proportion of young people. As young people have lower opportunity cost of 
committing crimes than older age groups, increased unemployment rate for the youth 
will further reduce their opportunity cost of involving in illegal activities and, 
therefore, increase the number of motivated potential offenders. Hence, we expect the 
variable of youth unemployment rate would exhibit more significant effect on the 
crime rate of burglary.  
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As an extended investigation, burglary rate has also been analysed according to 
equation (5.17). The aim of this is to test the relationship between burglary of an area 
and the independent variables of neighbouring areas as suggested by the theoretical 
model. Both year and area dummies are included in all estimations. Their coefficients 
are not reported for space-saving purposes.   
Table 5-9 
Burglary 
Robust OLS Variables OLS 
White Jacknife 
Constant 6.04 (4.44) 
6.04 
(4.68) 
6.04 
(5.72) 
Detection(t-1) -0.04 (0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
Young People 0.38 (0.33) 
0.38 
(0.31) 
0.38 
(0.41) 
Unemployment 0.05 (0.15) 
0.05 
(0.20) 
0.05 
(0.26) 
Real Earnings 0.94** (0.37) 
0.94** 
(0.40) 
0.94* 
(0.50) 
Spatial Lag of 
Detection(t-1) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
0.05 
(0.14) 
Spatial Lag of  
Young People 
-1.28 
(0.84) 
-1.28 
(0.91) 
-1.28 
(1.14) 
Spatial Lag of 
Unemployment 
0.27 
(0.23) 
0.27 
(0.22) 
0.27 
(0.27) 
Spatial Lag of  
Real Earnings 
-0.23 
(0.76) 
-0.23 
(0.86) 
-0.23 
(1.05) 
Log Likelihood 259.67 259.67 259.67 
Normality-Prob 0.38 0.38 0.38 
Heteroskedasticity 
BP-Prob 0.0002 - - 
Observations 172 172 172 
*** represents significant at 1% level; ** represents 5% level; * represents 10% level. 
 
Looking at the results in the table above, the first thing needs to report is that the 
standard OLS estimation has generated heteroskedastic error terms according to the 
highly significant BP test. When the robust OLS estimations are applied, the 
estimation results do not change significantly, as real earnings is still the only 
significant predictor for burglary.  
 
Comparing the results generated by equation (5.16) and (5.17), all previously included 
independent variables have shown the same signs and very similar magnitudes in the 
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extended model as before. The difference is that the coefficients of lagged detection 
rate and young people proportion are no longer significant. Meanwhile, the spatial 
lags of independent variables have attained overall insignificant coefficients. Their 
signs though, are consistent with the expected spill-over effects.  
 
The spatial lag of the lagged detection rate has positive coefficient in the extended 
model. It suggests that burglary is positively correlated with the averaged detection 
rate of neighbouring areas. This is because the burglary rate in one area will rise as a 
result of tightened-up crime control in neighbouring areas. This idea has been 
predicted in the theoretical model as the displacement effect of law enforcement. In a 
short run, strengthened law enforcement in one area will motivate its potential 
offenders to spillover into neighbouring areas, therefore increase the crime rates in 
neighbouring areas.  
 
The spatial lag of unemployment rate has positive coefficient confirming with the 
prediction. Unemployment rate could have the motivation effect, as higher 
unemployment rate in neighbouring areas could motivate more potential offenders. 
The burglary rate of one area will, therefore, increase as a result of the offenders 
spilled over from neighbouring areas. In addition, as higher unemployment could 
reduce the opportunities for burglary, higher unemployment rate in neighbours will 
also drive the potential criminals to spillover therefore increase the burglary rate.  
 
The negative coefficient of the spatial lag of real earnings can also be explained by 
the spill-over theory. Higher income levels in neighbouring areas could imply more 
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opportunities available for burglars. As potential burglars would be attracted to 
neighbouring areas, the local burglary rate will be reduced accordingly. 
 
The spatial lag of young people has negative coefficients in the extended model. This 
finding could support one of the assumptions explained previously. As young people, 
especially students, are usually regarded as the prime targets of burglary, higher 
young people proportion in neighbouring areas could create a target-rich environment 
attracting more burglars. When more burglars travel to neighbouring areas, their local 
areas will be left with lower burglary rate.  
5.5.2 Theft and Handling 
The same analysis procedure has been applied on theft and handling. For the 
concentrated model following equation (5.16), standard OLS estimation will be 
followed by robust OLS estimations if heteroskedasticity occurs. Spatial error and 
spatial lag models will be applied to test the spill-over effect of crime. When 
heteroskedasticity is detected, the GHET technique will be used to correct the biases. 
The extended model given by equation (5.17) will be applied to test the spill-over 
effects of independent variables. As usual, it will follow the same technique to control 
for heterodskedasticity. The year and area dummies are included all the time. Their 
coefficients, again, are not reported here to save space.  
Table 5-10 
Theft and handling 
Robust OLS Variables OLS 
White Jacknife 
Spatial Error Spatial Lag 
Constant 4.48*** (1.60) 
4.48*** 
(1.55) 
4.48** 
(1.93) 
4.03*** 
(1.34) 
2.38 
(1.48) 
Detection(t-1) -0.13*** (0.05) 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
-0.13** 
(0.05) 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
Young People -0.58** (0.26) 
-0.58 
(0.58) 
-0.58 
(0.87) 
-0.49** 
(0.22) 
-0.53** 
(0.22) 
Unemployment 0.17** (0.09) 
0.17* 
(0.10) 
0.17 
(0.12) 
0.17** 
(0.08) 
0.18** 
(0.07) 
Real Earnings 1.21*** (0.30) 
1.21*** 
(0.34) 
1.21*** 
(0.45) 
1.26*** 
(0.25) 
1.19*** 
(0.25) 
Lambda - - - 0.24** - 
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(0.10) 
Spatial Lag - - - - 0.25*** (0.09) 
Log Likelihood 288.06 288.06 288.06 290.39 291.07 
Normality-Prob 0.64 0.64 0.64 - - 
Heteroskedasticity 
BP-Prob 0.0003 - - 0.00001 0.0006 
Heteroskedasticity 
Spatial BP-Prob - - - 0.00001 0.0006 
Spatial Lag  
Dependence-Prob 0.28 - - 0.20 0.01 
Spatial Error 
Dependence-Prob 0.82 - - 0.03 0.85 
Observations 172 172 172 172 172 
*** represents significant at 1% level; ** represents 5% level; * represents 10% level. In OLS estimation, both 
spatial lag and spatial error dependences are diagnosed by the robust Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test which does not 
require the normality of the error terms. In SEM model, the spatial lag dependence is based on the LM test and the 
spatial error dependence is based on the LR test. In the SAR model, the spatial lag dependence is based on the LR 
test and the spatial error dependence is based on the LM test. Lambda in the first part of the table represents the 
spatial dependence coefficient of the error term in the spatial error model. Spatial lag in the first part of the table 
represents the included spatial lag of dependent variable in the spatial lag model. 
 
The diagnostic tests given in the table above suggest that heteroskedasticity exists in 
the standard OLS, spatial error and spatial lag models. Robust OLS estimations is 
applied to correct the standard errors of the coefficients in the OLS estimation. The 
GHET technique is adopted for both spatial error and spatial lag models with the 
northern dummy being used as the categorial variable. Table 5-11 reports the results 
of spatial error and spatial lag estimations both before and after applying the GHET 
technique. Because, in this way, it is easy to observe any change in the coefficients 
due to the application of GHET technique.  
 
Table 5-11 
Theft and handling 
 
Variables Spatial Error 
Spatial Error 
GHET Spatial Lag 
Spatial Lag 
GHET 
Constant 4.03*** (1.34) 
4.08*** 
(1.33) 
2.38 
(1.48) 
2.31 
(1.48) 
Detection(t-1) -0.13*** (0.04) 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
Young People -0.49** (0.22) 
-0.42* 
(0.22) 
-0.53** 
(0.22) 
-0.47** 
(0.22) 
Unemployment 0.17** (0.08) 
0.18** 
(0.08) 
0.18** 
(0.07) 
0.19** 
(0.07) 
Real Earnings 1.26*** (0.25) 
1.21*** 
(0.25) 
1.19*** 
(0.25) 
1.14*** 
(0.25) 
Lambda 0.24** (0.10) 
0.28*** 
(0.10) - - 
Spatial Lag - - 0.25*** (0.09) 
0.28*** 
(0.09) 
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Log Likelihood 290.39 293.29 291.07 292.01 
Heteroskedasticity 
BP-Prob 0.00001 - 0.0006 - 
Heteroskedasticity 
Spatial BP-Prob 0.00001 - 0.0006 - 
Spatial Lag 
Dependence-Prob 0.20 - 0.01 - 
Spatial Error 
Dependence-Prob 0.03 - 0.85 - 
Groupwise  
Heteroskedasticity-Prob - 0.05 
- 0.17 
Observations 172 172 172 172 
*** represents significant at 1% level; ** represents 5% level; * represents 10% level. In SEM model, the spatial 
lag dependence is based on the LM test and the spatial error dependence is based on the LR test. In the SAR model, 
the spatial lag dependence is based on the LR test and the spatial error dependence is based on the LM test. 
Lambda in the first part of the table represents the spatial dependence coefficient of the error term in the spatial 
error model. Spatial lag in the first part of the table represents the included spatial lag of dependent variable in the 
spatial lag model. The groupwise heteroskedasticity is diagnosed by LR test with the null hypothesis being equal 
groupwise variances.  
 
Considering the results in table 5-10 and 5-11, the coefficients of independent 
variables are very robust across different regression models and agreeing with 
expectations in most cases. The lagged detection rate has negative and significant 
coefficient in all estimations. The magnitude, meanwhile, has been at -0.13 constantly. 
The unemployment rate has positive and significant coefficient in all estimations 
expect for the second robust OLS estimation. The magnitude of the coefficient is also 
very stable at either 0.17 or 0.18. The positive effect with unemployment has 
confirmed the expectation that higher unemployment would encourage some people 
to involve in crimes, theft and handling in this case, because of the lower expected 
legal income. Real earnings has also shown very stable coefficient that is positive and 
highly significant across all estimations. This is because real earnings has picked up 
the opportunity effect as it did in the analysis of burglary.  With an increase in 
average income, people will probably carry more cash and spend more on goods. 
Such situation provides extra incentives and opportunities for potential thieves.  
 
Contrary to expectation, young people proportion has constantly maintained negative 
coefficient in all estimations. Especially, the coefficient of young people proportion is 
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negative and significant in the conventional OLS estimation. It then changes to 
insignificant in both robust OLS estimations. Such change is due to the exaggerated 
significance of young people proportion by heteroskedasticity. In both spatial error 
and spatial lag modes, the coefficient of young people proportion is always negative 
and highly significant either before or after applying the GHET technique. The 
problem is, however, the northern dummy does not successfully explain the 
heteroskedasticity in the spatial lag model according to the probability of 0.17 in the 
LR test. Therefore, it can only be concluded with confidence that young people 
proportion has negative and significant effect on theft and handling in the spatial error 
model, while cautions should be taken in interpreting its coefficient in the OLS and 
spatial lag estimations.  
 
The negative coefficient of young people proportion (regardless its significance), may 
be due to the aforementioned double-edged effect that young people may have on 
theft and handling. Whilst higher young people proportion may encourage more 
potential thieves, given their lower opportunity cost, more young people may also 
increase the number of potential victims.  
 
By looking at the sub-categories of theft and handling, it is not difficult to notice that 
theft from vehicle, as the largest sub-category, takes up to one third of the total 
number of theft and handling. It is probably reasonable to assume that theft from 
vehicle usually takes young people as potential targets, given that most young people 
cannot afford expensive cars that have better security measures, but they are more into 
gargets like CD players, SatNavs, customised speakers. This combined with cars’ 
poor security features, such goods are attractive targets for thieves. Moreover, it is a 
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general consensus that young people tend to be less cautious than matured adults. 
They are perhaps more likely to leave their personal belongings unattended in cars,  
which also provides opportunities for ”smash and grabs”. From this perspective, more 
young people could increase theft and handling by expanding the number of victims.  
 
The second and third largest sub-categories are “other theft and unauthorised taking” 
and “theft or unauthorised taking of motor vehicle”. The common feature of these 
sub-categories is that the main targets are the older age groups who have relatively 
stable incomes and possess more valuable items and more expensive cars. An increase 
in the young people proportion could reduce the opportunities of such offences and 
hence the total of theft and handling. Taking this into consideration, then, the net 
effect of higher young people proportion remains ambiguous as all the possible effects 
analysed here may offer conflicting interpretations. In addition, we need to bear in 
mind that young people may not always be more prone to commit crimes than adults 
given their lower opportunity cost of doing so. As a criminal record will jeopardize 
the future labour market outcomes of the youth, they will be deterred to commit 
offences when considering this.   
 
The spatial dependence in the error terms has been detected by the spatial error model 
both before and after applying the GHET technique. The estimated spatial dependent 
coefficient does not change much over the two cases. This result implies that there 
may be variables omitted from the spatially dependent specification.  According to the 
spatial lag model, however, it cannot be concluded with confidence that theft and 
handling has spill-over effect. This is because, although both spatial lag estimations, 
with and without GHET technique, have attained positive and significant coefficient 
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for the spatial lag of dependent variable, the northern dummy has not shown the 
power in explaining the heteroskedasticity. Hence, without solid evidence, it is 
reasonable to be sceptical that this type of crime would spill over. 
 
The best performing model can be selected by comparing the log likelihood ratios 
across estimations, and the spatial error model with GHET technique has provided the 
highest log likelihood ratio and therefore the best fit for explaining the variations in 
theft and handling.  A point worth the attention is that, when the spatial dependence is 
controlled by the spatial error model with GHET technique, the unemployment rate 
becomes more powerful in explaining the variations of theft and handing by 
exhibiting a coefficient of 0.18. (The coefficient of unemployment rate is 0.17 is OLS 
estimations). In contrary, the proportion of young people is less powerful in the 
GHET spatial error model: its coefficient is -0.58 in the OLS estimations and reduced 
to -0.42 when the spatial dependence in the error term is controlled for.  
 
The estimation results of the extended model are given in the table below. Such model 
includes the spatial lags of independent variables as allowing them to have spill-over 
effects. As the BP test in the table below suggests the existence of heteroskedasticity, 
robust OLS estimations have been applied to generate reliable inferences. In order to 
save space, the coefficients of year and area dummies are not reported.  
Table 5-12 
Theft and handling 
Robust OLS Variables OLS 
White Jacknife 
Constant 12.25*** (3.63) 
12.25*** 
(3.91) 
12.25** 
(4.78) 
Detection(t-1) -0.09* (0.05) 
-0.09* 
(0.05) 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
Young People -0.45 (0.47) 
-0.45 
(0.53) 
-0.45 
(0.82) 
Unemployment 0.16 (0.12) 
0.16 
(0.14) 
0.16 
(0.17) 
Real Earnings 1.16*** 1.16*** 1.16*** 
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(0.30) (0.31) (0.40) 
Spatial Lag of 
Detection(t-1) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.07 
(0.12) 
Spatial Lag of  
Young People 
-1.93*** 
(0.73) 
-1.93** 
(0.80) 
-1.93* 
(0.99) 
Spatial Lag of 
Unemployment 
0.11 
(0.19) 
0.11 
(0.21) 
0.11 
(0.27) 
Spatial Lag of  
Real Earnings 
-0.70 
(0.62) 
-0.70 
(0.68) 
-0.70 
(0.84) 
Log Likelihood 295.09 295.09 295.09 
Normality-Prob 0.69 0.69 0.69 
Heteroskedasticity 
BP-Prob 0.0002 - - 
Observations 172 172 172 
*** represents significant at 1% level; ** represents 5% level; * represents 10% level.  
 
Comparing to the concentrated model, including the spatial lags of independent 
variables does not alter the signs of existing independent variables. The lagged 
detection rate and real earnings still have significant coefficients with the same signs. 
Young people proportion and unemployment rate, on the other hand, have gathered 
insignificant coefficients in the extended model.  
 
The spatial lags of independent variables have broadly shown insignificant 
correlations with theft and handling with the spatial lag of young people proportion 
being the only exception. Particularly, the spatial lag of young people proportion has 
negative and significant effect on theft and handling. This result could be associated 
with the fact that young people, in addition to be more crime-prone, are also the main 
targets of certain crimes. As mentioned earlier, the sub-category of theft from vehicle 
takes up to one-third of the total numbers of theft and handling and is believed to 
mainly target on young people. As a result, with more young people in neighbouring 
areas, the potential criminals of theft from vehicle may well be drawn to the 
neighbouring target-rich environment and leave their own areas with lower crime 
rates.  
 
  211 
Differing to the expectation, the spatial lag of lagged detection rate has obtained 
negative coefficient. This result advocates that the level of theft and handling will 
decrease as a result of tougher crime controls in neighbouring areas. As predicted in 
the theoretical model, the crime rate of one area should indeed have a negative 
relationship with its neighbouring crime control variables in long-run due to more 
criminals being locked-up. Consequently, the spatial lag of lagged detection rate 
could pick up the incapacitation effect, which may be beneficial in reducing crime 
rates for both local and neighbouring areas.  
 
The spatial lags of both unemployment rate and real earnings have achieved the 
expected signs, positive for unemployment rate and negative for real earnings. As 
higher unemployment rate in neighbouring areas means more motivated thieves and 
fewer opportunities, theft and handling will increase as a result of thieves spill over 
from neighbouring areas. Likewise, higher income levels of neighbouring areas 
represent better opportunities for potential thieves. Theft and handling will fall as a 
result of criminal spillovers into neighbouring areas.  
5.5.3 Fraud and Forgery 
Table 5-13 and 5-14 present the estimation results for fraud and forgery following the 
concentrated specification given by equation (5.16).  The year and area dummies are 
included in the all estimations as usual, but their coefficients are not reported here, 
Table 5-13 
Fraud and forgery 
Robust OLS Variables OLS 
White Jacknife 
Spatial Error Spatial Lag 
Constant -0.96 (3.92) 
-0.96 
(4.58) 
-0.96 
(5.63) 
-1.80 
(3.31) 
-2.12 
(3.31) 
Detection(t-1) -0.13* (0.07) 
-0.13* 
(0.07) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.10* 
(0.05) 
-0.11** 
(0.05) 
Young People -0.41 (0.65) 
-0.41 
(0.98) 
-0.41 
(1.43) 
-0.45 
(0.55) 
-0.43 
(0.55) 
Unemployment 0.41* (0.21) 
0.41* 
(0.24) 
0.41 
(0.29) 
0.41** 
(0.19) 
0.41** 
(0.18) 
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Real Earnings 1.80** (0.74) 
1.80* 
(0.86) 
1.80* 
(1.07) 
1.97*** 
(0.62) 
1.85*** 
(0.62) 
Lambda - - - 0.15 (0.10) - 
Spatial Lag - - - - 0.14 (0.10) 
Log Likelihood 133.33 133.33 133.33 134.04 134.12 
Normality-Prob 0.75 0.75 0.75 - - 
Heteroskedasticity 
BP-Prob 0.02 - - 0.01 0.009 
Heteroskedasticity 
Spatial BP-Prob - - - 0.01 0.009 
Spatial Lag 
Dependence-Prob 0.42 - - 0.42 0.21 
Spatial Error 
Dependence-Prob 0.60 - - 0.23 0.79 
Observations 172 172 172 172 172 
*** represents significant at 1% level; ** represents 5% level; * represents 10% level. In OLS estimation, both 
spatial lag and spatial error dependences are diagnosed by the robust Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test which does not 
require the normality of the error terms. In SEM model, the spatial lag dependence is based on the LM test and the 
spatial error dependence is based on the LR test. In the SAR model, the spatial lag dependence is based on the LR 
test and the spatial error dependence is based on the LM test. Lambda in the first part of the table represents the 
spatial dependence coefficient of the error term in the spatial error model. Spatial lag in the first part of the table 
represents the included spatial lag of dependent variable in the spatial lag model. 
 
The diagnostic tests in the table above have shown that heteroskedasticity is a 
persistent problem across regressions. As robust OLS estimations have been applied 
to correct the standard OLS estimation, GHET technique is taken as the solution to 
deal with heteroskedasticity in both spatial error and spatial lag models. The results of 
GHET spatial error and spatial lag models are presented in the table below along with 
the original spatial models to show any change generated.  
Table 5-14 
Fraud and forgery 
 
Variables Spatial Error 
Spatial Error 
GHET Spatial Lag 
Spatial Lag 
GHET 
Constant -1.80 (3.31) 
-1.71 
(3.29) 
-2.12 
(3.31) 
-2.04 
(3.29) 
Detection(t-1) -0.10* (0.05) 
-0.11** 
(0.06) 
-0.11** 
(0.05) 
-0.12** 
(0.06) 
Young People -0.45 (0.55) 
-0.35 
(0.56) 
-0.43 
(0.55) 
-0.33 
(0.55) 
Unemployment 0.41** (0.19) 
0.44** 
(0.19) 
0.41** 
(0.18) 
0.43** 
(0.18) 
Real Earnings 1.97*** (0.62) 
1.91*** 
(0.62) 
1.85*** 
(0.62) 
1.81*** 
(0.61) 
Lambda 0.15 (0.10) 
0.13 
(0.11) - - 
Spatial Lag - - 0.14 (0.10) 
0.13 
(0.11) 
Log Likelihood 134.04 136.03 134.12 135.10 
Heteroskedasticity 
BP-Prob 0.01 - 0.009 - 
Heteroskedasticity 0.01 - 0.009 - 
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Spatial BP-Prob 
Spatial Lag 
Dependence-Prob 0.42 - 0.21 - 
Spatial Error 
Dependence-Prob 0.23 - 0.79 - 
Groupwise  
Heteroskedasticity-Prob - 0.14 
- 0.16 
Observations 172 172 172 172 
*** represents significant at 1% level; ** represents 5% level; * represents 10% level. In SEM model, the spatial 
lag dependence is based on the LM test and the spatial error dependence is based on the LR test. In the SAR model, 
the spatial lag dependence is based on the LR test and the spatial error dependence is based on the LM test. 
Lambda in the first part of the table represents the spatial dependence coefficient of the error term in the spatial 
error model. Spatial lag in the first part of the table represents the included spatial lag of dependent variable in the 
spatial lag model. The groupwise heteroskedasticity is diagnosed by LR test with the null hypothesis being equal 
groupwise variances. 
 
Adherent to the results shown in table 5-13 and 5-14, the variables that significantly 
affect fraud and forgery are the lagged detection rate, unemployment rate and real 
earnings. The lagged detection rate has negative and significant coefficient in all 
estimations except the second robust OLS regression. Therefore, it is rational to 
conclude that the problem of heteroskedasticity does not affect the significant 
correlation between lagged detection rate and fraud and forgery. As the lagged 
detection rate represents the lagged law enforcement effort, it can reduce fraud and 
forgery through both deterrence and incapacitation channels. Potential criminals could 
learn from their past experiences, their friends’ experiences or media reports to 
estimate how likely they are going to get detected if commit such crimes. Therefore, 
higher detection rate of last time period would serve warnings on potential criminals 
by increasing their expected chance of punishment. For criminals who have been 
detected and sentenced into prison, it is impossible for them to recommit any crime 
while under custody. 
 
The unemployment rate has overall positive and significant coefficient except again 
for the second robust OLS estimation. This result is in line with expectation since 
higher unemployment rate would reduce the expected return from legal labour market 
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and hence the opportunity cost of criminal activities. Thus, higher unemployment may 
create incentives for engaging in property crimes such as fraud and forgery. 
 
Real earnings has gained positive and significant coefficient in all estimations. This is 
because real earnings has picked up the opportunity effect as did it in previous 
analysis. People with higher incomes tend to spend more. Plus, with the increasing 
popularity of online shopping, those people may provide more opportunities for fraud 
and forgery. By checking the sub-categories of fraud and forgery, it is worth stressing 
that cheque and credit card fraud takes up to 90 percent of total offences in fraud and 
forgery. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that average income is positively 
correlated with fraud and forgery because of increased cheque and credit card 
payments from more affluent individuals.   
 
One thing worth noting is that the GHET technique has failed to generate significantly 
different groupwise variances in either spatial error or spatial lag regression given the 
results of LR tests. In other words, fraud and forgery is not sensitive to whether or not 
the area is located in northern regions. In fact, this result does make sense due to the 
nature of fraud and forgery, as many of such activities are conducted remotely, which 
are not necessarily restricted by local unobservable characteristics. For example, 
credit card frauds are often carried out via the Internet, regardless geographical 
boundaries. In both spatial error and spatial lag models, no significant spatial 
dependence has been detected due to the presence of heteroskedasticity. As 
heteroskedasticity usually exaggerates the significance of coefficient, lacking of 
significance under heteroskedasticity is unlikely to become significant when 
heteroskedasticity is controlled. Hence, it is sensible to state that spatial dependence 
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does not exist in either fraud and forgery or its omitted factors given that the Internet 
is the most commonly used platform and such crime is not as sensitive to geographic 
locations as other property crimes.  
By comparing the log likelihood ratios, the spatial error model with GHET technique 
provides the best fit for fraud and forgery. Due to the problem of heteroskedasticity, 
however, the inferences of this model should be considered with scepticism.  
 
The estimation results of the extended specification are given in table 5-15. The BP 
test proposes that heteroskedasticity exists in the standard OLS estimation. Thus, the 
robust OLS estimations are necessary to apply. All estimations have incorporated the 
year and area dummies while their coefficients are not reported.   
Table 5-15 
Fraud and forgery 
Robust OLS Variables OLS 
White Jacknife 
Constant 6.10 (8.75) 
6.10 
(8.28) 
6.10 
(10.45) 
Detection(t-1) -0.27*** (0.08) 
-0.27*** 
(0.09) 
-0.27** 
(0.11) 
Young People -0.76 (0.65) 
-0.76 
(1.13) 
-0.76 
(1.73) 
Unemployment 0.49* (0.29) 
0.49 
(0.35) 
0.49 
(0.44) 
Real Earnings 1.40* (0.74) 
1.40* 
(0.83) 
1.40 
(1.05) 
Spatial Lag of 
Detection(t-1) 
-0.28*** 
(0.10) 
-0.28** 
(0.11) 
-0.28* 
(0.16) 
Spatial Lag of  
Young People 
1.67 
(1.73) 
1.67 
(1.74) 
1.67 
(2.15) 
Spatial Lag of 
Unemployment 
-0.27 
(0.45) 
-0.27 
(0.52) 
-0.27 
(0.65) 
Spatial Lag of  
Real Earnings 
-1.38 
(1.51) 
-1.38 
(1.48) 
-1.38 
(1.80) 
Log Likelihood 142.97 142.97 142.97 
Normality-Prob 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Heteroskedasticity 
BP-Prob 0.000002 - - 
Observations 172 172 172 
*** represents significant at 1% level; ** represents 5% level; * represents 10% level.  
 
While the previously included independent variables still have the same signs in the 
extended model, unemployment rate has become insignificant in both robust OLS 
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estimations. Similarly, real earnings is significant only in the first robust OLS 
estimation and has lost its significance in the second robust OLS estimation. The 
lagged detection rate is the only one with significant coefficient among the previously 
included independent variables. 
 
The spatial lags of the independent variables have broadly gathered insignificant 
coefficients. The spatial lag of lagged detection rate is the only one that has obtained 
significant coefficient with negative sign. Although it is possible that, in long-run, the 
crime rate in one area is negatively affected by the detection rates of neighbouring 
areas due to more criminals being locked-up, the interpretation of the negative 
relationship between fraud and forgery and the spatial lag of lagged detection rate 
needs more careful consideration. This is because, as argued previously, fraud and 
forgery is usually carried out via the platform of Internet and thus not as sensitive or 
restrictive to geographic locations as the other types of crime. Additionally, this point 
has been demonstrated by the previous analysis, in which either spatial error or spatial 
lag model has detected significant spatial dependence. Therefore, it would seem 
doubtful to explain the detected negative relationship between fraud and forgery and 
the lagged detection rate of neighbouring areas with the spill-over effect of tougher 
law enforcement, because the spill-over theory is based on the mobility of criminals. 
For the same reason, the coefficients of the other spatial lags of independent variables 
should not be explained by the spill-over theory either.  
5.5.4 Robbery  
Although robbery has been categorized as violent crime, the main purpose of such 
crime, however, is still to acquire valuable properties. As mentioned in the data 
description section, there are some 0s in the crime rate of robbery implying the 
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number of robbery is less than 1 per 1000 population. To deal with this, the 
specifications given by equation (5.16) and equation (5.17) have been estimated based 
on the levels of both dependent and independent variables without taking logarithm. 
As usual, the year and area dummies are included all the time, with their coefficients 
not reported to save space. 
Table 5-16 
Robbery 
Robust OLS Variables OLS 
White Jacknife 
Spatial Error Spatial Lag 
Constant -342.53 (229.70) 
-342.53 
(352.83) 
-342.53 
(453.44) 
-349.75* 
(191.27) 
-353.16* 
(190.64) 
Detection(t-1) -0.55 (0.69) 
-0.55 
(0.70) 
-0.55 
(0.88) 
-0.61 
(0.55) 
-0.59 
(0.57) 
Young People 39.62** (16.72) 
39.62 
(24.71) 
39.62 
(32.08) 
44.81*** 
(13.93) 
42.74*** 
(13.88) 
Unemployment -25.31 (17.18) 
-25.31 
(27.45) 
-25.31 
(33.49) 
-37.41** 
(14.53) 
-28.89** 
(14.29) 
Real Earnings 1.05*** (0.23) 
1.05*** 
(0.34) 
1.05** 
(0.52) 
0.86*** 
(0.20) 
0.88*** 
(0.20) 
Lambda - - - 0.25** (0.10) - 
Spatial Lag - - - - 0.20** (0.10) 
Log Likelihood -825.37 -825.37 -825.37 -822.79 -823.59 
Normality-Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - 
Heteroskedasticity 
KB-Prob 0.00002 - - 0.0000 0.0000 
Heteroskedasticity 
Spatial BP-Prob - - - 0.0000 0.0000 
Spatial Lag 
Dependence-Prob 0.39 - - 0.44 0.06 
Spatial Error 
Dependence-Prob 0.17 - - 0.02 0.06 
Observations 172 172 172 172 172 
*** represents significant at 1% level; ** represents 5% level; * represents 10% level. In OLS estimation, both 
spatial lag and spatial error dependences are diagnosed by the robust Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test which does not 
require the normality of the error terms. In SEM model, the spatial lag dependence is based on the LM test and the 
spatial error dependence is based on the LR test. In the SAR model, the spatial lag dependence is based on the LR 
test and the spatial error dependence is based on the LM test. Lambda in the first part of the table represents the 
spatial dependence coefficient of the error term in the spatial error model. Spatial lag in the first part of the table 
represents the included spatial lag of dependent variable in the spatial lag model. 
 
The heteroskedasticity tests given in the results table generate highly significant 
statistics indicating the existence of heteroskedasticity in the standard OLS, spatial 
error and spatial lag estimations. As usual, robust OLS estimations and the GHET 
technique have been applied to deal with this problem. While the results of robust 
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OLS estimations are given in table 5-16, the GHET spatial estimations are presented 
in the table below along with the normal spatial regressions.  
 
Table 5-17 
Robbery  
 
Variables Spatial Error 
Spatial Error 
GHET Spatial Lag 
Spatial Lag 
GHET 
Constant -349.75* (191.27) 
-351.31* 
(190.53) 
-353.16* 
(190.64) 
-353.66* 
(189.59) 
Detection(t-1) -0.61 (0.55) 
-0.58 
(0.54) 
-0.59 
(0.57) 
-0.55 
(0.56) 
Young People 44.81*** (13.93) 
42.68*** 
(13.87) 
42.74*** 
(13.88) 
40.94*** 
(13.78) 
Unemployment -37.41** (14.53) 
-28.48** 
(13.87) 
-28.89** 
(14.29) 
-21.83 
(13.68) 
Real Earnings 0.86*** (0.20) 
0.90*** 
(0.21) 
0.88*** 
(0.20) 
0.92*** 
(0.20) 
Lambda 0.25** (0.10) 
0.23** 
(0.10) - - 
Spatial Lag - - 0.20** (0.10) 
0.18* 
(0.10) 
Log Likelihood -822.79 -819.30 -823.59 -821.12 
Heteroskedasticity 
BP-Prob 0.0000 - 0.0000 - 
Heteroskedasticity 
Spatial BP-Prob 0.0000 - 0.0000 - 
Spatial Lag 
Dependence-Prob 0.44 - 0.06 - 
Spatial Error 
Dependence-Prob 0.02 - 0.06 - 
Groupwise  
Heteroskedasticity-Prob - 0.03 
- 0.03 
Observations 172 172 172 172 
*** represents significant at 1% level; ** represents 5% level; * represents 10% level. In SEM model, the spatial 
lag dependence is based on the LM test and the spatial error dependence is based on the LR test. In the SAR model, 
the spatial lag dependence is based on the LR test and the spatial error dependence is based on the LM test. 
Lambda in the first part of the table represents the spatial dependence coefficient of the error term in the spatial 
error model. Spatial lag in the first part of the table represents the included spatial lag of dependent variable in the 
spatial lag model. The groupwise heteroskedasticity is diagnosed by LR test with the null hypothesis being equal 
groupwise variances. 
 
The first thing needs to mention is that the GHET technique has indeed managed to 
control the heteroskedasticity on some level in both spatial error and spatial lag 
models. This is shown by the LR tests and the results of which have clearly rejected 
the null hypothesis of equal groupwise variances.  
 
The estimated results in both tables presented above do not suggest significant 
correlation between robbery and lagged detection rate. However, the coefficient of 
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lagged detection rate constantly has negative sign in all estimations. The other 
independent variables, meanwhile, have broadly shown significant effects on robbery. 
Real earnings, as usual, has positive and highly significant coefficient in all 
estimations. The explanation can be relatively straightforward. Real earnings has 
picked up the opportunity effect as higher incomes would generate more opportunities 
for robbery. This explanation is based on the assumption that people would consume 
more with higher incomes and such consumptions should include portable and 
valuable goods such as designer handbags, latest mobile phones and other digital 
gadgets.   
 
The coefficient of unemployment rate is negative and insignificant in both normal and 
robust OLS estimations. When the spatial models are applied, the coefficient of 
unemployment turns negative and significant in both spatial error and spatial lag 
models. After applying the GHET technique, however, the coefficient of 
unemployment rate switches back to insignificant in the GHET spatial lag model 
whilst still remains significant in the GHET spatial error model. Regardless of its 
significance, the sign of this coefficient is constantly negative. Robbery is the type of 
crime that usually happens outdoors, and more often on the streets in less affluent 
areas. Moreover, timing is essential for successful actions. Determined robbers must 
come across with suitable victims at the right time and place. When unemployment 
rate rises, the probability will be reduced for potential robbers to meet suitable targets, 
as less people have to commute carrying with valuable items. This opportunity effect 
of higher unemployment rate will offset the motivation effect of unemployment rate 
and thus the net effect could be negative.  
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The significance of young people proportion is also varying across estimations. Basic 
OLS estimation has given positive and significant coefficient while the robust OLS 
estimations have corrected it back to insignificant. In the case of spatial analysis, the 
positive and significant coefficient of young people proportion is not affected by 
applying the GHET technique to both spatial error and spatial lag models. The sign of 
young people proportion, nonetheless, has been positive all the time. The constantly 
positive sign validates with the expectation that more young people could imply more 
potential criminals given their lower opportunity cost of committing crimes. At the 
same time, due to the double-edged effect, more young people could also increase the 
number of potential victims. As youngsters are more into chasing the latest trend in 
fashionable and digital products, they are perhaps popular targets in robbery. 
Furthermore, as discussed above, young people may not as cautious and caring to 
their personal possessions as their older counterparts, they may be again more 
exposed to the risk of being robbed than other age groups. By summarising the above 
reasons, young people should be positively correlated with robbery. Despite this, one 
should not forget the fact that age is negatively correlated with income level in most 
cases. Young people, on average, have lower incomes and possess less valuable goods. 
Furthermore, the potential future labour market payoff could make the youngsters less 
keen to become offenders. These effects could somehow offset the positive effect that 
young people proportion has on robbery.  
 
According to both spatial error and spatial lag regressions with GHET technique, 
location really matters in the case of robbery, with positive and significant spatial 
dependence being detected. Nevertheless, the interpretation of which should depend 
on whether the spatial dependence presents in the error terms or in the dependent 
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variable. The significant spatial dependence in the spatial error model connotes the 
omission of spatially dependent variables from the specification.  The spatial lag 
model, on the other hand, suggests a spill-over effect that robbery has over 
neighbourhoods.  
 
By comparing the log likelihood ratios, the spatial error model with GHET technique 
has provided the strongest explanation power for robbery.  
 
The table below reports the results of the extended model incorporating the spatial 
lags of independent variables. As the standard OLS estimation has the problem of 
heteroskedasticity, robust OLS estimations are applied to correct the coefficient 
inferences.  
Table 5-18 
Robbery 
Robust OLS Variables OLS 
White Jacknife 
Constant 186.17 (468.51) 
186.17 
(507.96) 
186.17 
(671.98) 
Detection(t-1) -0.58 (0.69) 
-0.58 
(0.70) 
-0.58 
(1.01) 
Young People 41.49** (16.73) 
41.49 
(28.82) 
41.49 
(42.99) 
Unemployment -35.95** (17.48) 
-35.95 
(27.22) 
-35.95 
(36.21) 
Real Earnings 0.90*** (0.30) 
0.90 
(0.60) 
0.90 
(1.04) 
Spatial Lag of 
Detection(t-1) 
-0.07 
(1.51) 
-0.07 
(1.29) 
-0.07 
(1.67) 
Spatial Lag of  
Young People 
-66.84* 
(37.28) 
-66.84 
(50.15) 
-66.84 
(70.14) 
Spatial Lag of 
Unemployment 
54.56* 
(31.47) 
54.56 
(50.93) 
54.56 
(78.31) 
Spatial Lag of  
Real Earnings 
0.66 
(0.63) 
0.66 
(1.07) 
0.66 
(1.47) 
Log Likelihood -818.21 -818.21 -818.21 
Normality-Prob 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 
Heteroskedasticity 
BP-Prob 0.00002 - - 
Observations 172 172 172 
*** represents significant at 1% level; ** represents 5% level; * represents 10% level.  
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As shown in the above table, none of the independent variables have displayed 
significant coefficients in the robust OLS estimations. Whilst the previously included 
independent variables still have the same signs as in the concentrated model, they 
have all lost their significant correlations with robbery rate.  
 
The spatial lags of independent variables are not able to provide solid evidence for the 
predicted spill-over effects of independent variables. Firstly, the spatial lag of lagged 
detection rate has negative and highly insignificant coefficient. This result suggests 
that the robbery rate in one area is highly unlikely to be affected by the lagged 
detection rate of neighbouring areas. Consequently, this result is not supporting the 
predicted spill-over effect of detection rate. Secondly, the spatial lag of young people 
proportion has negative but insignificant coefficient. The negative coefficient could 
imply that the robbery rate of one area would be reduced as there are more young 
people in neighbouring areas. This result will be valid only if, as argued previously, 
young people also represent the prime victims of robbery. Therefore, more young 
people in neighbouring areas may indicate more opportunities for robbery and so 
attract potential robbers to spillover from nearby areas. Thirdly, the spatial lag of 
unemployment rate has shown positive sign as expected although the coefficient is 
significant. This result implies a positive correlation between the robbery rate of one 
area and the unemployment rate in neighbouring areas. As higher unemployment 
could entail more motivated potential robbers as well as fewer opportunities for them, 
those determined robbers are likely to spillover into neighbouring areas for better 
opportunities and in doing so, push up the robbery rate of neighbouring areas. Finally, 
the spatial lag of real earnings has found positive sign in the extended model 
contrasting to prediction. Although higher incomes may denote more opportunities for 
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robbery, higher income level in neighbouring areas is predicted to reduce the robbery 
rate of the area under study by drawing potential robbers away to more affluent 
neighbouring areas. As a result, the positive coefficient is not supporting the predicted 
spill-over effect of real earnings. 
5.5.5 Sexual Offences 
Sexual offences is a typical type of violent crime and seems have no direct 
relationship with social-economic factors. It is usually believed that people commit 
sexually offences owing to their difference in “personality” or “taste”. However, as 
we mentioned earlier while the crime itself may generate utility, potential criminals 
may still try to commit the crime where it is easier to do so and the deterrence effects 
may apply here as well. The same analysis procedure has therefore been applied on 
sexual offences in hoping to generate interesting insights.  
 
The crime rate of sexual offences and independent variables enter the estimations on 
their levels without taking logarithm. This is because there are 0s in the crime rate 
indicating there is less than 1 sexual offence per 1000 population. Both year and area 
dummies are included in each estimation. Their coefficients are not reported for space 
limit.  
Table 5-19 
Sexual offences 
Robust OLS Variables OLS 
White Jacknife 
Spatial Error Spatial Lag 
Constant 1136.1*** (196.80) 
1136.1** 
(535.41) 
1136.1 
(762.58) 
1070.52*** 
(161.54) 
1127.9*** 
(164.34) 
Detection(t-1) 0.10 (0.33) 
0.10 
(0.48) 
0.10 
(0.66) 
0.16 
(0.27) 
0.09 
(0.28) 
Young People -82.22*** (14.16) 
-82.22* 
(44.38) 
-82.22 
(62.69) 
-79.12*** 
(11.65) 
-81.22*** 
(11.80) 
Unemployment -8.34 (15.13) 
-8.34 
(15.58) 
-8.34 
(19.64) 
-1.98 
(12.35) 
-5.75 
(12.61) 
Real Earnings -0.57*** (0.20) 
-0.57 
(0.76) 
-0.57 
(1.20) 
-0.51*** 
(0.16) 
-0.56*** 
(0.17) 
Lambda - - - -0.17 (0.12) - 
Spatial Lag - - - - -0.20* (0.11) 
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Log Likelihood -799.63 -799.63 -799.63 -798.91 -798.50 
Normality-Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - 
Heteroskedasticity 
KB-Prob 0.0000 - - 0.0000 0.0000 
Heteroskedasticity 
Spatial BP-Prob - - - 0.0000 0.0000 
Spatial Lag 
Dependence-Prob 0.35 - - 0.29 0.13 
Spatial Error 
Dependence-Prob 0.56 - - 0.23 0.66 
Observations 172 172 172 172 172 
*** represents significant at 1% level; ** represents 5% level; * represents 10% level. In OLS estimation, both 
spatial lag and spatial error dependences are diagnosed by the robust Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test which does not 
require the normality of the error terms. In SEM model, the spatial lag dependence is based on the LM test and the 
spatial error dependence is based on the LR test. In the SAR model, the spatial lag dependence is based on the LR 
test and the spatial error dependence is based on the LM test. Lambda in the first part of the table represents the 
spatial dependence coefficient of the error term in the spatial error model. Spatial lag in the first part of the table 
represents the included spatial lag of dependent variable in the spatial lag model. 
 
For the diagnostic tests in the table above, heteroskedasticity presents in the normal 
OLS estimation as well as both spatial analysis models, so that heteroskedasticity 
correction is necessary before the results can be interpreted. The results of robust OLS 
estimations are given in the table above along with the normal OLS estimation. The 
results of GHET spatial error and spatial lag models are reported in the table below, 
which can be easily compared to the ordinary spatial models.  
Table 5-20 
Sexual offences  
 
Variables Spatial Error 
Spatial Error 
GHET Spatial Lag 
Spatial Lag 
GHET 
Constant 1070.52*** (161.54) 
924.80*** 
(161.32) 
1127.9*** 
(164.34) 
989.38*** 
(164.59) 
Detection(t-1) 0.16 (0.27) 
0.10 
(0.28) 
0.09 
(0.28) 
0.01 
(0.28) 
Young People -79.12*** (11.65) 
-67.61*** 
(11.67) 
-81.22*** 
(11.80) 
-70.03*** 
(11.85) 
Unemployment -1.98 (12.35) 
-1.91 
(11.89) 
-5.75 
(12.61) 
-6.05 
(12.13) 
Real Earnings -0.51*** (0.16) 
-0.41** 
(0.17) 
-0.56*** 
(0.17) 
-0.46*** 
(0.17) 
Lambda -0.17 (0.12) 
-0.19* 
(0.11) - - 
Spatial Lag - - -0.20* (0.11) 
-0.20* 
(0.12) 
Log Likelihood -798.91 -795.72 -798.50 -796.57 
Heteroskedasticity 
BP-Prob 0.0000 - 0.0000 - 
Heteroskedasticity 
Spatial BP-Prob 0.0000 - 0.0000 - 
Spatial Lag 
Dependence-Prob 0.29 - 0.13 - 
Spatial Error 
Dependence-Prob 0.23 - 0.66 - 
Groupwise  
Heteroskedasticity-Prob - 0.04 
- 0.05 
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Observations 172 172 172 172 
*** represents significant at 1% level; ** represents 5% level; * represents 10% level. In SEM model, the spatial 
lag dependence is based on the LM test and the spatial error dependence is based on the LR test. In the SAR model, 
the spatial lag dependence is based on the LR test and the spatial error dependence is based on the LM test. 
Lambda in the first part of the table represents the spatial dependence coefficient of the error term in the spatial 
error model. Spatial lag in the first part of the table represents the included spatial lag of dependent variable in the 
spatial lag model. The groupwise heteroskedasticity is diagnosed by LR test with the null hypothesis being equal 
groupwise variances. 
 
The results have shown that the most influential predictors for sexual offences are 
young people proportion and real earnings. The coefficient of young people 
proportion is negative and highly significant in the normal OLS estimation as well as 
the spatial regressions, as still is the case in the first robust OLS estimation. The 
second robust OLS estimation has failed to provide significant coefficient. The 
negative relationship between young people proportion and sexual offences may 
entail that such crime is not very sensitive to young age from the perspectives of both 
potential offenders and victims. The incentives of committing such crimes are 
probably genetic and do not necessarily decrease as one gets older. There should be a 
clear distinction between the type of people who are naturally sexually offensive and 
others who may never accept such behaviours. This distinction is certainly not the age. 
Speaking of potential victims, females are obviously the majority, due to their 
physiological characteristics. Although one cannot deny that some sexual offenders 
are more target-specific, such as paedophiles, others are seemingly more of an 
opportunist, with the age of the victims not a determine factor.  Perhaps, timing and 
location are more critical for those offenders. 
 
Real earnings, as a typical social-economic factor, constantly exhibits negative 
correlation with sexual offences. The coefficient is significant in the normal OLS 
estimation and turns to insignificant in both robust OLS estimations. In the spatial 
analysis models, the coefficient of real earnings is negative and highly significant 
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both with and without the GHET technique being applied. The negative effect of real 
earnings on sexual offenses could be explained that given higher incomes, the 
potential victims (mainly women) would be able to spend more on self-protections, 
such as taking cabs in late night or live in a less crime-prone area, and reduce the 
probability of contacting potential criminals.    
 
The lagged detection rate and unemployment rate have insignificant coefficients in all 
estimations. Interestingly, the coefficient of unemployment rate is constantly negative. 
Considering sexual offences mainly committed outdoors, higher unemployment rate  
reduces the unavoidable movement of people on streets.  Moreover, higher 
unemployment also has inevitably financial implications for the unemployed. As less 
money is around, they might go out at night as much as they did before.  As a result, 
for opportunist sexual offenders, relatively fewer targets may be available. 
 
Negative spatial dependence has been detected by both GHET spatial error and spatial 
lag regressions. In fact, the coefficient of spatial dependence in the spatial error model 
becomes significant when introducing the GHET technique. The northern dummy has 
indeed captured some of the heteroskedastic feature according to the LR tests.  In the 
spatial lag model, the negative and significant spill-over effect of sexual offences is 
consistent with expectation. It is the “personality” or “taste” that distinguishes the 
potential criminals from others. When potential criminals relocate to neighbouring 
areas seeking for opportunities, their residential areas would be left with less people 
with sexually offensive intentions and hence less such incidents.  
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The log likelihood ratios have shown that the spatial error model with GHET 
technique has the best performance in explaining the variations in sexual offences. 
 
The table below gives the estimation results of the extended model. As usual, both 
year and area dummies are included all the time.  
Table 5-21 
Sexual offences 
Robust OLS Variables OLS 
White Jacknife 
Constant 693.97* (390.33) 
693.97 
(680.83) 
693.97 
(1145.44) 
Detection(t-1) -0.03 (0.34) 
-0.03 
(0.36) 
-0.03 
(0.51) 
Young People -89.46*** (13.92) 
-89.46* 
(51.37) 
-89.46 
(84.28) 
Unemployment -17.43 (15.06) 
-17.43 
(21.29) 
-17.43 
(29.80) 
Real Earnings -0.49* (0.25) 
-0.49 
(0.83) 
-0.49 
(1.49) 
Spatial Lag of 
Detection(t-1) 
1.31* 
(0.61) 
1.31 
(1.14) 
1.31 
(1.78) 
Spatial Lag of  
Young People 
12.10 
(32.32) 
12.10 
(51.22) 
12.10 
(80.91) 
Spatial Lag of 
Unemployment 
90.25*** 
(27.26) 
90.25 
(85.29) 
90.25 
(142.51) 
Spatial Lag of  
Real Earnings 
0.66 
(0.52) 
0.66 
(0.84) 
0.66 
(1.39) 
Log Likelihood -789.56 -789.56 -789.56 
Normality-Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Heteroskedasticity 
BP-Prob 0.0000 - - 
Observations 172 172 172 
*** represents significant at 1% level; ** represents 5% level; * represents 10% level.  
 
As robust OLS estimations are applied to control for heteroskedasticity, none of the 
independent variables have significant coefficients expect young people proportion in 
the first robust OLS estimation. As usual, including the spatial lags of independent 
variables does not alter the signs of previously included independent variables. Their 
significances, however, have been greatly reduced. While the coefficients of young 
people proportion and real earnings are constantly significant in the concentrated 
model, their significant effects on sexual offences have been eliminated in the 
extended model.   
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The spatial lags of independent variables have, once again, indicated overall 
insignificant coefficients. Their signs are consistent with expectation in most cases. 
Firstly, the spatial lag of lagged detection rate has gained positive sign in the extended 
model. This result confirms the prediction that, in short-run, sexual offences in one 
area will increase as a result of higher detection rate in neighbouring areas, because 
tougher law enforcement is expected to drive potential offenders into nearby areas. 
Secondly, the spatial lag of young people proportion has gained positive coefficient 
entailing a positive relationship between the sexual offences in one area and the 
young people proportion in neighbouring areas. On the other hand, as analysed 
previously, this type of crime is generally not sensitive to young age but should 
depend on the offender’s personality instead. Higher young people proportion does 
not necessarily denote more potential offenders who might spillover into 
neighbouring areas. Thirdly, the spatial lag of unemployment rate is positively 
correlated with sexual offences agreeing with both previously findings and the 
predicted spillovers of potential offenders. In the concentrated model, the 
unemployment rate is negatively correlated with sexual offences albeit with an 
insignificant coefficient. This is because higher unemployment rate may provide 
fewer opportunities for sexual offences given that such crimes normally happen at 
public places. In a model where potential offenders are allowed to spillover into 
neighbouring areas, higher unemployment rate in neighbouring areas could drive the 
potential offenders to spillover for better opportunities and thus increase the level of 
sexual offences in the area under study. Finally, the spatial lag of real earnings has 
also shown positive sign consisting with previous finding. The negative correlation 
between real earnings and sexual offences in the concentrated model implies that 
higher incomes could provide extra protections for potential victims in some cases. In 
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an area with higher income and less opportunities, potential offenders are likely to 
spillover into nearby areas and increase their levels of sexual offences.  
5.5.6 Violence against the Person 
The same procedure has been applied on violence against the person searching for 
less obvious relationships with social-economic factors. Estimations firstly follow the 
specification given by equation (5.16) and the results are reported in table 5-22. As 
usual, year and area dummies are included all the time to count for year-specific and 
area-specific fixed effects. Both dependent and independent variables have been taken 
logarithm before estimations because there is no 0 in the crime rate.  
Table 5-22 
Violence against the person 
Robust OLS Variables OLS 
White Jacknife 
Spatial Error Spatial Lag 
Constant 3.34 (3.60) 
3.34 
(4.63) 
3.34 
(5.74) 
3.12 
(3.04) 
3.21 
(3.08) 
Detection(t-1) -0.23* (0.12) 
-0.23* 
(0.13) 
-0.23 
(0.17) 
-0.24** 
(0.10) 
-0.23** 
(0.10) 
Young People -0.009 (0.59) 
-0.009 
(0.59) 
-0.009 
(0.76) 
0.03 
(0.50) 
-0.002 
(0.50) 
Unemployment 0.37* (0.20) 
0.37* 
(0.21) 
0.37 
(0.26) 
0.36** 
(0.17) 
0.37** 
(0.14) 
Real Earnings 0.87 (0.67) 
0.87 
(0.83) 
0.87 
(1.01) 
0.90 
(0.56) 
0.87 
(0.56) 
Lambda - - - 0.04 (0.11) - 
Spatial Lag - - - - 0.02 (0.11) 
Log Likelihood 150.74 150.74 150.74 150.82 150.75 
Normality-Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - 
Heteroskedasticity 
KB-Prob 0.005 - - 0.0000 0.0000 
Heteroskedasticity 
Spatial BP-Prob - - - 0.0000 0.0000 
Spatial Lag 
Dependence-Prob 0.34 - - 0.30 0.85 
Spatial Error 
Dependence-Prob 0.31 - - 0.69 0.30 
Observations 172 172 172 172 172 
*** represents significant at 1% level; ** represents 5% level; * represents 10% level. In OLS estimation, both 
spatial lag and spatial error dependences are diagnosed by the robust Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test which does not 
require the normality of the error terms. In SEM model, the spatial lag dependence is based on the LM test and the 
spatial error dependence is based on the LR test. In the SAR model, the spatial lag dependence is based on the LR 
test and the spatial error dependence is based on the LM test. Lambda in the first part of the table represents the 
spatial dependence coefficient of the error term in the spatial error model. Spatial lag in the first part of the table 
represents the included spatial lag of dependent variable in the spatial lag model. 
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Based on the standard OLS estimation, it seems that only the lagged detection rate 
and unemployment rate have significant effects on violence against the person. Their 
coefficients are negative and positive, respectively. As robust OLS estimations are 
introduced to correct the impact of heteroskedasticity, the first robust OLS estimation 
still generates significant coefficients for lagged detection rate and unemployment rate 
with the same sign. The second robust OLS estimation, whereas, produces overall 
insignificant coefficients for all four independent variables. In the same way, the 
results of spatial error and spatial lag models are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
before interpretation. The results of GHET spatial error and spatial lag models are 
presented in table 5-23.  
Table 5-23 
Violence against the person 
 
Variables Spatial Error 
Spatial Error 
GHET Spatial Lag 
Spatial Lag 
GHET 
Constant 3.12 (3.04) 
2.33 
(2.85) 
3.21 
(3.08) 
2.60 
(2.90) 
Detection(t-1) -0.24** (0.10) 
-0.29*** 
(0.11) 
-0.23** 
(0.10) 
-0.29*** 
(0.11) 
Young People 0.03 (0.50) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
-0.002 
(0.50) 
0.39 
(0.50) 
Unemployment 0.36** (0.17) 
0.36** 
(0.17) 
0.37** 
(0.14) 
0.36** 
(0.17) 
Real Earnings 0.90 (0.56) 
0.91* 
(0.53) 
0.87 
(0.56) 
0.86 
(0.53) 
Lambda 0.04 (0.11) 
0.05 
(0.11) - - 
Spatial Lag - - 0.02 (0.11) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
Log Likelihood 150.82 156.90 150.75 155.80 
Heteroskedasticity 
BP-Prob 0.0000 - 0.0000 - 
Heteroskedasticity 
Spatial BP-Prob 0.0000 - 0.0000 - 
Spatial Lag 
Dependence-Prob 0.30 - 0.85 - 
Spatial Error 
Dependence-Prob 0.69 - 0.30 - 
Groupwise  
Heteroskedasticity-Prob - 0.002 
- 0.001 
Observations 172 172 172 172 
*** represents significant at 1% level; ** represents 5% level; * represents 10% level. In SEM model, the spatial 
lag dependence is based on the LM test and the spatial error dependence is based on the LR test. In the SAR model, 
the spatial lag dependence is based on the LR test and the spatial error dependence is based on the LM test. 
Lambda in the first part of the table represents the spatial dependence coefficient of the error term in the spatial 
error model. Spatial lag in the first part of the table represents the included spatial lag of dependent variable in the 
spatial lag model. The groupwise heteroskedasticity is diagnosed by LR test with the null hypothesis being equal 
groupwise variances. 
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Table 5-23 shows that the northern dummy categorial variable has indeed explained 
the heteroskedasticity on some level in the results of LR tests. Such results advocate 
that, by dividing the police force areas into two groups according to the northern 
dummy, the groupwise variances of error terms are indeed unequal that is the cause 
(or at least partly the cause) of detected heteroskedasticity. By applying the GHET 
technique, the results of both spatial error and spatial lag models are now corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and more reliable to interpret.  
 
The coefficient of lagged detection rate is constantly negative and significant except 
for the second robust OLS estimation. This result proposes that lagged detection rate 
can reduce violence against the person as expected. Nevertheless, this specification 
cannot separately identify the deterrence and incapacitation effect of detection rate 
given that the lagged detection rate may reflect both. Potential offenders can estimate 
their probability of detection based on past experiences and records. Thus, higher 
lagged detection rate will deter such crimes by increasing the offenders’ expectation 
of detection rate. On the other hand, there is usually a time gap between the detection 
and conviction of real offenders. Higher lagged detection rate implies more offenders 
being detected in last period and being convicted and being currently put in prison. As 
a result, lagged detection rate may reduce violence against the person through 
incapacitation effect.  
 
The coefficient of unemployment rate is positive and significant in all estimations 
except again for the second robust OLS estimation. This result implies that higher 
unemployment rate is associated with higher violent crimes again person. Although 
this result is consistent with the expectation that higher unemployment rate could 
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increase crime level by reducing the expected legal payoff, the violent crimes are 
quite different in nature from property crimes. This is because the gain from violent 
crimes (excluding robbery) is difficult to calculate in monetary term, as they are not 
seeking for financial gains. Therefore, the positive effect of unemployment rate could 
be through less obvious channel rather than the simple monetary trade-off between 
legal and illegal activities. For example, unemployment is often associated with social 
and domestic disorders. The psychological impact of losing jobs combining with 
increased economic pressure may instigate violent conducts against persons. 
The coefficient of real earnings shows up as significant only in the GHET spatial error 
model, but has been constantly positive under all circumstances. The positive sign of 
real earnings could be explained by the fact that more than 90 percent cases of 
violence against the person belong to the sub-category of possession of weapons. If 
weapons, such as guns, are regarded as consumption, it will be not difficult to 
understand the positive correlation between income levels and weapon possessions 
and hence, the total level of violence against the person.  
 
As shown in both GHET spatial error and spatial lag estimations, no significant 
spatial dependence has been detected. This finding may be supported by the nature of 
such crime that violence against the person is quite spontaneous and the potential 
offenders are less likely to travel around looking for suitable targets. Moreover, one 
shall also acknowledge that, many cases of violence against the person are fuelled by 
inner city gang (or quasi-gang) rivalries. As these specific targets are between rival 
groups of gang, their violent activities are normally confined within one local area. By 
comparing the log likelihood ratios, the GHET spatial error model is the best one to 
explain the variations in violence against the person.  
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The results of the extended estimations are summarized in the table below. Without 
reporting the coefficients, both year and area dummies do enter all estimations. 
Table 5-24 
Violence against the person 
Robust OLS Variables OLS 
White Jacknife 
Constant 16.95** (8.40) 
16.95* 
(8.73) 
16.95 
(10.64) 
Detection(t-1) -0.20 (0.13) 
-0.20 
(0.14) 
-0.20 
(0.18) 
Young People 0.01 (0.60) 
0.01 
(0.62) 
0.01 
(0.87) 
Unemployment 0.26 (0.27) 
0.26 
(0.28) 
0.26 
(0.34) 
Real Earnings 1.16* (0.69) 
1.16 
(0.78) 
1.16 
(0.97) 
Spatial Lag of 
Detection(t-1) 
0.24 
(0.19) 
0.24 
(0.20) 
0.24 
(0.30) 
Spatial Lag of  
Young People 
-4.24*** 
(1.61) 
-4.24** 
(1.75) 
-4.24* 
(2.17) 
Spatial Lag of 
Unemployment 
0.22 
(0.42) 
0.22 
(0.52) 
0.22 
(0.65) 
Spatial Lag of  
Real Earnings 
-1.35 
(1.44) 
-1.35 
(1.48) 
-1.35 
(1.79) 
Log Likelihood 157.24 157.24 157.24 
Normality-Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Heteroskedasticity 
BP-Prob 0.01 - - 
Observations 172 172 172 
*** represents significant at 1% level; ** represents 5% level; * represents 10% level.  
 
In the extended model incorporating the spatial lags of independent variables, none of 
the predictors have obtained significant coefficients in the robust OLS estimation 
except for young people proportion. In fact, the coefficient of young people 
proportion is negative and highly significant in both robust OLS estimations. This 
result demonstrates that violence against the person is decreasing as the young people 
proportion in neighbouring areas increases. One possible explanation is that, if young 
people represent the prime targets of such crime, more young people in neighbouring 
areas create a target-rich environment. According to the spill-over theory of crime, 
such target-rich environment will attract potential criminals from neighbouring areas 
and thus leave their home areas with fewer crimes. However, this explanation is 
questionable due to the nature of violence against the person. As argued in above.  It 
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is therefore not convincible enough to explain the effect of spatial lag of young people 
proportion simply with the spillovers of potential criminals. The interpretation of this 
result deserves further analysis.  
 
The lagged detection rate and unemployment rate become insignificant in the 
extended model, whereas they are significant in the concentrated model. Given the 
largely insignificant coefficients, the predicted spill-over effects of independent 
variables are not supported in the case of violence against the person.   
5.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to test the spill-over effects of crime rates as well as a set of 
crime-influential variables. This work is motivated by the idea that, given the mobility 
of individuals, one is able to choose where to commit crime. Where exactly to commit 
crime depends on the expected returns and cost relative to other places.  
 
This chapter has developed a simple model including two regions, namely, home and 
neighbouring. By allowing individuals to choose between the two regions for criminal 
activities, it has shown that the crime in the neighbouring area as a result of criminals 
spilling over from the home area is positively correlated with the relative criminal 
opportunities in the neighbouring area and negatively correlated with the relative 
crime control in the neighbouring area. 
 
In order to test the predicted spill-over effects of both crime rates and crime-
influential variables, this chapter has specified two empirical models. Model 1 (the 
concentrated model) assumes that the crime rate in one area is only predicted by its 
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local crime-influential variables. However, the crime rate is allowed to depend on the 
crime rates of its neighbouring areas. The rationale of this model is that crime 
opportunities can be proxied to an extent by crime rates, higher crime rate in one area 
implies more fierce competition between criminals and thus potentially fewer 
opportunities for each of them. As criminals are mobile, neighbouring areas with 
lower crime rates will attract them to spillover due to the relatively better crime 
opportunities. As a result, the crime rates of neighbouring areas will increase as a 
result of the criminal spillovers. 
 
The concentrated model has been tested with panel data covering 43 police force 
areas in England and Wales over the period 1998-2001. The predicted positive spill-
over effect of crime rate has been strongly supported by the data employed. 
Particularly, in the case of burglary, theft and handling, robbery, and sexual offences, 
the crime rates have shown significant correlation with the crime rates of 
neighbouring areas. On the other hand, the crime rates of fraud and forgery and 
violence against the person do not exhibit spatial dependence between the crime rates 
of neighbouring areas. This finding is highly consistent with the varying natures 
across different types of crime. For burglary, theft and handling, robbery, and sexual 
offences, finding a suitable target at the right time and the right place is essential.   
Therefore, potential criminals will travel and choose locations for better crime 
opportunities. Fraud and forgery is not sensitive to locations because the majority of 
which are committed via the Internet. The main reason for violence against the person 
not being sensitive to location is its occurring is mostly spontaneous. In summary, as 
for the crimes where locations really matter, the predicted spill-over effect of crime 
rate has been strong supported by empirical analysis.  
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The empirical model 2 (the extended model) is designed to test the spill-over effects 
of the independent variables. In this model, the crime rate of one area is predicted by 
not only its local independent variables, but also the independent variables from 
neighbouring areas. The rationale is that the crime opportunities in one area can 
affected by its local crime control policies, labour market conditions and so on. 
Specifically, tightened-up crime control should reduce crime opportunities in one area. 
Likewise, better economic conditions, such as higher income level or lower 
unemployment rate, should provide better crime opportunities. In a model where 
criminals are mobile, neighbourhoods with more crime opportunities are supposed to 
appeal criminals from neighbouring areas, thus, affect the crime rates of neighbouring 
areas.  
 
Testing model 2 using the same data set, however, has not generated supportive 
results. In fact, the crime rate in one area is not significantly correlated with the 
independent variables of neighbouring areas in most case. Furthermore, by 
incorporating the independent variables of neighbouring areas into the model, the 
effects of local independent variables have been greatly eliminated. In most cases, the 
independent variables with significant coefficients in model 1 have displayed 
insignificant coefficients in model 2.  
 
Nonetheless, the overall insignificant results of model 2 should not be concluded that 
the crime rate in one area is not affected by the crime-influential factors in 
neighbouring areas. One possible explanation for these unsatisfactory results shown in 
model 2 may be that police force areas are still too big as proxies of neighbourhoods. 
This provides great incentives for further researches. In the future, it may be useful to 
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test the spill-over effects of crime-influential factors with more disaggregated data. 
For example, the cross-sectional or panel data based on contiguous neighbourhoods 
within a city could be a good choice.  
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
6.1 EVALUATION OF RESULTS 
 
This thesis contains (apart from the literature review) three (mainly) empirical 
chapters. The first two chapters (i.e. chapters 3 and 4) examine the relationships 
between the empirically testable counterparts of Becker and Ehrlich’s crime 
influential variables on different types of crime rates by applying it different data sets 
and using different econometric techniques. The third empirical chapter aims to test 
whether there is spatial dependence between the crime rates of neighbouring areas 
controlling for relevant explanatory variables. In this chapter, we are going to briefly 
summarise our empirical analyses in chapter 3-5 as well as our main findings. We will 
also discuss the limitations of each chapter and further research prospects.  
 
In Chapter Three, we start our empirical analyses by carrying out simple time series 
analysis. The aim of this chapter is to examine the correlations between property 
crimes and unemployment as well as law enforcement from the angle of temporal 
variations. We construct the empirical model following the theoretical frameworks in 
Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973). The crime rates being analysed are overall crime 
rate, burglary, theft and handling, and fraud and forgery. Each of these crimes is 
predicted by unemployment, detection rate and custody rate with the last two 
variables being proxies for law enforcement instruments. According to both models in 
Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), we expect both detection rate and custody rate to 
negatively affect crime rates due to their deterrence and incapacitation effects that 
they have as law enforcement instruments. The effect of unemployment on crime is 
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ambiguous to predict as argued in both Ehrlich (1973) and Cantor and Land (1985) 
and shown in a large number of empirical papers.  
 
Our time series analyses are performed by applying cointegration tests and error 
correction mechanism (ECM) on national level data covering 1971-2000. Due to the 
influence of new counting rules on crime rates introduced in 1998, we find that both 
overall crime rate and fraud and forgery are affected by this change. Therefore, in the 
analyses of these two crimes, we restrict the time period being examined to only 
include 1971-1997. Our first step leading to cointegration test is conducting unit root 
test for each variable and determining their order of integration. The results shows 
that all the variables in our analyses are integrated of order one indicating they are 
non-stationary on levels but stationary once differenced. Such results enable us to 
move on to cointegration tests between different crimes and their related variables. 
The results from cointegration tests suggest that, firstly, unemployment is positively 
cointegrated with overall crime, burglary, and theft and handling, while it is 
negatively cointegrated with fraud and forgery. These results indicate that, in the 
long-run, unemployment affects overall crime, burglary and theft through its 
motivation (i.e. by lowering employment opportunities it motivates criminal activity) 
effect. Such positive correlation could also be caused by the effect of crime on 
unemployment: higher crime rates imply more participation in illegal activities of 
offenders and probably less time spent on legal labour market; furthermore, criminals 
could have worse labour market opportunities due to either criminal records or 
deficient skills. The positive cointegration between unemployment and fraud and 
forgery seems to match one’s expectation for this type of crime. This is because 
people usually need jobs to obtain opportunities for such crimes. Secondly, custody 
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rate has negative cointegration with all the crime rates being examined, suggesting its 
deterrence and incapacitation effect as law enforcement instrument. And thirdly, the 
crime-specific detection rate is negatively correlated with overall crime rate which is 
consistent with prediction. On the other hand, detection rate has positive cointegration 
with burglary, theft and handling, and fraud and forgery. This result can be explained 
by the fact that higher crime rates require tougher crime controls.  
 
Given the obtained cointegrations, we are able to estimate a short-term dynamic ECM 
model for each crime. We find that the change in custody rate has been the strongest 
predictor for the change in each crime rate with constantly negative effect. This result 
is supportive of both theoretical prediction and previously found cointegrating 
relationships. Moreover, we also find that the change in unemployment rate is 
positively correlated with the changes in overall crime, burglary, and theft and 
handling. This result is consistent with its long-run correlation with crimes as well.  
 
As pointed in Chapter Three, one of the weaknesses of this work is the econometric 
technique we adopted for cointegration test. Our approach, Engle-Granger two step 
procedure, has the advantage of being straightforward to apply and understand. Its 
biggest limitation, however, is ignoring the possibility of multiple cointegrating 
relations when there are more than two variables in the equation. Such limitation 
could be overcome by Johansen technique. However, in the case of multiple 
cointegrating relations, such technique will induce the problem of identifying the 
“true” cointegation between the variables which is rather difficult, if not impossible, 
to do. To cope with the possibility of multiple cointegrating vectors among our 
concerned variables, we have carried out both eigenvalue and trace tests to detect the 
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number of cointegration vectors. Our results suggest only one cointegrating relation 
for each crime rate under analysed. Therefore, as a starting point of our analyses, our 
adoption of the Engle-Granger two step procedure is appropriate.  
 
The second weakness of this chapter is our rather limited data set. On the one hand, 
the relatively small sample size is a common issue for annual time series data. 
However, this fact restricts us from including a relatively complete set of explanatory 
variables into our analyses and thus expose us under the risk of omitted variable bias. 
Moreover, time series estimations are only based on temporal variations in the 
variables. However, the variables employed in our model, such as detection rate and 
unemployment, are likely to vary across areas. Neglecting area variations could 
increase the risk of generating biased and misleading results. In order to tackle this 
issue, we apply panel data analysis in our next chapter.  
 
In Chapter Four, we carry on our analyses by employing panel data disaggregated by 
43 police force areas in England and Wales over the period 1992-2005. Such data set 
not only provides much larger sample size and variations across areas in the variables, 
it also enables us to eliminate area-specific fixed effects that would be otherwise 
correlated with independent variables and thus bias our results. We further extend our 
analyses by incorporating violent crimes into the picture. Therefore, we study six 
types of crime rates in total: burglary, theft and handling, fraud and forgery, robber, 
sexual offences, and violence against the person. We formulate our empirical model 
following Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) and relate each crime rate to crime-
specific detection rate, crime-specific prison population, Gini coefficient, 
unemployment rate, real earnings, as well as the proportion of people aged 15-24. In 
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addition, we also allow crime rate to be affected by its one year lagged value to 
incorporate the persistence in crime. We adopt generalized method of moments 
(GMM) technique, in addition to OLS and fixed-effect models, to eliminate area-
specific fixed effects. Furthermore, this technique also allows us to apply instrumental 
variables for the three endogenous variables including detection rate, prison 
population, as well as the once-lagged crime rate. We choose to use all the available 
lags starting from the second lags as the instruments of the endogenous variables. As 
a unique feature, we check the robustness of coefficients not only by applying 
different regression techniques, such as OLS, fixed-effect and GMM, but also by 
applying a larger data set (though disaggregated at a somewhat coarser level for some 
variables) from 1987-2005. The differences of the two data sets have been given 
detailed description in that chapter.  
 
We summarize the main findings as follows. First, property crimes are explained 
better by the empirical model than violent crimes. Such result is not surprising 
because we construct our model by assuming that crime-influential factors affect 
crime through changing its potential cost and monetary gains. As property crimes aim 
to obtain financial benefit, they should be more responsive to the variables 
representing social-economic factors. Second, the law enforcement instruments, 
represented by detection rate and prison population, are the strongest predictors and 
show negative effects on each type of crime. This finding has confirmed the 
predictions made by both Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) that either higher 
probability of apprehension or more severe punishment will reduce crime through 
deterrence and incapacitation effects. Third, the social economic factors are 
represented by Gini coefficient, unemployment and real earnings. All three variables 
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have constantly shown opportunity effects on property crimes. Contrary to 
expectation, Gini coefficient is negatively correlated with crimes, particularly 
property crimes, in most cases. We try to explain this finding by arguing that an 
increase in Gini coefficient could reduce crimes by decreasing the number of rich 
people and thus the available crime opportunities. However, we still should be 
cautious with this interpretation because the variable of Gini coefficient is aggregated 
on national level and thus cannot reflect area variations. Such data limitation could 
affect the estimation results. Both unemployment and real earnings mainly pick up 
opportunity effects on property crimes. Given the prediction that both variables could 
have opposing effects on crime, motivation and opportunity, our results suggest that, 
during the period being examined, the opportunity effects of both variables are 
stronger than their motivation effects.  
 
The empirical model and estimation techniques adopted in our panel data analyses 
have tackled a number of potential issues such as limited sample size, area-specific 
fixed effects, endogenous law enforcement variables and so on. However, this work 
can be improved in at least two aspects. On the one hand, the variables of prison 
population and Gini coefficient are aggregated on national level due to unavailability 
and show no variation across areas. This data limitation could obstruct the analyses to 
reveal their true relationships with crime rates. Furthermore, their aggregation level 
has also made it impossible to eliminate year-specific fixed effects by applying 
dummy variables. Instead, we have to incorporate a linear time trend in the empirical 
model to control for area-invariant unobserved factors. On the other hand, this study, 
like most of other papers in this field, assumes that the crime rate in one area is only 
affected by its local factors. However, such assumption can be challenged by arguing 
  244 
that offenders are mobile and thus are able to choose where to commit crimes by 
comparing the relative opportunities between different locations. Neglecting such 
effect from an empirical model is equivalent to omitting an important explanatory 
variable from the equation of crime. We address these mentioned problems in the next 
chapter.  
 
In Chapter Five, we aim to test whether there is spatial spillover effect in crime. We 
are motivated by the fact that, if offenders are mobile and economically rational, they 
are able to choose where to commit crimes by comparing the relative crime 
opportunities and costs of different locations. Tougher law enforcement in one area 
implies higher cost of committing crimes. Other things being equal, tightened crime 
control in one area could drive its local offenders spillover into neighbouring areas for 
their relatively lower cost of committing crimes. Similarly, economically affluent area 
could attract potential offenders to spillover from neighbouring areas due to its 
relatively target-rich environment. Therefore, in this chapter, we test the hypothesis 
that the crime rate in one area depends not only on its local crime-related factors, but 
also on those factors in neighbouring areas.  
 
We firstly construct a simple theoretical model containing two regions. By assuming 
individuals are utility maximizing, we show that an offender will spillover into 
neighbouring area to commit crime if his expected return (measured by potential gain 
minus expected punishment) from committing crime in neighbouring area netting his 
travelling cost exceeds his expected return from committing crime in his home area. 
Accordingly, we predict that the number of crimes due to criminal spillovers from 
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region 1 into region 2 is affected by the relative crime opportunities and expected 
punishment between the two regions.  
 
In order to test our prediction, we formulate two empirical models. In model one, we 
allow the crime rate in one area is not only depending on its local explanatory 
variables including detection rate, unemployment rate, real earnings, and the 
proportion of young people, but also depending on the crime rates of neighbouring 
areas. This is because crime rate itself could reflect the availability of crime 
opportunities. Alternately, when the number of suitable crime targets is exogenously 
given, higher crime rate could imply more fierce competition between offenders and 
thus fewer potential opportunities. In model two, we assume that the crime rate of one 
area is affected by its local explanatory variables as well as those factors from its 
neighbouring areas.  
 
We apply panel data disaggregated by 43 police force areas in England and Wales 
covering the period 1998-2001 to estimate our empirical models. The application of 
panel data in spatial analysis is a significant advance over most other spatial analysis 
papers. Such data structure enables us to explicitly incorporate both area-specific and 
year-specific unobserved factors that could be otherwise correlated with the 
explanatory variables. Our results show that model one performs well to reflect the 
spatial dependence between crime rates. We have found positive and significant 
spatial dependence in the crime rates of neighbouring areas for burglary, theft and 
handling, fraud and forgery and sexual offences. This result supports our expectation 
that areas with high crime rates have spillover effects on neighbouring areas due to 
the migration of potential offenders. Among the explanatory variables, the strongest 
  246 
predictors for different crimes are once-lagged detection rate (using lagged detection 
rate to avoid its endogeneity with crime rates) and real earnings: while the lagged 
detection rate constantly has negative effect on crimes, real earnings always shows 
positive impact on property crimes. These results are consistent with predictions as 
well as our findings from panel data analyses. On the other hand, model 2 performs 
less well to reflect the spillover effects of explanatory variables. The crime-related 
variables from neighbouring areas broadly have insignificant coefficients. However, 
their signs are consistent with expectation in most cases.  
 
Our results from detecting spatial spillovers of crimes imply that it is meaningful to 
improve the coordination among police force areas. Simply tighten the law 
enforcement in certain areas will drive the potential offenders spilling over into 
neighbourhoods. Therefore, increasing the crime control all over the country and 
equalling the wealth distribution among areas can be effective policies to combat 
crimes.  
6.2 PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCHES 
 
Based on the results of model 2 in spatial analyses, we cannot draw the conclusion 
that crime rate in one area is not affected by the crime-influencing factors in 
neighbouring areas. Our broadly insignificant results in this model could be caused by 
the disaggregation level we adopted. Police force areas could still be too big to pick 
up the spillover effects of explanatory variables, in future research one might try more 
disaggregated spatial units such as neighbourhoods within a city.  
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Another angle for future research is motivated by our finding in panel data analysis: 
the variable of real earnings constantly has positive correlation with property crimes 
picking up its opportunity effect based on the data 1992-2005. As we apply a longer 
data 1987-2005, this variable shows negative impact on burglary and fraud, indicating 
its motivation effect. We try to explain this change by the fact that 1992-2005 is a 
period of steady economic growth. Under such circumstances, people are more likely 
to spend and provide more opportunities for property crimes, while potential 
offenders are less likely to face severe economic difficulties. Therefore, property 
crimes committed may largely be due to increased opportunities and more attractive 
targets, rather than economic desperation. Consequently, during economic growth, the 
opportunity effect of real earnings could be stronger than its motivation effects. On 
the other hand, the data 1987-2005 includes the economic recession in the early 1990s. 
During economic downturn, potential offenders are more likely to be facing financial 
problems and take committing crimes as a solution. A decrease in the earnings would 
not only reduce the opportunities for property crimes as people spend less, more 
importantly, it could turn more people into potential offenders due to their economic 
desperation. Therefore, in economic recession, the motivation effect of real earnings 
could be stronger than its opportunity effect. In the future, one could try to look at 
whether economic growth and recession change the correlations between property 
crimes and social-economic factors.  
 
These outstanding issues and shortcomings we hope will inspire further research in 
this area. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: Police force areas and local authorities  
 
Police Force Areas Areas Responsible for by County, District; and Unitary Authority 
Avon and Somerset Constabulary Avon and Somerset; Bath and Northeast Somerset, Bristol, North Somerset, South Gloucestershire 
Bedfordshire Police Bedfordshire; Luton 
Cambridgeshire Constabulary Cambridgeshire; Peterborough 
Cheshire Constabulary Cheshire; Halton, Warrington 
City of London Police ; City of London 
Cleveland Police Cleveland; Hartlepool, Middlesbrough, Redcar and Cleveland, Stockton-on-Tees 
Cumbria Constabulary Cumbria 
Derbyshire Constabulary Derbyshire; Derby 
Devon and Cornwall Constabulary Cornwall and Isles of Scilly, Devon; Plymouth, Torbay 
Dorset Police Dorset; Bournemouth, Poole 
Durham Constabulary Durham; Darlington 
Dyfed-Powys Police Carmarthenshire, Ceredigion, Pembrokeshire, Powys,  
Essex Police Essex; Southend-on-Sea, Thurrock 
Gloucestershire Constabulary Gloucestershire;  
Greater Manchester Police Greater Manchester 
Gwent Police Blaenau Gwent, Caerphilly, Monmouthshire, Newport, Torfaen  
Hampshire Constabulary Hampshire and Isle of Wight; Portsmouth, Southampton 
Hertfordshire Constabulary Hertfordshire 
Humberside Police ; East Riding of Yorkshire, Kingston upon Hull, Northeast Lincolnshire, North Lincolnshire 
Kent Police Kent; Medway 
Lancashire Constabulary Lancashire; Blackburn, Blackpool 
Leicestershire Constabulary Leicestershire; Leicester, Rutland 
Lincolnshire Police Lincolnshire 
Merseyside Police Merseyside 
Metropolitan Police Service Greater London (excluding City of London) 
Norfolk Constabulary Norfolk 
North Wales Police Conway, Denbighshire, Flintshire, Gwynedd, Isle of Anglesey, Wrexham  
North Yorkshire Police North Yorkshire; York 
Northamptonshire Police Northamptonshire 
Northumbria Police Northumberland, Tyne and Wear 
Nottinghamshire Police Nottinghamshire; Nottingham 
South Wales Police 
Bridgend, Cardiff, Merthyr Tydfil, Neath Port Talbot, 
Rhondda Cynon Taff, Swansea, The Vale of 
Glamorgan  
South Yorkshire Police South Yorkshire 
Staffordshire Police Staffordshire; Stoke-on-Trent 
Suffolk Constabulary Suffolk  
Surrey Police Surrey 
Sussex Police East Sussex, West Sussex; Brighton and Hove 
Thames Valley Police 
Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire; Bracknell Forest, 
Milton Keynes, Reading, Slough, West Berkshire, 
Windsor and Maidenhead, Wokingham 
Warwickshire Police Warwickshire 
West Mercia Police Worcestershire; Herefordshire, Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin 
West Midlands Police West Midlands 
West Yorkshire Police West Yorkshire 
Wiltshire Police Wiltshire; Swindon  
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Appendix II: Police force areas and regions in England and Wales 
 
 
 
Regions Polices Force Areas 
North East, ENGLAND Cleveland Police, Durham Constabulary, Northumbria Police 
North West, ENGLAND 
Cheshire Constabulary, Cumbria Constabulary, Greater 
Manchester Police, Lancashire Constabulary, 
Merseyside Police 
Yorkshire and the Humber, ENGLAND Humberside Police, North Yorkshire Police, South Yorkshire Police, West Yorkshire Police 
East Midlands, ENGLAND 
Derbyshire Constabulary, Leicestershire Constabulary, 
Lincolnshire Police, Northamptonshire Police, 
Nottinghamshire Police 
West Midlands, ENGLAND Staffordshire Police, Warwickshire Police, West Mercia Police, West Midlands Police 
East, ENGLAND 
Bedfordshire Police, Cambridgeshire Constabulary, 
Essex Police, Hertfordshire Constabulary, Norfolk 
Constabulary, Suffolk Constabulary 
London, ENGLAND City of London Police, Metropolitan Police Service 
South East, ENGLAND Hampshire Constabulary, Kent Police, Surrey Police, Sussex Police, Thames Valley Police 
South West, ENGLAND 
Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Devon and Cornwall 
Constabulary, Dorset Police, Gloucestershire 
Constabulary, Wiltshire Police 
WALES Pyfed-Powys Police, Gwent Police, North Wales Police, South Wales Police 
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Appendix III: Tables of statistical summaries for independent 
variables 1987-2005 
 
 
Table Ap-1 - Statistics for detection rates 1987-2005 
 Violent crimes 
 Overall crime 
Violence 
against person Sexual offences Robbery 
Mean 31 75 67 33 
Median 29 78 73 31 
Maximum 69 106 124 96 
Minimum 14 24 21 10 
Std. Dev. 9 14 21 13 
Observations 817 817 688 688 
 Property crimes 
  Burglary 
Theft and 
handling 
Fraud and 
forgery 
Mean  21 26 52 
Median  19 24 50 
Maximum  56 54 99 
Minimum  7 8 9 
Std. Dev.  9 9 18 
Observations   817 817 817 
 
 
Table Ap-2 - Statistics for prison population 1987-2005 
 Violent crimes 
 Overall crime 
Violence 
against person Sexual offences Robbery 
Mean 88 19 8 11 
Median 83 19 8 11 
Maximum 116 28 12 16 
Minimum 64 14 5 8 
Std. Dev. 18 4 2 3 
Observations 817 817 817 817 
 Property crimes 
  Burglary 
Theft and 
handling 
Fraud and 
forgery 
Mean  14 10 10 
Median  16 11 11 
Maximum  18 14 14 
Minimum  9 7 7 
Std. Dev.  3 2 2 
Observations   817 817 817 
 
 
 
 
Table Ap-3 - Statistics for the other independent variables 1987-2005 
 
Gini 
coefficient Unemployment 
Real average 
weekly earnings Young people 
Mean 38.13 5.82 141.58 12.90 
Median 38.00 5.25 137.56 12.81 
Maximum 40.40 15.01 452.06 17.41 
Minimum 36.10 1.71 27.22 8.11 
Std. Dev. 1.20 2.77 82.07 1.55 
Observations 817 817 817 817 
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Appendix IV: Distribution of overall crime rate across police force 
areas in England and Wales (2000/2001) 
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